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In response to GAO and Congressional criticism in 1989,
the Department of Defense (DoD) sought to eliminate the
Automatic Data Processing (ADP) redundancy and incompatibility
across the uniformed services and agencies. DoD was
determined to identify ADP management inefficiencies, and
develop a common data architecture for DoD administrative
information systems (IS) . Corporate Information Management
(CIM) was established as the vehicle to attack these various
problems.
The CIM implementation provides a rare opportunity to
observe the birth and development of a Department of Defense
strategic information system.
The CIM initiative was developed to correct the myriad of
IS deficiencies within the defense services and agencies.
This area of study relates directly with the Computer Systems
Management (CSM) curriculum for several reasons: (1) there is
a lack of current strategic level IS issues for students to
discuss in the classroom; (2) students can discuss the various
forces that come to play when a strategic level decision is
made in a highly parochial, complex organization. Issues such
as politics, turf fighting, inter-service bickering, and
reluctance to forced change are important because most
students have an operational background and do not often have
the opportunity to discuss these types of issues; and (3) the
CSM curriculum provides students with courses whose topics
include: data redundancy, data incompatibility, concurrency,
management inefficiencies, and economic analysis. This case
study allows the CSM student to bring all curriculum course
information to bear on possible solutions to the issues.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary research questions asked are: 1) What is CIM?
and 2) How does it address the concerns of DoD's ADP
redundancy across services and agencies, ADP management
inefficiencies, and incompatible data architectures DoD-wide?
The subsidiary research question was to identify the
forces that come into play when a strategic decision is made
in an organization which traditionally does not welcome forced
change
.
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The perspective was from the strategic level, top-down and
external in nature. We did not study any level of the CIM
organization below the functional work group. We did not
focus on the effectiveness of the CIM strategy because it is
not yet fully developed.
The research was limited due to the real-time nature of
the CIM initiative. Consequently, there is no historical
database and our data are based on our ability to obtain
articles, internal CIM documents, Congressional testimonies
and personal interviews. The dynamic environment of the CIM
office created a sometimes unreliable research interface.
D. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY
The literature review centered on problems one could
anticipate in initiating and implementing a project of this
scope. There was no previous research of CIM because of its
recent implementation at DoD. Hence, our research literature
and methodology consisted of obtaining documents, memos, and
interviews on an ad hoc basis. We relied on weekly
periodicals, Congressional testimonies and other information




A. CASE STUDY FOR RESEARCH
A case study is an empirical inquiry that, "investigates
a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context; when
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident; and multiple sources of evidence are used." [Ref.
l:p. 23]
Within the social sciences, the five commonly accepted
research strategies are experiment, survey, archival analysis,
history and case study. Experiments, history and case studies
address the "how" and "why" research questions. Experiments
control behavioral events while concentrating on contemporary
phenomena. History neither controls behavior events, nor
concentrates on contemporary phenomena. As defined above, a
case study concentrates on contemporary phenomena without
regard to behavioral events. In contrast to the history
research strategy, the major difference is that case study
researchers add their direct observation and personal
interviews to their data collection methods. [Ref. l:p. 19]
B. ADVANTAGES OF CASE STUDIES
The ability of the case study to draw from various sources
makes it effective [Ref. l:p. 20]. These sources of data
include official records, documents, artifacts, personal
interviews and observations. The case study then presents the
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data from several angles and points of view. One set of data
with a single point of view does not often represent the true
situation. With multiple sources of data a more robust and
comprehensive picture can be obtained, and the research
captures a fuller story.
An additional advantage is the use of qualitative data.
These data are in the form of words, not numbers. As an
advantage over quantitative data, qualitative data are a
"source of well-grounded, rich descriptions and explanations
of processes occurring in local contexts." [Ref. 2: p. 15]
Words often give a much richer texture to data when presented
in a descriptive manner. This stirs the reader's imagination
more than can a chart full of numbers. [Ref. 2: p. 15]
Additionally, case study research is important to the
information systems environment. "The information systems
area is characterized by constant technological change and
innovation." [Ref. 3:p. 370] Such change affects management
and organizational issues in an information systems
department. Case study research illuminates these issues with
valuable insight. [Ref. 3:p. 370]
C. DISADVANTAGES OF CASE STUDIES
The major disadvantage of using the case study for
research is the use of qualitative data. Often people rely
on numbers to make comparisons and draw conclusions, even
though some numbers have subjective and questionable origins.
One criticism of using qualitative data is that words have
5
various interpretations, whereas numerical data yields more
similar interpretations. Another reason to question the case
study is that it is difficult for researchers to reproduce a
case study and its conclusions from the same set of
qualitative data. "Observations tend to be unique and non-
replicable." [Ref. 4: p. 2] Researchers with a positivism
frame of mind are apprehensive when using a case study as a
research method. [Ref. 2: p. 16]
Uncertainty about case studies stems from incomplete
documentation. Incomplete documentation biases and influences
the data. Without standardized methods for qualitative data
analysis, poorly detailed documentation continues to be a
problem. [Ref. 2:p. 16]
Other disadvantages to case study researchers include a
necessity for time-consuming and meticulous research with
extensive documentation. Critics also feel that case study
conclusions result in no general scientific consensus or
"rules of thumb" which apply to "real life" situations.
Moreover, they are not universal to other similar
organizational studies. "Case study conclusions are
generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to
populations or universes." [Ref. l:p. 21]
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D. ADVANTAGES OF CASE STUDIES FOR TEACHING PURPOSES
According to Robyn, "there are two criteria potentially
present in any learning situation." [Ref. 5:p. 1] One is the
knowledge itself and the other is the learning process.
Knowledge is the foundation of learning. The learning process
is a methodology to making decisions and solving problems.
A student needs both knowledge and the ability to deal with
life away from the classroom. [Ref. 6: p. 1]
Case studies provide real life experiences for students to
view. The advantage of this technique is that students can
absorb the lessons of cases without having to live through
them. With the knowledge gained, the student can confront
everyday situations and experiences with greater insight and
confidence. [Ref. 7:p. 56]
Traditionally, a classroom setting presents both facts and
situations of a problem which has only one correct answer and
corresponding methodology [Ref. 5:p. 2]. Life is full of
situations with incomplete or irrelevant facts with which to
base decisions. Often there is more than one right decision
or solution, if in fact a solution exists. "Case studies are
valuable lessons in teaching students the habits of diagnosing
problems, analyzing and evaluating alternatives and
formulating workable plans of action." [Ref. 7:p. 56]
Moreover, it is important for students to understand that
politics is a factor in the decision making process. "The
decision is a political process ... involving power and
influence." [Ref. 4:p. 2] Students must learn that real life
decisions are based on mental thought and experience, not
simple step by step checklists. Case studies hone this
decision making process. Case studies provide students with
the opportunity to apply theory to situations within the
sanctuary of a classroom environment. In a sense, a case
study is a "simulated experience." [Ref. 8:p. 109] Additional
benefits include teaching students the following skills:
finding pertinent facts, analyzing alternatives, deciding
which alternatives are viable, and deciding what questions to
ask. [Ref. 5:p. 2]
E. METHODOLOGY OF THESI8
The case study series that is the subject of this thesis
concerns the chronological events of an evolving Department
of Defense strategic level initiative from its genesis in
October 1989 to the present in December 1990. The case
describes the on-going development of the Corporate
Information Management strategy in the Department of Defense.
An organizational case study is defined as:
Where you purposely observe the entire configuration of
individuals and groups in the setting of an organization,
and you observe events in the way that they naturally
unfold, without imposing any sort of experimental controls
or treatments whatsoever on what it is you're observing.
[Ref. 4:p. 1]
A case study "treats people as the observable agents
through which the unobservable forces of the organization
act." [Ref. 4:p. 9]
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The case study writers studied the recently established
Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative adopted by
the Department of Defense from a strategic perspective. In
response to GAO and Congressional criticisms, the Department
of Defense (DoD) was tasked with solving the problems of
Automatic Data Processing (ADP) redundancy across the services
and agencies, identifying and correcting ADP management
inefficiencies, and developing common data architectures for
DoD computer systems. CIM was established to correct these
various problems.
A group interview was conducted in the CIM office located
in the Pentagon. The group consisted of four senior members
of the CIM management staff. These interviews took place on
June 25, 1990. The interviewers were Professor William James
Haga and Lieutenant James P. Steele. During this day we had
the opportunity to interview the staff both, as a group, and
individually as their schedules would permit. A minor caveat
is that a few of the interviewees particularly when
interviewed in a group presented us with "party line"
responses in a couple of instances. Because the CIM
initiative is in its infancy and its long term survival
initially is questionable, the data presented by these
interviewees may be shaded towards protecting the
organization. We also interviewed a senior navy IRM official
at the Naval Postgraduate School. His comments seemed honest
and forthright. His perspective was, as expected, concerned
mainly with the effects the CIM initiative would have on navy
IRM projects. Additionally, documents and trade press
articles were obtained both locally and from the CIM office.
We attempted to set up interviews with the ASD, Donald J.
Atwood, and the General Motors executives who currently run
the GM CIM office. Also, we were not able to interview or
observe any of the functional groups. We feel that this case
could have been enhanced if even one of the aforementioned
interviews or observations had taken place.
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III. GENESIS OF CIM
A. THE DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REVIEW (DMR)
On July 15, 1985 President Reagan issued Executive Order
12526 which established the President's "Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management." David Packard was
appointed Chairman of the commission [Ref. 9:p. 1]. The
Packard Commission report of June 1986 criticized, among other
things, the complex and cluttered acquisition processes [Ref.
10:pp. 18-20]. The Commission also urged reforms of the
defense procurement system, and better management of the
Defense Department and its assets. [Ref. 11 :p. 8]
During the early months of President Bush's administration
in 1989, the Department of Defense (DoD) received sharp
criticism of its automated data processing (ADP) acquisition
and management practices. The President, in a speech to
Congress in February 1989, instructed the Secretary of Defense
to overhaul DoD acquisition and resource management practices.
[Ref. ll:p. 8]
In July 1989, the Secretary of Defense drafted the Defense
Management Review to the President which addressed the
management criticisms and implementation issues of the Packard
Commission recommendations. In the area of automated data
processing, the DoD was obliged to deal with redundancy,
consistency, concurrency and standardization in management
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information systems. The DMR identified major functional
areas of management which could use a single information
system. It also addressed DoD-wide consolidation of the
Department's more than 1000 information systems, and
streamlining the uniformed services' pay and accounting
systems. Through management changes, personnel cuts and
enhanced information systems, the March/April edition of
Defense 90 stated that DoD anticipated $2.3 billion in savings
in 1991, and $39 billion cost savings over five years. [Ref.
ll:pp. 13-15]
B. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) CRITICISMS
At the May 18, 1989 hearing of the Legislation and
National Security Subcommittee (LNSS) of the House Committee
on Government Operations, the GAO testified about six reports
that the subcommittee had requested. These reports criticized
various DoD automated information systems. [Ref. 12: pp. 3-4]
In July, 1989, Congress responded to the GAO reports which
cited mismanagement of automated data processing in DoD by
suggesting that funding would no longer be forthcoming for DoD
investments in information technology until the department
devised a unified, non-duplicative, comprehensive strategy for
its information systems (IS). [Ref. 13:p. 181]
In November, 1989 the Committee on Government Operations
presented its sixth report, entitled "DoD Automated
Information Systems Experience Runaway Costs and Years of
Schedule Delays while Providing Little Capability." This
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report stressed the importance of realizing cost savings in
DoD by improving management of automated information systems.
In Congressional testimony, the GAO severely criticized the
services 1 handling of development as well as acquisition
processes [Ref. 12:p. 4]. Originally prompted by the LNSS,
which conducted a hearing on the Navy Standard Automated
Financial System (STAFS) project on September 13, 1988, the
GAO verified development schedule delays and cost overruns in
an additional seven major automated information systems to the
Subcommittee. These systems:
Experienced significant cost growth, some in the hundreds
of millions of dollars. As of September 1988, the estimate
to develop and deploy the systems totaled about $2 billion
— almost twice the original estimate cost. Four of the
eight systems have been in development for the last 8 years
and two of the systems' development efforts were abandoned
after $237 million, completion dates have been delayed by
3 to 7 years and none of the systems are scheduled to be
fully deployed until the 1990' s. [Ref. 12: p. 2]
According to the LNSS, inaccurate ADP cost estimation was
a recurring problem which led to inadequate funding and
systems with reduced capabilities. This occurred in both the
Navy STAFS, and the Air Force Engineering Data Computer
Assisted Retrieval System (EDCARS) programs [Ref. 12:pp. 7-9].
The GAO found a 20-month schedule slippage in the Air Force
Stock Control and Distribution project. 25% of all large
scale systems were canceled before completion and less than
one percent were finished on schedule [Ref. 12: pp. 7-9]. The
GAO identified incomplete and substandard software testing in
the Navy's STAFS program, the Air Forces 's Requirements Data
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Bank (RDB) as well as its EDCARS program, and the Army's
Civilian Personnel System (ACPERS) [Ref. 12:p. 12]. Another
problem described by the GAO reports was the shortfall of DoD
technical personnel with the required skills to work on
programs in both development and acquisition processes [Ref.
12: p. 12]. The GAO also criticized the lack of credible cost
estimate data given to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
(OSD) Major Automated Information System Review Council
(MAISRC) by the services. For example, the Navy
underestimated life cycle costs of its Integrated Disbursing
and Accounting Financial Information Processing (IDAFIPS)
,
Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System
(NALCOMIS)
, and STAFS by $788 million, $488 million, and $659
million respectively. The Navy underestimated the costs of
these projects to MAISRC, which subsequently reported these
inaccurate data to Congress, which resulted in an incorrect
picture of these costs for budget negotiations. [Ref. 12: p.
15]
C. CONGRESSIONAL CRITICISMS
The House of Representatives' Armed Services Committee
charged that DoD's ADP practices were "in disarray and out of
control." [Ref. 13 :p. 181] This response was due to severe
mismanagement with annual ADP expenditures. Over three
quarters of the $9 billion spent by DoD each year on automated
data processing annually comes out of the operation and
maintenance account. When ADP programs exceed their budgets,
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they are financed by taking funds from the operation and
maintenance accounts of other DoD programs, including military
training and maintenance [Ref. 13:p. 181]. On July 1, 1989
the House Armed Services Committee recommended reducing the
DoD ADP appropriation by $165.5 million. The idea was to slow
down the flow of ADP appropriated funds until the various
services corrected their automated data processing management
and acquisition difficulties. The committee further directed
that:
• All funds used for major information systems must
be approved by MAISRC.
• Proposed that expenditures for major automated
information system must include an economic
analysis in support of the system which shall be
reviewed annually and submitted in the DoD budget
to Congress.
• Any major administrative automated information
system which is determined to be service unique
must be reported to the Armed Services Committee
prior to any initial MAISRC milestone.
• Each major automated information system project
manager must include in the annual budget
submission a current set of management indicators.
• The DoD Comptroller along with the Director of
Operation Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) were charged
with developing a quality assurance program for
major automated information systems.
• The DoD Comptroller and the Defense Acquisition
Board must report to Congress within 90 days of a
critical milestone whether to use MAISRC for
evaluation of computer systems in weapons
programs. [Ref. 13 :p. 181]
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D. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S RESPONSE
In response to GAO and Congressional criticisms outlined
in the DMR, the Secretary of Defense realized this issue
needed a solution. He directed DoD to solve the problems of
ADP redundancy across services and agencies by quickly
identifying and correcting ADP management inefficiencies, and
by developing common data architectures for computer systems
DoD-wide. Moreover, DoD had to realize ADP cost savings in
view of expected paring down of Defense spending in the post-
Cold War era.
E. CORPORATE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (CIM) ESTABLISHED
On October 4, 1989, the Deputy Secretary of Defense
established a Corporate Information Management initiative
through three actions. First an executive level group was
formed to plan and develop data standards, system
specifications and information resource strategies across DoD
components. This became known as the "CIM approach." Second,
the DoD Information Resources Management office was charged
with developing a process guide and management plan for
management information systems. And, third, technical and
business functional groups were directed to develop
information requirements of the OSD, Uniformed Services, and
Defense Agencies [Ref. 14]. The functional business and
technical areas included Civilian Payroll, Civilian Personnel,
Contract Payment, Financial Operations, Government Furnished
Material, Material Management, Medical, and Warehousing [Ref.
16
15] . These functional work groups were charged with
developing standardized and consistent data structures and
environments [Ref. 14]. During the interim period, between
what had currently existed and the eventual CIM designed
system, current policies were to remain in effect which
included life-cycle management principles as well as MAISRC
procedures. The Deputy Secretary emphasized a need to ensure
savings of the $9 billion annual information technology
expenditure. [Ref. 14]
F. DEPUTY SECRETARY AND GENERAL MOTORS
The Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) was appointed by
President Bush and took office April 24, 1989. Prior to being
brought on board to manage the DoD comptroller office, which
includes the office of information resources management (IRM)
,
he was Vice Chairman of the Board of General Motors (GM) and
President, Delco Electronics Corporation and GM Hughes
Electronics [Ref. 16]. The DSD brought with him a corporate
information management (CIM) strategy that was being
implemented by his former employer. GM was having problems
with its information systems that were similar to the DoD's
dilemmas. These included system redundancy, high-cost
systems, non- standard data architectures and interfaces and
divisional parochialism and rivalry. Due to a declining
economic market, the company needed to consolidate and
standardize their information systems in the wake of the
strong divisional differences [Ref. 17]. The company devised
17
its CIM program to bring information resources together across
divisional boundaries.
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IV. CIM GOALS AND PLANS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is designed to give the reader a better
understanding of the purpose, objectives, scope,
implementation, and methodology of the CIM initiative.
Although brief, it will prepare the reader for future chapters
and will help maintain continuity.
B. OBJECTIVES
The Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative is
a DoD program that originated under the direction of the DoD
comptroller. It has three objectives:
• To ensure the standardization, quality, and consistency
of data from DoD's multiple management information
systems
.
• To identify and implement management efficiencies in
support of business areas throughout the information
system life cycle.
• To eliminate duplication of efforts in the development
of multiple information systems designed to meet a
single functional requirement. [Ref. 15]
C. SCOPE
Besides these objectives, the CIM initiative has a range
which covers:
• DoD-wide information management
• Information management within each functional
administrative area [Ref. 15]
19
D. PURPOSE
The purpose of the initiative is to eliminate redundancy,
to identify and implement management efficiencies throughout
information system life cycles, and to develop common data
requirements and formats to eliminate redundant information
systems that support identical functions. CIM aims to ensure
the standardization, quality, and consistency of data from
DoD's multiple management information systems. Its primary
purpose was to develop standard functional requirements to
meet DoD's management information systems needs [Ref. 15].
E . IMPLEMENTATION
The CIM initiative was implemented through two groups
which were to manage different levels of strategy. The first
group was the Executive Level Group (ELG) which was charged
with developing a DoD-wide information management strategy.
It consists of six industry executives and three DoD
executives. The industry executives include university deans
and executives from the CIM office at General Motors. Each
member was nominated on the basis of their expertise in the
management of information systems. The purpose of the ELG was
to examine the critical elements of DoD CIM, evaluate current
oversight practices, and review the procedures of the
functional work groups. It provides a wide view of management
instead of focusing on individual programs. The ELG includes
a Federal Advisory Council which reports directly to the
Deputy Secretary of Defense, advising the Secretary on CIM
20
issues. The group met one or two days each month during 1990.
[Ref. 15]
The second level of CIM implementation is the eight
functional work groups which are responsible for the







• Government Furnished Material
• Material Management
• Medical
• Warehousing (Distribution Center) [Ref. 15]
Each work group is made up of senior MIS personnel from
services and defense agencies, as well as representatives from
CIM. The purpose of the Functional Groups is to study and
develop requirements from a functional point of view. The
expectation was that the CIM initiative would eventually
encompass all administrative functions in the Department of
Defense which would include many more than the original eight,
but not all these have been identified.
One of the important elements of the CIM initiative was
that all functional areas use consistent development processes
and methodologies. The product from each group was to be a
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set of standard functional requirements and system
specifications for a single management information system
functional area. The methodology for developing the
requirements design used a phased approach as explained below.
[Ref. 15]
While initial planning is within the scope of the
functional work groups, some CIM officials acknowledged that
data interfaces across functional areas would ultimately
compel a single, unified, standard data architecture
throughout all DoD administrative systems.
F. CIM METHODOLOGY
The methodology of the functional groups is specifically
directed toward meeting strategic DoD goals. It must cover
the entire planning process, from strategic level mission
statement definition to design details such as data
definitions and data modelling. Currently, no methodology
exists which will satisfy the requirements of such a
comprehensive, all encompassing project. The CIM methodology
includes: strategic planning, information engineering, data
modelling, program analysis and evaluation. There are three
phases to this methodology [Appendix A]
:
1. Functional Vision - provides a long range goal for
each working group. Each goal will include a mission and




2. Functional Business Plan - provides the functional
business requirements, actions and milestones which will
develop the vision into its future state. This is
accomplished by analyzing the current business plan to gain
a baseline reference, and then repeatedly refining the
strategy that will be used to implement the information
systems that will support the long range business functions.
3
.
Information System Strategy - this strategy involves
a plan of actions and milestones which will assess the current
information systems contribution to the ultimate vision. This
assessment will determine the transition path from the current
information systems to those which will support the standard
systems of the future vision. This phase does not include the
design and implementation of the strategy. [Ref. 18: pp. 3-4]
DOD implemented CIM by defining its objectives, scope and
purpose. But the real work started with the CIM methodology.
The product of this process is a set of standard system





This chapter will show where the CIM office exists within
the DoD. It will also describe in detail the various internal
task forces, counsels, and groups which make up the CIM
organization.
B. CIM OFFICE IN DOD
The CIM office was placed within DoD as shown in Appendix
B. On October 17, 1989, a CIM office was created under the
DoD deputy comptroller for information resource management
(DC(IRM)). She appointed a director of CIM who began by
blending the General Motors recipe for standardizing
information resources with her own ideas. [Ref. 17]
C. PURPOSE OF CIM TASK FORCE
The director of CIM was charged with heading the CIM Task
Force which had the responsibility of establishing the
functional work groups in each identified area. Other
responsibilities included:
• Formulating technical and management concepts and
strategies.
• Providing direction and coordination.
• Resolving technical and functional issues.
• Providing administrative and logistical support.
[Ref. 15]
24
D. FUNCTIONAL WORK GROUPS
For each functional area, a working group was created that
was staffed with the cream of the experts in that area from
the uniformed services and DoD agencies. The leader of each
functional work group is from the Office of the Secretary of
Defense functional policy office. The members of each
functional group are from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine
Corps, and Defense agencies. These people are experts in
functional policy, operation, user/client interface, and ADP
systems. Participation is on a full time basis for the
duration of the CIM development effort. Included in each
group is a CIM functional information manager, a professional
facilitator, along with technical and administrative support
from the CIM office. The charter for each working group is
to devise a long range vision of a unified, standardized IS
strategy for its respective functional area. The emphasis is
on unified and standardized . The strategies to be devised
must be conceived at the DoD level rather than being an
amalgam of the parochial interests of the individual services
and agencies. The planning horizon for implementation of these
DoD-level visions is ten years. The working groups have 18
months in which to complete their work (the earliest is due
in February 1991 and the latest by July 1991). [Ref. 15:p. 35]
Appendix C shows the number of people required to fully
man the eight functional groups. The names on the far left
column are the uniformed services and defense agencies which
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make up the Department of Defense. Each component was
required to send the designated number of personnel listed in
the table. The totals in the right most column indicate the
total number of people each component must "give up"
temporarily. [Ref. 15]
E. CIM FUNDING
The purpose of CIM was not only to standardize automated
data processing and develop integrated functional
requirements, but also to realize cost savings by cutting the
redundancy which plagues DoD's information systems. The
eventual systems that the CIM initiatives would implement in
place of the redundant systems should create long term cost
savings. During the interim period, while the CIM initiative
develops, DoD must screen and submit all proposed management
information systems to CIM for continuance approval and
funding. [Ref. 19 :p. 1]
DoD planned to reduce the $9 billion annual ADP budget to
fund the operations of the CIM office. Reductions included
$600,000 for FY 1990 and $265.1 million for FY 1991 for a
total of $3.5 billion through FY 1995. This estimate provides
funding for CIM as follows: FY 1990, $1.7 million; FY 1991,
$50.0 million; FY 1992, $220.0 million; FY 1993 $320.0
million; FY 1994 $323.0 million; FY 1995, $329.0 million
(Appendix D) . The funds for CIM include contract support,
travel, office space and other support for development of
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standard systems by the functional work groups and the
executive level steering group. [Ref. 19: pp. 1-3]
The idea was that the DoD could detour 2 5% of the funds
planned for development, restoration or amplification of new
or existing systems to use in converting systems to the CIM
initiatives. Additional savings were predicted to be realized
by reduced operation and maintenance costs of the new CIM
systems. [Ref. 19 :p. 2]
As CIM functional work groups developed standards and
specifications for DoD-wide management information systems,
about one third of CIM's funding would be held for the
implementation of these systems or for interim systems that
satisfy DoD requirements. [Ref. 19: p. 3]
The October 22, 1990 edition of Federal Computer Week
reported that the Senate's 1991 Defense appropriations bill
earmarked $1 billion for CIM out of the $9 billion proposed
for DoD's ADP budget for FY 1991. This provided political
support for the CIM initiative. The committee further charged
the services and Defense agencies to submit all future
information system requests or CIM-related projects through
the CIM director for both approval and funding [Ref. 20:p. 1].
Out of the deductions in the services' budgets which fund CIM,
the Army was the big loser with $500 million in reductions
while the Navy and Air Force faced $200 million each. The
House Appropriations Committee, however, did not share the
Senate's endorsement of CIM [Ref. 20:p. 49]. The House wanted
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to exercise a more conservative initial funding for CIM, and
push for other ADP programs.
By November the Congress had approved the $1 billion for
CIM but at a considerable cost to the services. They absorbed
an across the board cut of 3 percent of their respective IRM
budgets. Most of the cuts were destined for operations and
maintenance of existing ADP systems [Ref. 21:p. 1]. With a
$1 billion budget, CIM became a major force with which to
reckon.
F. CIM SHIFTS DOD AGENCIES
By December 1990, the Secretary of Defense moved CIM from
IRM to C3!. This change broadened the scope of CIM to include
all administrative information systems throughout DoD. Also,
the SECDEF streamlined the chain of command by directing the
new head of CIM to report directly to the SECDEF or his
deputy. [Ref. 22 :p. 1]
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VI. ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION SYSTEMS PLANNING
A. INTRODUCTION
An information system in any organization is a strategic
resource which requires careful planning. Elements of this
planning include: developing a vision, monitoring external
influences, ensuring management support, obtaining a quality
MIS staff, and developing a strong technological base. The
information system reflects the structure of the organization
and helps meet its business goals. The Department of Defense
is unique in that it does not seek a competitive advantage as
the foundation of its business aim, but it does have the
responsibility to use tax dollars in the most efficient and
effective manner. Yet, the DoD is a complex organization made
up of diverse entities, each of which performs similar
business functions in different manners. The goal of
Corporate Information Management (CIM) is to standardize
several business functions to reduce redundancy, and improve
overall efficiency and quality. [Ref. 23 :p. 616]
B. DEVELOPING A VISION
A vision is the direction an organization takes to reach
its goals. It is the first step in developing a strategic
plan. An organization develops a strategic information
systems plan to take advantage of new information
technologies, to gain a competitive advantage, as well as to
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support the strategic goals of the organization. The
strategic IS plan must support the organization's business
functions as well as have a defined vision of the
organization's goals and the role of the information system
in achieving those goals. However, a vision that reaches too
far into the future, and does not include internal and
external changes is unlikely to be attained. The information
systems plan allows flexibility to absorb new technical or
business opportunities. [Ref. 24: p. 263]
Through experience, managers are reluctant to grasp quick
solutions and they have difficulties dedicating themselves to
a succession of improvements in a long range information
systems plan. As Emery points out:
The remedy is to focus on the next steps rather than on the
end result. A long-term goal is necessary to point the
direction and establish a charter, but the payoff comes from
a succession of cost-effective applications along the way.
Short-term benefits make it much easier to justify the long-
term effort. In the process, organizational learning takes
place and the vision evolves. [Ref. 24 :p. 265]
Designing a flexible system is necessary not only to meet
short term milestones, but also to adapt to various changes
within the organization or to technology. Although the
initial design may address future changes in the system, many
changes occur during the subsequent development process. [Ref.
24:p. 272]
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C. STRATEGIC PLANNING INFLUENCES
Various issues affect the strategic information plan.
These issues include changing technology, personnel shortages,
limited resources, use of integrated systems and database
management systems, and the information system plan's fit with
the corporate plan.
The strategic information system plan must be sensitive to
changing technology. This requires frequent meetings between
technical staff, users, and management to achieve planning to
meet requirements and corporate goals. Also important in the
planning process is the use of integrated systems and database
design. A requirement for modern information technology
systems is an integrated data base which supports a variety
of applications.
Personnel shortages also affect the strategic information
plan because there is a present and future need for computer
analysts, programmers and development personnel. This issue
is particularly acute in the public sector where paucity of
government funds restrict salaries and private industry can
attract a significant number of personnel with the required
information technology skills. [Ref. 12]
In any business, when monetary assets are limited, the
importance of strategic information planning is paramount.
Large expenditures take place in this area of the organization
and a successful plan and subsequent implementation are
critical. Another strategic issue which the organization
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must address is how the information system fits with the
corporate plan. The information technology strategy must
integrate into the corporate plans and goals. It should not
hinder or block the corporate plan. [Ref. 23:pp. 616-618]
D. MANAGEMENT SUPPORT
When information systems occupy a strategic resource
within an organization it is imperative that top management
support it. Information system planning should be integrated
into senior management's plans and goals of the organization.
Although the strategic information plan must be flexible, the
size of the organization affects this flexibility. As Cash
et al point out, "as organizations increase in both size and
complexity and as IT applications grow larger and more
complex, increasingly formal planning processes help to ensure
the kind of broad-based dialogue essential to the development
of an integrated vision of IT." [Ref. 23 :p. 634] However,
in organizations of rapid change and personnel turnover the
organization loses its dedication to the information systems
plan. In a more stable environment there is greater




A key ingredient to any successful management information
system (MIS) is an MIS staff which is capable of incorporating
the organization's goals into a strategic information system.
One of the most important roles in designing an information
system is for the MIS staff to develop, identify and describe
elements of the system [Ref. 24:p. 275]. These elements
include:
• Hardware and system software







• Installation procedures [Ref. 24: p. 275]
F. TECHNOLOGICAL BASE
A sound technological capability is vital for the success
of an information system. First it is important to establish
a technological base, and plan for changing technology by
making periodic updates to the technological base [Ref. 24 :p.
283]. Second, when choosing a technology, MIS planners should
consider technologies which will be most valuable to the
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organization instead of attempting to grasp unproven
experimental technologies [Ref. 24:p. 285]. As Emery points
out, "it is only after a technology has been well assimilated
through one or more pilot projects that the firm should
consider a large investment in a full-scale production
version." [Ref. 24:p. 287]
6. BIG BROTHER COMPLEX
A perceived issue to lower and middle level managers is
the "Big Brother" complex. When a large organization develops
an integrated and comprehensive information system it gives
upper level management access to information that was
previously accessed by middle and lower level management.
This access by upper level management may run the risk of
developing a micromanagement or "Big Brother" corporate
atmosphere. This "gives the organization an unprecedented
degree of control." [Ref. 24: p. 267] Any problem is instantly
available to top management via the information system. This
may be a tool for management if the need for control is deemed
important. However, it could stifle the authority and
creativity of lower levels of management.
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VII. PROBLEMS WITH CIM
A. INTRODUCTION
During our research and subsequent evaluation numerous
issues and problems surfaced which may affect the final
outcome of the CIM initiative. While not necessarily unique
to IS planning, these issues are new to DoD because it had
never before been tasked to implement such a large scale and
aggressive IS strategy. These issues and problems fall into
the categories of (1) Implementation of CIM into DoD, (2) CIM
Strategic Planning and (3) ADP Transition from Status Quo to
CIM Methodology. The three categories are appropriate because
when CIM started there were problems with its implementation,
its strategic planning, its transition from the current status
of ADP in DoD to the final CIM product.
The following issues were identified as significant in the
evaluation of the CIM initiative. These issues are
comprehensive up to the date we finished our research in
December 1990. They are not exhaustive because CIM is still
evolving.
B. CIM STRATEGIC PLANNING
Compared to strategic planning in the private sector, CIM
strategic planning has several weaknesses.
Attempting to devise a visionary, long term, comprehensive
plan is possibly unrealistic considering DoD's poor track
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record in designing and implementing massive, strategic IS
projects. It has sometimes been effective, but sually has had
gaps in the thought processes that developed the IS plan.
[Ref. 17]
The functional work group efforts require a stable and
serene working environment. This conflicts with the dynamic
climate of the CIM office caused by the strong external
political influences. This dynamic environment has caused
frequent changes in policies and procedures.
Issues of integration — from strategic system integration
to data structure compatibilities — are arising that
transcend the work of the separate functional work groups.
Not only must the functional work groups integrate the needs
of the various services and agencies but also data structures
must be compatible across functional areas.
Another issue of integration and meshing of service and
agency representatives is the differences within the
functional groups. Some functional groups orient themselves
toward a standard DoD set of requirements while others tend
toward service or cultural specific domains due to the nature
of the individual service requirements.
Leadership throughout CIM is tenuous because military
officers and DoD-level political appointees have limited
tenure, sometimes as short as 18 months. A further
complication is the shortage of qualified and dedicated DoD
ADP personnel.
36
Questions are raised when the data structures are
integrated across functional boundaries and integrated into
one giant database. With all data in one database, access to
previously unavailable data would be possible. Some believe
this will lead to micro-management, and consequently to a big
brother atmosphere.
C. IMPLEMENTATION OF CIM INTO DOD
After the decision was made to use the CIM strategy, the
big question was how CIM would be implemented into the DoD
organization. The following questions and issues arose:
Is CIM a quick fix in which the services and agencies go
through the motions of committing personnel to a project
without true enthusiasm while waiting for the next federal
administration to abandon CIM and revert back to parochial
systems?
The July 9, 1990 Federal Computer Week editorial referred
to the "self perpetuation" of the CIM effort. Critics
consider this the genesis of "yet another" federal bureaucracy
regardless of whether CIM is the answer to the DoD IRM
problem. The historical Congressional answer to a problem
like this is to keep pumping money in the direction of the
problem (in this case, CIM) and it will go away. CIM
requested $200 million for FY 1991 and Congress gave them one
billion dollars! What will Congress do if CIM spends the
money and has nothing to show for it? Will Congress pump more
money or take the loss? Historically, Congress has a weak
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record for terminating projects. The only major exception was
the Army's DIVAD system (nickname; SGT York) where hundreds
of millions of dollars were spent on this divisional air
defense system before DoD decided to terminate the program.
Congress continuously pumped money into the program despite
major flaws in the system and questions concerning its ability
to meet the current air threat. Both costs and problems
mounted until finally, Congress pulled the financial plug.
In the end, $1.8 billion had been spent. [Ref. 25]
Parochialism, divided loyalties and deficient commitment
have emerged within the functional area work groups. Each
service or DoD agency wants to defend its own systems and this
makes it difficult to harness their enthusiasm toward the goal
of a standardized and integrated system [Ref. 17]. This issue
is also influenced by a time factor which shows that the
farther away is the planning horizon, the greater is the
likelihood that parochialism will be set aside in order to
work on a long range vision. Turf fighting arises when a
planning horizon is short. [Ref. 17]
Senior CIM officials stated that external political
influences are being brought to bear on the work of the
functional work teams. Congressional micro-management in
place of large budget support could influence CIM through the
Executive Level Group (ELG) . Service and agency influence on
functional group members may lead to turf fighting within
individual functional work groups. CIM officials are the
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buffer against these external influences [Ref. 17]. They have
isolated the functional work groups and are the liaison to any
outside influence.
The CIM office decided that the ADP situation within DoD
was so bad that there was no time to obtain the opinions of
end users as to what was needed. It would take too long and
most likely be inconclusive — a waste of time. A "you'll do
it our way, or else" implementation strategy was adopted.
This strategy counters all theories about implementing change
which hold that forced-change without involvement is doomed
to failure.
The CIM office is tasked with streamlining only the DoD's
non-tactical (administrative) information systems. A group
of senior IRM officers are of the opinion that only one of the
eight functional groups is truly "non-tactical." Are the
eight functional areas non-tactical?
Some question whether the DoD can implement a 10-year
visionary strategy in an organization that operates with five
year plans, that are implemented by two year tour personnel
and paid for with money that is appropriated one year at a
time? The civilian federal IRM employees are underpaid,
undertrained and just as transient as military personnel. How
can a long term strategy be successful with these constraints?
[Ref. 17]
The services in particular have long complained of IS
manpower shortages and a lack of trained, experienced
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personnel. When CIM was formed and each service and agency
had to give up their best IS people to the functional groups,
many wondered who was going to "mind the store" . The Deputy
Director for Navy IRM, (speaking specifically for the Navy but
suggesting that his analysis applied throughout DoD) granted
that the CIM concept is "right-on," makes sense, and is
needed. However, the methodology for implementing it is not
in tune with the current DoD manpower situation. He stated
that since DoD's manpower pool was already deficient, that CIM
should consider implementing one functional area first rather
than try all eight at once. His reasoning was: (1) It would
reduce the manpower drain on the services and agencies. (2)
It would allow services to maintain their current IRM systems
until it is known that CIM will work. (3) The first
functional group would be the "test group" for all groups to
follow. The first functional area implementation would either
prove or disprove the CIM concept. If it disproves the
concept, millions of dollars and man years will be saved, and
possibly another avenue to pursue would come to light. If the
concept was proven viable, then the lessons learned from
implementing one functional area will enable the others to be
implemented more effectively [Ref. 26]. The Deputy Director
of Navy IRM stressed that should the implementation of the
first functional area be successful, it should be advertised
as a precursor of what was to come. This would strengthen the
support for CIM-originated systems. His opinion was that
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support for the CIM concept existed; the idea was sound and
people admit that something needed to be done. IRM people
were shell-shocked at the scope of the effort and the time
frame in which it was to be implemented. No one appreciates
having a new system "ram-rodded" down their throats. It goes
against all computer system and management theories for
implementing new systems. [Ref. 26]
D. ADP TRANSITION FROM STATUS QUO TO CIM METHODOLOGY
As CIM becomes a force within DoD, how will it handle the
ADP transition from current systems and policies to the final
CIM product.
While CIM is focused on unification and standardization,
another office under the Deputy Comptroller for IRM is focused
on immediately reducing Defense spending by consolidating DoD
information technology resources as they exist. Their efforts
add further uncertainty to the working climate of the
functional work groups. While the work groups are trying to
standardize and unify systems, these resources are
disappearing as they discuss them. Indeed, some of the
working group members have faced RIFs of their regular jobs
initiated by the consolidation office. Ultimately, there are
two groups within DoD IRM working against each other [Ref.
17].
A senior CIM official believes the inter-service rivalry
issue has been practically nullified because of the fait
accompli approach used to start the CIM process. In a June
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25, 1990 interview, she stated that this approach swept aside
the arguments, justifications and politicking by the agencies
being forced into IS standardization. One questions whether
this was an appropriate implementation method. The approach
may have created a distrust of the CIM strategy. The forced
approach of CIM implementation may in fact feed the
interservice rivalry issue. [Ref. 17]
Questions remain about what happens when a system, such as
IDAFIPS, which has cost hundreds of millions of dollars is
scratched. Such large-scale systems were developed to replace
antiquated ADP systems. Options are to either throw these
systems out for the CIM initiative, or to have the services
struggle with 1960's and 1970' s technology during the 1990' s.
When the eight functional area IS strategies are unveiled,
they may be eight to ten years from implementation. In the
interim, three schools of thought have emerged:
The first approach is to do nothing. DoD has a pitiful
record of installing cross-service, large-scale unified
systems. WMCCS (Worldwide Military Command and Control
System) Information Management and Air Force Advanced
Logistical Support are offered as examples of failed systems.
Besides, all of the services and agencies, individually, are
just about to bring on line new information systems that will
provide the very productivity about which Congress is so
concerned. By waiting just another year or so the problem is
likely to be solved in any event. To head off the feared
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impact of CIM strategies on their own IS turf, the services
are cooperating on some systems and offering this cooperation
as evidence of their good intentions. Thereby do they hope
to head off CIM strategy and preserve the systems for which
they do not want to submit to DoD level standardization. The
services recently adopted the Air Force system for the
automated development of technical manuals. They called it
JUSTIS (Joint Unformed Services Technical Information System) .
They also called it a "CIM initiative," presenting it as an
implementation of CIM strategy (which, of course, is still in
development). The CIM office disowned the effort. [Ref. 27]
The DOD is comfortable with its present power
distribution. Services retain control over IS that fits their
unique requirements. System complexity defies simple analysis
by the CIM working groups. Unrealized, unappreciated,
unforseen interdependencies in IS systems will be over looked.
Centralized large systems will stifle innovative efforts by
decentralized small groups that are essentially in competition
for resources. There are numerous ADP systems about to come
on line. CIM will kill all of that in the name of a distant
future ideal. If the Soviets turn nasty again, we have a
proven IS support system infrastructure in place. This is not
the time to upset the whole system while we are trying to
figure if Gorbachev will last and perestroika is for real.
Bad as the DoD is alleged to be, the fact is that it is no
worse than any other organization. At decentralized
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facilities, technical and functional people work closely
together. Under a centralized approach, they are likely to
be driven apart to the detriment of their creativity and
innovativeness in the development of systems. [Ref. 27]
The disadvantage of doing nothing is that it does not work
now and DOD should do something. [Ref. 17]
The second approach is to devise interim information plans
and systems to support each functional area as it makes the
transition from the status quo to the fulfillment of the
ultimate strategic system. This interim solution could act
as a prototype of the final system. It would also provide for
the immediate needs of services and agencies instead of
waiting for the ultimate system. It would also keep
contractors interested in DoD programs so they could
participate with CIM later. It may provide for a cultural
transition to the ultimate plan. The interim also provides
the opportunity for end users to critique this system for
input to the ultimate plan. And the interim solution may
become the final system.
One disadvantage is if the interim solution is adopted it
would be an expedient solution instead of a thorough one.
However, the interim solution may be so powerful and well
accepted that there may be no chance for the final CIM
product. [Ref. 17]
The third approach is to either immediately implement the
final, visionary system or maintain the existing systems until
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the ultimate systems can be put in place. Going to an
ultimate, strategic vision will enable sound, prudent and
efficient investment of DOD IT resources. Taking the long
strategic view develops the possibility of a strategic
advantage from IS. A strategic view communicates to
industrial contractors and to our allies that we know where
we are going. This fosters a willingness on the part of
contractors to risk an investment in a stable plan. Beware
of interim systems for they will, by default and parochial
interests, be deficient but minimally acceptable systems that
will become entrenched as permanent systems. Visions of
unified, standardized DoD information resources will never be
realized if the interim systems get a foot in the door. A
strategic plan in place allows organizations to relate their
IS budget requests to Congressionally endorsed plans. A
strategic plan compels allocation of dollars in a way that
supports the plan instead of only piecemeal parts. The
implementation of a strategic vision communicates that this
organization has a measure of competence in the realm of IS.
A strategic vision allows an organization to resist transient
influences. Without a strategic plan the DoD will not get
money from Congress for IS because they communicate that they
do not know where they are going in IS. DOD managers can
contribute good ideas rather than being in the mode of
constantly and exhaustively reacting to transient events and
influences.
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However, a disadvantage is that past attempts at grand
visions have failed. We have no DoD track record of
implementing IS visions or even of formulating them. The
implementation of an ultimate vision will take a long time.
The very length of the time it will take for the working
groups to develop ultimate visions (18 months to 2 years)
means a group of experts working in isolation from their
organizations. They will be developing an ideal system while
being out of touch with new developments in their fields. The
average 18 month tenure of military officers and political
appointees means that the ultimate vision will lose steam and
support with a change in administration or the normal turnover
of leaders in the DoD system. When you try to implement a
total system across the services, the implementation of that
system will be a function of the implementation by the slowest
user. Savings from an ultimate system are far in the future;
there are no immediate, visible quick-hitter results. DoD is
an organization that prizes quick hitters. DoD is
functionally oriented in structure. It is inherently
vertical. That is the structure that supports command. It




VIII. TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This CIM case study is unique in that it gave us a rare
opportunity to observe in a real-time manner the genesis of
a DoD strategic level decision and its subsequent planning
process. We met with key personnel involved with developing
and implementing the CIM strategy. Through the case study we
attempted to capture the atmosphere and conditions that
prevailed before and during the CIM initiative.
Throughout our research we became more and more convinced
that the CIM initiative was ripe with issues of strategic
level information planning. With case methodology making a
comeback as a viable teaching tool at the Naval Postgraduate
School, and the lack of any current DoD strategic level
decision making case studies, we felt this case would help
fill the current void.
From the very beginning and still today, the basic concept
of CIM is sound: CIM promised to cut DoD ADP expenditures by
centralizing the ADP decision making process, and to
standardize ADP systems throughout the DoD. For the first
time all ADP programs filtered through one office (CIM) for
approval. The idea was to ensure no duplication of systems
and therefore realize a cost savings. CIM also promised to
standardize administrative business functions throughout the
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Department of Defense. Cost savings would be realized in many
ways. Eliminating duplicative systems will by its very nature
mean a reduction in maintenance, data entry and personnel.
For those ADP systems that are developed and approved by CIM,
the standardization that CIM requires will save money through
reduced maintenance of ADP systems, more effective training,
and more efficient use of personnel. The standardization will
result in a standard languages, data structures, data
architectures and compatible communication protocols. This
will result in a dramatic reduction in maintenance costs and
a streamlined information system. Training will be reduced
due to the elimination of redundant and incompatible systems.
Using fewer languages and centralized ADP facilities will
result in requiring fewer personnel to operate and maintain
the ADP systems.
Although the basic CIM concept makes sense and is needed,
the implementation of CIM into DoD was forced and not fully
thought out. From the beginning, the methodology to implement
CIM was a top down approach. No effort was made to gather the
opinions of lower and middle level managers as to how to
implement the CIM strategy. This 10-year visionary strategy
is contrary to accepted IS strategic planning principles which
stipulate a 3 to 5 year time frame. Planning beyond 3 to 5
years may cause lower level management to lose confidence in
the commitment to the project [Ref. 24 :p. 265]. Furthermore,
CIM came up with eight functional work areas without
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consulting the various services and agencies as to whether or
not they defined them as administrative or tactical. For
example, Marines consider logistics as a tactical function
whereas the Air Force considers logistics an administrative
function.
Additionally, CIM did not follow the basic principles of
strategic IS planning. Strategic planning relies on a stable
working environment. The functional work groups who create
the strategic information system plan contended with external
influences, competing agencies (consolidation vs.
standardization) , and moving to another agency within DoD.
This is not a stable working environment. Strategic planning
also depends on developing a technological base. This
includes developing a prototype before committing to a full
investment of resources. DoD lacks this technological base
and intends on developing all functional strategies at the
same time.
And finally, CIM is not adequately prepared for the
transition from the current ADP environment to the future CIM
way of doing business. CIM has not adequately considered the
consequences of canceling major IS projects that have been
under development for 8-10 years. Additionally, CIM will not
have a system on line for at least 10 years. This will create
a gap of 20 years or more without any new information systems
to deal with current demands.
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B . RECOMMENDATIONS
Our recommendations are based on the fact that CIM is a
viable and well funded "agency" within the DoD. To ensure the
successful implementation of the CIM initiative, we recommend
the following:
• Bring to the attention of the CIM office the
weaknesses outlined in the conclusions above.
• To ensure organizational stability, CIM should
remain in the C3I agency.
• Continue to use CIM as the authority of approval
for all major ADP systems within DoD to maintain
centralized ADP decision making.
• Chose one and only one administrative functional
area and implement it with the CIM initiative.
• Continue to fund all major ADP systems currently
under development until the success of one CIM
functional area is proven.
• If CIM is successful, compile lessons learned and
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This organization chart shows the placement of the CIM
office within the DoD heirarchy.
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Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
DoD Comptroller
Principal Deputy Comptroller




CIM FUNCTIONAL GROUP COMPOSITIONS
This table shows the composition of the CIM functional




COMPOSITION OF CIM (CORK) FUNCTIONAL CROUP
CIVILIAN DISTRIBUTION FINANCIAL CIVILIAN MEDICAL GOVERNMENT MATERIAL CONTRACT TOTAL
FAYROLL CENTERS OrERATIONS FERSONNEL SERVICES FURNISHED
MATERIALS
MANAGEMENT PAYMENTS
OSD (Fundi 3 2 4 2 1 1 1 2 16
OSD (CIM) 1 1 1 1 1 1 : 1 9
OASD 1 7 8
APMY 3 4 7 4 8 1 e 3 38
navy 3 : 8 6 7 1 5 2 34
AIP FORCE 3 3 8 6 6 1 5 3 35
MARINE 1 1 1 2 1 6
JCS 1 1
OLA 3 3 5 5 1 10 S 32
DMA 1 1
WHS 1 1 2
FACILITIES 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
ADMIN 1 2 1 1 2 1 8






SUMMARY OF SERVICE REDUCTIONS
This table is a summary of service reductions from the
DoD ADP budget which supports CIM funding.
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(TOA, Dollars in million*)





























Total -1.7 -315.0 -631.0 -931.0 -949.0 -968.0




This document is the Defense Management Report to the President
from the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Dick Cheney.
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I am pleased to submit the Report of the Defense Management Review conducted
pursuant to your direction in National Security Review 1 1 . This Report is the product
of extensive study and sets forth the plan you requested to:
-- implement fully the Packard Commission's recommendations;
- improve substantially the performance of the defense acquisition system; and
- manage more effectively the Department of Defense and our defense
resources.
With your approval, the Department is prepared to embark immediately on the
implementing actions identified in the Report. Some of these actions will require
the assistance of other executive branch agencies. The most important will require
the cooperation of the Congress. All will demand the Department's sustained





In his February 1989 address to the Joint Session of Congress, the President
announced that he was directing the Secretary of Defense to develop "a plan to
improve the defense procurement process and management of the Pentagon."
Terms of reference provided by the President called upon the Department of
Defense (DoD) to:
develop a plan to accomplish full implementation of the recommenda-
tions of the Packard Commission and to realize substantial improve-
ments . . . in defense management overall.
For these purposes, the President directed that specific actions be identified in
four broad areas—personnel and organization, defense planning, acquisition
practices and procedures, and government-industry accountability. The President
also called for recommended "actions the Congress could take which would
contribute to the more effective operation and management" of DoD.
The Defense Management Review has examined the various efforts made to date
to realize the far-reaching improvements envisioned both by the Packard
Commission in itsTReports and by Congress in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986. It has benefitted from the information provided
and views offered by senior civilian and military officials throughout DoD, as
well as the valuable insights of numerous outside organizations and experts who
have monitored the course of recent defense reforms.
While some progress unquestionably has been made since 1986, there is no basis
for complacency. On the contrary, redoubled efforts will be required in order
to realize improvement to the degree contemplated by the Packard Commission
and the Goldwater-Nichols Act. But the progress to date does give cause for
hope that the necessary consensus and commitment can be sustained in the
coming years. This will be essential if the U.S. defense effort is to be managed
in a manner that:
• ensures the continued strength and readiness of the nation's Armed Forces;
• helps us acquire needed new weapon systems at less cost, in less time, and
with greater assurance of promised performance;
• encourages industry and government alike to meet the highest standards of
integrity and performance;
• and promotes greater public confidence in our stewardship of defense
resources.
The dimension and importance of the task cannot be overstated. The course of
international affairs in the years ahead promises to test U.S. leadership in new
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and unforeseeable ways. Potential threats to the security of the U.S. and its
Allies are likely to dimmish in some areas while increasing in others, may well
take new and more subde forms, and undoubtedly will necessitate U.S. military
forces that are modern, ready, and sustainable in a variety of contingencies. At
the same time, as a result of competing national priorities, the real resources
available for defense in the early 1990s are likely to be less than in recent years.
If we are to continue to protect our global interests, meet our responsibilities,
and minimize the risks to our security, we must preserve essential military
capabilities through ever more skillfull use of the resources at our disposal.
Such circumstances compel the utmost attention to prudent management of our
defense program—and oblige the Executive branch, Congress and industry, as
seldom before, to join in husbanding available defense dollars, cutting unneces-
sary costs, and achieving new levels of productivity and quality.
Building on recent efforts, in light of experience and current circumstances, this
Report is intended to articulate an overall approach for achieving these impor-
tant objectives and to identify a series of specific management initiatives for the
President's consideration. Many of these initiatives can be undertaken on the
authority of the Secretary of Defense. Some will require concerted action by
the Administration, including other Executive departments and agencies. Still
others -- among them actions that hold the greatest promise for long-term
improvement — will require the support of Congress and the defense industry.
Together, these initiatives respond to the findings and conclusions of the
Packard Commission and to the provisions of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and
speak to their as-yet-uncompleted agenda for constructive change.
None of the additional steps recommended by the Defense Management Review
departs from the course already charted for DoD, but likewise none represents a
quick fix. The harder pan of the job remains to be done -- and the larger
improvements are yet to be realized. Nothing less than an unreserved and
long-term commitment on the part of DoD will be necessary to meet the
President's objectives. Nothing less than sustained cooperation between the
Administration and Congress, and between government and industry, will suffice
for that purpose.
II. MANAGEMENTFRAMEWORK
The overall framework adopted for decisionmaking within DoD must reflect
sound management principles if the President and Secretary of Defense are to be
well served. The management framework that follows has been guided by several
fundamental principles:
• The individual responsibilities of senior managers must be well understood.
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• Managers must be given a range of authority commensurate with their
responsibility.
• Subject to final decision by the President, the Secretary, or the Deputy
Secretary, managers' participation in the process of establishing central
policies should be encouraged.
• Approved policy, including longer-term priorities and objectives for the
defense program, must be widely and clearly communicated within DoD.
• Within this context, managers must expect to be held strictly accountable
for the overall results of their efforts, for adhering to approved policy,
and for executing decisions.
• The full talents, dedication, experience and judgment of all DoD employees
must be brought to bear in the execution of their diverse missions. Policy
must be implemented in a wide variety of settings, and the process by
which this is done must be carefully monitored in order to take full
advantage of opportunities for cost savings and quality improvement.
Innovation will come most naturally from the military and civilian profes-
sionals entrusted to do the job. They must be encouraged to examine and
improve continuously the processes in which they are engaged — and to
raise, at all levels, new ideas and approaches that will contribute to a
sound, affordable program to maintain adequate U.S. military strength.
The current broad division of responsibilities among the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS), the Unified and Specified Commands, the Military Departments, and the
Defense Agencies provides a generally sound structure within which to implement
these principles. The essential challenge is one of integrating their respective
efforts more effectively. This will depend heavily upon certain key senior
officials, some aspects of whose responsibilities bear emphasizing.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense will assist the Secretary in overall leadership of
DoD and exercise authority delegated by the Secretary on all matters in which
the Secretary is authorized to act. He will be responsible for day-to-day
management of DoD and operation of a more rigorous Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System (PPBS) designed to produce a coherent, integrated, and
efficient defense program. He will have day-to-day responsibility, with the
Secretary, for ensuring the full implementation of approved actions under the
Defense Management Review.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD/A 1 will exercise the
authority intended by the Packard Commission and provided in law. Under the
direction of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, the USD/A will be responsible
for policy, administration, oversight and supervision regarding acquisition
matters DoD-wide. In this regard, the USD/A 's authority will extend to
directing the Secretaries of the Military Departments on the manner in which
acquisition responsibilities are executed by their Departments. The USD/A will
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have the full confidence and active support of the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary as their principal staff assistant on such matters, including
implementation of numerous initiatives stemming from the Defense Management
Review. The USD/A 's role within DoD will be enhanced in certain respects,
among them the following: the USD/A will be a key participant in all phases of
the PPBS, including deliberations on major budget issues; and will administer the
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) and other Congressional reporting on
acquisition programs and issues.
The Secretaries of the Military Departments, under the Secretary's and Deputy
Secretary's direction, will be responsible for managing the affairs of their
Departments as provided in law, including front-line implementation of many of
the initiatives identified in the Management Review as well as other policy,
program and budget decisions. As key advisers to the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary, they will provide candid personal views as well as convey the institu-
tional perspective of their Departments. Collectively, they will be charged with
helping to coordinate the activities of the Military Departments in the interest
of more efficient management of the overall defense program.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD/P), among his other responsi-
bilities, will support and represent DoD, as directed by the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary, on foreign relations and arms control matters. In addition,
the USD/P will serve as the Deputy Secretary's primary advisor for the planning
phase of the PPBS, and as a key participant in programming and budgeting
decisions as well. In accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and in order to
strengthen the ties between national policy and plans, the USD/P and a select
element of his staff will assist the Secretary and Deputy Secretary in developing
guidance for, and in reviewing, operational and contingency plans for nuclear and
conventional forces.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) was vested by the Goldwa-
ter-Nichols Act with critically important responsibilities for planning, advising,
and policy formulation. In keeping with his functions as principal military advisor
to the President and the Secretary of Defense, and as spokesman for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified and Specified
Commands (CINCs), the CJCS will advise the Secretary and Deputy Secretary on
the full range of issues and participate in senior councils within DoD.
The foregoing descriptions are not exhaustive, but rather intended to highlight
important roles that the Deputy Secretary, USD/A, Secretaries of the Military
Departments, USD/P, and CJCS will play as core managers within DoD. Sound
working relationships and regular communications among these and other senior
officials are indispensable to managing DoD successfully; to ensuring that it
responds to the President's and Secretary's priorities; to assisting the Secretary




rf budget decisions; and to guaranteeing prompt and effective execution of those
{£ decisions. For these purposes, DoD will rely on several major intradepartmental
ife groups whose broad responsibilities and functions are described below.
"'-' DoD Executive Committee. Under the Secretary as chairman, the Deputy
Secretary, USD/A, Secretaries of the Military Departments, USD/P, and CJCS
will comprise the membership of a new Executive Committee. The Executive
"? Committee will meet reguiaxly and serve as the key, senior deliberative and
decisionmaking body within DoD for all major defense issues. In order to
promote the candor and confidentiality of the Executive Committee's delibera-
tions on the most important and difficult issues, the Executive Committee's
membership will be strictly limited. The DoD General Counsel will attend
meetings of the Executive Committee as a legal advisor and observer. The
participation of other DoD officials will be subject to the Secretary's approval,
on a case-by-case basis. The Executive Committee will assume continuing
responsibility for, among other things, reviewing and expediting the implementa-
tion of measures approved by the President as a result of the Defense Manage-
ment Review. The Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary will
serve as Executive Secretary of the Executive Committee.
Defense Planning and Resources Board. The Deputy Secretary will manage a
revitalized Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) as chairman of a
Defense Planning and Resources Board (DPRB). The DPRB will replace the
current Defense Resources Board. The DPRB will have the following permanent
members: CJCS, USD/A, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, USD/P,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation), and the
DoD Comptroller. As matters on the agenda of the DPRB dictate, other senior
military and civilian officials will be called upon to participate in its deliberations
-including, as appropriate, the Service Chiefs, CINCs, and representatives of
other OSD offices. Representatives of the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will
participate in the DPRB on a regular basis. The Deputy Secretary will appoint a
single individual from within his office as the Executive Secretary of the DPRB.
Through the DPRB, the Deputy Secretary will help to develop stronger links
between our national policies and the resources allocated to specific programs
and forces.
Planning Process Responding to the Packard Commission's recommendations
and the mandate of the Goldwater-Nichols Act will require substantial improve-
ments in the threshold or planning phase of the PPBS. Under the pressures of
the annual budget cycle, consideration of broad policies and development of
guidance on high-priority objectives all too often has been neglected, and
decisions made instead on a short-term, issue-by-issue basis not well-suited to
optimizing the use of available defense resources. As a result. DoD's principal
planning product, the Defense Guidance, now represents at best an early,
67.
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT
negotiated settlement on the content of the Service and Defense Agency
programs.
Redressing this situation will require a major effort by the DPRB, including
continued development of a biennial budget process consistent with the Packard
Commission's recommendations, in order to achieve better long-range planning
and greater stability in the defense program.
In the spring of the year prior to DoD's program and budget reviews, the
Secretary, on the advice of the DPRB, will issue guidance on a limited number of
planning topics to be considered and resolved. In addition, the Secretary may
wish to issue alternative planning scenarios to be considered. The DPRB, or a
select group of its members designated by the Deputy Secretary, will meet
through the spring and summer to develop recommendations on these issues for
consideration by the Secretary before August 1, and for subsequent communica-
tion to the Military Departments and Defense Agencies.
The USD/P will include these and other issues as specific planning guidance in the
restructured Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which the Secretary will formally
issue by October 1 in the year preceding the programming phase. In addition to
the planning issues provided by the Secretary and military strategy provided by
the CJCS, the DPG will contain:
• a dramatically shortened and more concise section on forces, incorporating
only a limited set of high-priority "Program Planning Objectives" that will
be mandatory guidance to the Services and Defense Agencies;
• broad identification of the projected impact of these objectives on future
funding;
• and a rough, 20-year "road map" of the modernization needs and invest-
ment plans of DoD, projecting the impact of the Program Planning
Objectives, and of additional modernization or replacement of major
systems (e.g., ship.;, aircraft, tanks and satellites) expected by the Military
Departments and Defense Agencies, against realistic levels of future
funding.
Defense Acquisition Board. The USD/A and the Vice Chairman of the JCS
(VCJCS), as chairman and vice-chairman respectively, will direct the efforts of a
streamlined Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The DAB's permanent member-
ship will be reduced, as will its committee and ad hoc working structures. The
USD/A will expedite the implementation of decisions following DAB delibera-
tions.
The DAB will rigorously oversee major systems acquisition, to ensure that the
acquisition process is managed in a manner consistent with DoD policy. That





4 program-specific exit criteria to be established by the USD/A. at each Milestone
«£. in a system's life. The paramount objective of the USD/A will be to discipline
the acquisition system through review of major programs by the DAB. This
review will be calculated to ensure that every program is ready to go into more
advanced stages of development or production prior to receiving Milestone
approval, and that the plans laid for such stages are consistent with sound
: acquisidon management.
In order to forge strong links between the DPRB and the DAB, the USD/A will
serve as a key advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary on resource
decisions affecting acquisition program baselines, including the cost, schedule and
performance of all major systems.
By August 1 , 1989, the USD/A and DoD Comptroller will submit their
recommendations to the Deputy Secretary concerning the assumption by the
DAB of responsibility for major automated data processing systems acquisition
currently exercised bv the Major Automated Information System Review Council
(MAISRC).
Joint Requirements Oversight Council. To assist the USD/A and the DAB, the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council, chaired by the VCJCS, will assume a
broader role in the threshold articulation of military needs and the validation of
performance goals and baselines for all DAB programs at their successive
Milestones. (This expanded role is more fully described below, in the Defense
Acquisition section of this Report.)
Coordinating Committees. In addition, three Assistant Secretary-level Commit-
tees will be established to improve internal coordination on arms control,
technology transfer, and conventional force readiness and related issues. The
arms control committee will be chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Policy). Representatives of the USD/P and USD/A will
serve as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the technology transfer
committee. These committees will report to the Deputy Secretary through the
USD/P. The conventional force readiness committee will be chaired by the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel), and will
report to the Deputy Secretary. In each case, committee membership will include
representatives, as appropriate, of other OSD offices, the CJCS, and the
Military Departments.
UL DEFENSE ACQUISITION
The terms of reference provided by the President for the Defense Management
Review focused principally on the defense acquisition system. Major challenges
remain to be addressed if DoD is to implement fully the Packard Commission's
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recommendations in this area, including the various organizational arrangements,
personnel improvements, and revised practices and procedures projected by the
Commission to reduce the cost and improve the performance of new weapon
systems. Efforts to date have not produced the tangible results envisioned by
the Commission. This is indicative of the dimension of the problems the
Commission identified, the far-reaching solutions it offered, and the persistence
required if DoD's management of major acquisition programs is to emulate the
characteristics of the most successful commercial and government projects.
Among these characteristics, descnbed in the Commission's reports, were:
• Clear Command Channels--the clear alignment of responsibility and author-
ity, preserved and promoted through short, unambiguous chains of
command to the most senior decisionmakers;
• Program Stability—a stable environment of funding and management,
predicated on an agreed baseline for cost, schedule, and performance;
• Limited Reporting Requirements-adherence to the principle of "manage-
ment by exception," and methods of ensuring accountability that focus on
deviations from the agreed baseline;
• Small, High Quality Staffs-reliance on small staffs of specially trained and
highly motivated personnel;
• Communications with Users-sound understanding of user needs achieved
early-on and reflecting a proper balance among cost, schedule, and perfor-
mance considerations;
• Better System Development—including aggressive use of prototyping and
testing to identify and remedy problems well before production, invest-
ment in a strong technology base that emphasizes lower-cost approaches to
building capable weapon systems, greater reliance on commercial products,
and increased use of commercial-style competition.
When considered in this framework, it is apparent that the Packard Commis-
sion's recommendations intended to make more fundamental changes in the
defense acquisition system than have yet been accomplished. Additional actions
are required-including steps that substantially depart from or go well beyond
DoD's and Congress' efforts to date.
Clear Command Channels
Positioning the USD/A as DoD's senior, full-time acquisition executive, with the
variety of important functions already described, was but one part of the
Commission's approach to acquisition management. No less central to its
conception was the establishment of clear, abbreviated lines of authority within
the Services for performance of their traditional role in managing major
programs. In each of the Military Departments, management responsibilities
were to flow through an experienced, full-time Service Acquisition Executive
(SAE), administering Service programs within policy guidance from the USD/A;
through Program Executive Officers (PEOs), as key middle managers responsible
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to the SAEs for defined and limited groups of major programs: to individual
Program Managers (PMs), vested with broad responsibility for and commensu-
rate authority over major programs, and reporting for these purposes exclu-
sively to their respective PEOs. The intent was to confine management account-
ability within this gready streamlined chain of command, which was intended to
capture all cost, schedule and performance features of all major programs.
The Military Departments have taken different approaches to implementing the
Commission's concept, and have had varying degrees of success. None has fuDy
met the Commission's purposes, and a careful review of their efforts to date
indicates a need for revising their acquisition organizations in several respects.
• Service Acquisition Executives. A single civilian official, at the Assistant
Secretary- level within each Military Department, will be designated the
SAE. The SAE will have full-time responsibility for all Service acquisition
functions. These functions will be conducted within Service Secretariats in
a manner that ensures effective civilian control, and will not be duplicated
in Service Chiefs' organizations.
• Program Executive Officers. Within each Military Department, the SAE
will manage all major acquisition programs through PEOs, each of whom
will have a small, separate staff organization and devote full-time attention
to management of assigned programs and related technical support
resources. PEOs will be relieved of other responsibilities.
• Program Managers. On all matters of program cost, schedule and perfor-
mance, PMs will report only to their respective PEO or SAE.
• Systems and Materiel Commands. Consistent with this structure, these
Service commands will be organized with a primary focus on three roles:
providing necessary logistical support; to the extent appropriate, managing
programs other than those conducted under the PEO structure; and
providing a variety of support services to PEOs and PMs, while duplicating
none of their management functions. The Secretaries of the Military
Departments and SAEs will be charged with ensuring that Service com-
mands perform these various roles in a fully accountable manner.
The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Service Chiefs will ensure
maximum accountability within the PEO structure. PEOs will be selected by the
Secretaries of the Military Departments, with the advice of SAEs who will have
primary responsibility for evaluating PEOs' job performance. Similarly, SAEs and
PEOs will advise on the selection of PMs and evaluate them. In addition, funding
and personnel authorizations for PEO offices, and those of the PMs reporting
to them, will be administered separately from Service commands.
Secretaries of the Military Departments will submit detailed plans for implement-
ing these changes for the Secretary's consideration by October 1, 1989.
7.1
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This approach promises to streamline and strengthen the management of major
systems acquisition within the Military Departments. It has important conse-
quences at several levels. It tends to fix responsibility and define authority more
clearly
,
and thus sharpen accountability. It should help relieve PMs of require-
ments for repetitive reviews by and reports to Service command layers. It will
vest PEOs with a more active management role -- one performed separately from
such commands and hence less susceptible to being defined by the bureaucratic
dynamics of those large organizations.
This approach also highlights collateral aspects of the Commission's recommen-
dations — notably those that relate to the elimination of duplicative or unneces-
sary functions and management layers and to the achievement of substantial
reductions in overall staffing. In this connection, the Packard Commission
clearly anticipated that implementation of its recommendations within the
Services would occasion a broader streamlining of headquarters and management
organizations, and more substantial personnel reductions than have yet been
accomplished. As discussed below, the Secretary of Defense will direct the
Secretaries of the Military Departments to implement this management chain of
command with these larger purposes in mind. Streamlining of substantial
magnitude is anticipated as a result of this effort by each Military Department.
Stability in Programs
The Packard Commission properly emphasized the important economies that
flow from conducting major systems acquisition in an environment of stable
funding and management. Reliable planning, funding, and system configuration,
and continuity in management personnel, gready increase the likelihood that
systems will be delivered on time and at projected cost. Reaching and adhering
to baseline agreement on factors critical to a program's success, contracting for
procurements over two or more years, and maintaining economical rates of
production—these and other techniques have been proven to yield substantial
savings over the life of a system.
The expected budget environment will make it more difficult, but altogether
more important, that DoD avail itself of these means to stretch its moderniza-
tion resources. For this reason, the Deputy Secretary and the Secretaries of the
Military Departments will ensure that the USD/A and the SAEs are more active
participants in the program and budget cycles at both DoD and Service levels.
These senior acquisition officials will serve as key advisors on resource decisions
affecting the baselines of major acquisition programs, and on alternatives that
may mitigate the impact of such actions.
To take greater advantage of potential savings through multiyear contracting
will require a change in current law, which limits eligible procurements to those
in which DoD can achieve demonstrated savings of 10 percent or more. This has
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the anomalous result of excluding from multiyear consideration major procure-
ments for which projected savings may be substantial in dollar terms even if
marginally less than 10 percent of the contract cost. The Administration should
seek to eliminate or reduce this threshold, in order to permit case-by-case
evaluation of opportunities for cost savings through multiyear procurement.
(See Appendix B to this Report.)
The Secretaries of the Military Departments and SAEs will promote continuity
in the management of major programs. They will ensure that successful PMs
enjoy a sustained tenure, ideally to direct their programs through an entire
Milestone phase or for the four-year period set by statute. They will provide
for an orderly transfer of responsibilities between PMs, and ensure that
successful PEOs enjoy tenure of comparable duration.
Limited Reporting Requirements
Numerous reviews of the acquisition system, including the Packard Commis-
sion's, have found that the system is encumbered by overly detailed, confusing,
and sometimes contradictory laws, regulations, directives, instructions, policy
memoranda, and other guidance. Little room now remains for individual
judgment and creativity of the son on which the most successful industrial
management increasingly relies to achieve higher levels of productivity and lower
costs. Much of this stifling burden is a consequence of legislative enactments,
and urgently requires attention by Congress. Much also has been administra-
tively imposed and requires prompt corrective action by DoD.
To reduce the self-imposed burden, the Secretary will charter a joint OSD-
Services task force to conduct a zero-based review of regulatory and other
guidance to DoD's systems acquisition, procurement, logistics, and related
activities, beginning first with DoD-level guidance and proceeding down through
the Military Departments and their components. The review will include both
existing guidance and that which is currently under development. The task force
will also assess the processes by which guidance is developed, issued, and
disseminated, and recommend changes to ensure that in the future such guidance
is held to the minimum required. The task force will be assembled by the
USD/A, and will complete its report to the Secretary not later than January 1,
1990. The task force effort will be governed by a strong presumption against
retention or duplication of guidance, absent a-clear and compelling need. The
burden of establishing such a need will be placed cr. the proponent of the
guidance in question. Special scrutiny will be given to guidance that imposes or
occasions unnecessary costs in the acquisition process; that inhibits the imple-
mentation of sound procurement policies such as "best value" competitive
practices and the buying of commercially-available products; that more narrowly
confines the discretion of working levels than is required by law or sound
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management control; and that imposes unnecessary reports and reviews on
program offices and contractors.
The USD/A, with the SAEs, will establish a similar task force to review existing
programs and initiatives for "advocacy" of special, single-purpose requirements
(e.g., concerning packaging, transportation, maintenance, etc.) on program
offices. The task force will be charged with developing a plan to eliminate as
many of these advocacy programs as possible.
Inherent in the concept of limited reporting and review requirements is the
principle of management by exception— i.e., intervention by senior management
only at Milestone intervals, at a PM's request, or in the event that a program
encounters substantial problems in meeting its baseline. In the 1987 Defense
Authorization Act, Congress provided authority to DoD to designate a limited
number of Defense Enterprise Programs (DEPs) to demonstrate the viability of
this approach, and as candidates for milestone authorization. DoD should take
better advantage of this special authority than it has to date. The USD/A, with
the SAEs, will carefully select several new Defense Enterprise Programs from
programs in the DAB's Concept Approval (post-Milestone I) phase, provide
strong policy direction and oversight in implementing the DEP concept, and seek
milestone authorization for such programs to enhance management stability.
Smaller, Higher Quality Staffs
Toward A More Capable Workforce
Approximately 580,000 civilian and military personnel in DoD spend all or a
substantial pan of their workday in the acquisition field-broadly defined to
include research, development, procurement, logistics, distribution, and related
maintenance activities. (See Appendix A to this Report.) Their collective efforts
form a core part of the U.S. defense program, and much depends upon how
efficiently and effectively they equip and supply our Armed Forces. As the
Packard Commission pointedly observed:
The defense acquisition workforce mingles civilian and military
expertise in numerous disciplines for management and staffing of the
world's largest procurement organization. Each year billions of
dollars are spent more or less efficiently, based on the competence
and experience of these personnel. Yet, compared to its industry
counterparts, this workforce is undertrained, underpaid, and inexperi-
enced. Whatever other changes may be made, it is vitally important to
enhance the quality of the defense acquisition workforce — both by
attracting qualified new personnel and by improving the training and
motivation of current personnel.
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While small improvements have been made in the nearly three years since the
Commission completed work, its major recommendations have yet to be
implemented. Identifying steps to accomplish the Commission's broad objec-
tives, accordingly, has been a major focus of the Defense Management Review.
4 On the civilian side -- In the Navy's China Lake personnel project, DoD has
*!•" proven the viability of a less rigid personnel management system. It also has
- demonstrated the clear advantages such a system offers to DoD employees and
managers alike, including notable improvements in working environment,
professional rewards, recruitment and retention. Although the Packard Commis-
sion strongly recommended that Congress authorize the Secretary to implement
an alternative system of this sort for all critical acquisition personnel, such
authority has not been forthcoming. During the 100th Congress, a measure
that would have expanded the China Lake initiative to include up to 100,000
DoD employees was adopted by the Senate but not the House of Representa-
tives. Expanded demonstration authority would be useful, but it is not enough.
Accordingly, the Adminisrxanon should seek to define a broader and permanent
authority for the Secretary to set civilian acquisition personnel policies DoD-
^
wide, on the understanding such authority will be exercised without increasing
'*''
overall personnel costs otherwise incurred. (See Appendix B.)
*.
^
: DoD also will seek to increase the professionalism of its procurement workforce
"£ to make its employees' capabilities and career opportunities more competitive
^
with those of their private sector counterparts. This will include actively
supporting legislation recently proposed by the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) that would allow DoD to pay for degree-related course work by civilian
.t personnel in critical procurement fields. (See Appendix B.) In addition, as the
*'-,; Packard Commission specifically recommended, the Secretary will seek prompt
action by the Administration, through OPM, on classification of DoD contract-
t ing officers as a professional personnel series, and, in the case of those con-
tracting officers who can commit DoD to more than $25,000 per contract, the
adoption of classification standards that require an appropriate combination of
relevant work experience and education.
On the military side - The sophistication and complexity of military equipment
continues to increase, as do the challenges implicit in developing, procuring and
supporting such equipment. The need for military specialists to manage the
acquisition process accordingly is now greater than ever, and will only grow
over time. As the Packard Commission observed, each of the Services has made
strides in managing its officer personnel to meet this challenge. Looking to the
future, however, it is clear none of the Services has yet gone far enough.
Current arrangements reflect a not altogether satisfactory compromise of two
valid, but directly competing interests. On the one hand, it is undeniably
desirable that those who manage the acquisition system be highly attuned,
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through personal experience in the operational world, to the needs of military
users. On the other hand, if these needs are to be met in the successful
development of major systems, it is increasingly imperative that acquisition
managers possess a range of technical skills and a breadth of experience largely
unavailable in operational assignments. It must be recognized that attainment by
a military officer of equal competence for senior field grade and higher assign-
ments in both the operational and acquisition arenas is increasingly difficult, and
for many purposes impossible. New means must therefore be found to develop
and retain the variety of necessary acquisition skills in the military, while at the
same time ensuring that development of weapon systems reflects keen regard for
operational realities.
For this purpose, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, working with the
Service Chiefs and in consultation with the CJCS, will develop and submit for
the Secretary's consideration, not later than October 1, 1989, plans for
establishment of a dedicated corps of officers in each Service who will make a
full-time career as acquisition specialists. These plans will be designed to
facilitate the development of officers expert in such distinct sub-specialties as
systems development, procurement and logistics. They will identify recom-
mended means to ensure:
• selection of highly promising officers early in their careers;
• timely specialization in acquisition, including the election of such career
paths by officers with some significant operational experience (not later
than 10-12 years);
• assignment, other than in exceptional cases, to acquisition positions and
related training once selected;
• creation of attractive and equitable career paths, including designation of
corps-eligible positions;
• and assurance of promotion potential up to the highest flag grades.
So that user perspectives are preserved in the development of weapon systems,
appropriate provision should be made for assignment of operational personnel to
important supporting roles within program offices.
As pan of these plans, the Secretaries of the Military Departments also will
submit coordinated recommendations to the Secretary concerning specialized
educational requirements and training opportunities for acquisition corps
officers throughout their careers. At a minimum, these recommendations will
address the designation of the Defense Systems Management College as an
intermediate Service school; provision for advanced management and technical
training, such as programs in universities and rotational assignments in industry;
and establishment of a senior-level Service school, comparable to the National
War College, with a specialized curriculum developed to train the most senior
acquisition managers. In this regard, such recommendations should address the
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rigor and quality of curricula, qualifications and compensation of permanent
faculty, and support for scholarly research at DoD acquisition schools, as well as
resources required for these purposes. They also should take account of the
recommendations of the recently established National Defense University
Transition Planning Committee on possible expansion of the mission of the
Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
In general - To ensure that DoD-wide training, education and career development
policies concerning civilian and military acquisition personnel are developed and
implemented effectively, the USD/A will establish within his organization a
central office for such matters. With the USD/A, the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Force Management and Personnel) will develop and administer a central
reporting system and data base on the composition and training of the acquisi-
tion workforce in the Services and other DoD components.
Toward a More Efficient Workforce
The Packard Commission concluded that implementation of its recommendations:
should allow for a substantial reduction in the total number of
personnel in the defense acquisition system, to levels that more
nearly compare with commercial acquisition counterparts. Elimi-
nating a layer of management by moving the functions and people
of that layer to some other layer clearly will not suffice.
The President directed DoD to "develop methods and rationale for reductions to
improve efficiency and realize direct and indirect cost savings."
For these purposes, the Defense Management Review examined the "turnaround"
of the largest private corporations that have realized dramatic, simultaneous
productivity improvements and cost reductions. Many such corporations faced
problems comparable to DoD's-including management structures, staffing levels,
and entrenched corporate policies and cultures that impeded decisionmaking,
frustrated innovation, obscured accountability for success and failure, and
imposed excessive overhead costs. Private sector experience in overcoming
problems of this son demonstrates the utility of several related actions:
• identifying and eliminating unnecessary functions and management layers:
• concentrating on core functions performed at appropriate organizational
levels;
• consolidating related functions where doing so will occasion greater
effectiveness or efficiency;
• lowering overall costs, particularly through sizable reductions in manage-
ment and other white collar personnel;
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• and employing a variety of innovative techniques proven to motivate
employees and suppliers and to achieve steady improvements in quality and
overall performance.
Actions such as these are far more easily undertaken by corporate than DoD
managers, who operate with differing objectives and under a variety of unique
constraints. Nonetheless, private sector experience is instructive at many levels
within the defense acquisirion system. It teaches that the achievement of
macro-efficiencies is possible over the long-term and should be a paramount
objective of all -- in the Executive branch. Congress, and industry -- who play a
role in U.S. defense efforts.
DoD and Congress have collaborated for these purposes recently in addressing
the traditionally divisive issue of DoD infrastructure. As a result of the work
of the Secretary's Commission on Base Realignment and Closure and companion
legislation enacted in 1988, DoD will be able to achieve a more efficient base
structure and greater mission effectiveness. Through strong management
oversight of the closure and realignment process, DoD will seek to realize the
full cost savings projected by the Base Closure Commission.
The Defense Management Review has identified a number of other measures that
can and should be taken to achieve greater efficiency in its acquisition and related
activities. In this context, substantial improvements must ultimately depend
upon progress achieved across a broad front—including the establishment of a
more capable acquisition workforce and of a statutory and regulatory environ-
ment that does not unnaturally limit its productivity. Nonetheless, a variety of
nearer-term actions will be undertaken.
Revision in Service acquisition organizations to implement the Packard Commis-
sion's recommendations, as outlined above, will be pan of a broader effort.
This will involve the elimination of management layers and research, development
and procurement-related functions that do not add clear value; a consolidation
of related functions where possible; an overall improvement in the efficiency of
DoD's acquisition management, logistics, distribution and related maintenance
activities; and, by these means, a reduction of at least 15 percent (or approxi-
mately $7.5 billion) in the annual cost to DoD of such related functions by not
later than Fiscal Year 1993, for an aggregate cost saving of $30 billion over the
1991-1995 Five Year Defense Plan. Such reduction will be implemented on a
phased basis, beginning with DoD's Fiscal Year 1991 budget review.
To achieve these purposes, the Deputy Secretary will chair a special task force
composed of the USD/A, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the DoD
Comptroller, and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense (Force Management and
Personnel) and (Program Analysis and Evaluation). A detailed plan incorporating
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the task force's recommendations will be submitted to the Secretary by October
1, 1989. The plan will provide for comprehensive review of management
structures within OSD, the Military Departments and Defense Agencies, and of
field and headquarters functions and operating processes, to meet the cost
reduction goal and enable DoD to perform its acquisition and related missions
with improved efficiency and effectiveness. Particular emphasis will be given to
steps that reduce recurring payroll costs to DoD, whether incurred by direct hire
or contract support. The plan will address, among other matters, the potential
for increased productivity through broader implementation of OMB Circular
A-76 (Performance of Contract Activities). It also will protect near-term
funding for labor saving devices (e.g., upgrades in automated data processing
capability) that will enhance productivity.
In addition, all DoD contract administration services (CAS), including those
currently performed in the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Military
Departments, will be consolidated under a newly-created Defense Contract
Management Agency ( DCMA), which will report to the USD/A and be charged
with more efficiently and effectively performing the CAS function. The USD/A
will assist the Deputy Secretary in preparing a plan to establish the DCMA for
the Secretary's approval by October 1, 1989. This plan will, among other
things, seek to streamline existing CAS organizations, promote uniform
interpretation of acquisition regulations, improve implementation of DoD
procurement policy, and upgrade the quality of the CAS workforce while
eliminating overhead and reducing payroll costs. The plan should make appropri-
ate provision for continued technical and other support to program offices. It
should also preserve the existing regulatory division of responsibilities between
those of administrative contracting officers, to be exercised within the DCMA.
and those of procuring contracting officers, which will continue to be exercised
within the Military Departments.
Communications With Users
Both the Packard Commission and the Goldwater-Nichols Act sought to improve
the requirements process, i.e., DoD's efforts to define military needs, their links
to national strategy and deficiencies in existing capabilities, and the characteris-
tics of specific systems to meet those needs. The Goldwater-Nichols Act staked
out an important role for the CJCS, as spokesman for the CINCs, in this
process. The Packard Commission emphasized the responsibility of the USD/A
and the VCJCS to ensure that complex systems reflect a sensible calculus of
cost, schedule and performance. Over the last several years, the VCJCS' Joint
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and the USD/A's Defense Acquisition
Board (DAB) have begun to collaborate more effectively for this purpose. This
collaboration should be strongly encouraged, and the JROC should assume a
broader role in support of DAB decisionmaking.
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-xraingly, the Secretary and the CJCS will charter the JROC to review all
"~:c:encies that may necessitate development of major systems, prior to any
'-"^deration in the DAB. Based on inputs from the CINCs. Services, and
vrvhere, the JROC will review the validity of an identified mission need (as
• •".r.nct from any potential system or program), assign a joint priority for
*~:ng the need, and forward an approved mission need statement to the DAB.
'-."T.aally, the DAB will review mission needs identified by the JROC for possible
'•;ie*tone approval. Those candidates passing through this restructured
'-:-=stone would not be considered programs in the traditional sense; instead,
'- this threshold the USD/A will authorize Concept Direction studies to evaluate
'^v.rnual alternative approaches to meeting validated, priority needs. The USD/A
"ul coordinate the funding of Concept Direction Studies, resources for which
"'•ay come from one or more of the Military Departments, a central fund
•'.ntrolled by the USD/A. or both. To address alternative approaches to
*-e:mg a variety of mission needs, more Concept Direction Studies may be
••"'iercaken than will be carried forward past Milestone I (Concept Approval),
'-nicular care will be exercised at Milestone I to ensure that Concept Approval
• ; ?iven to no more new programs than long-term resources available to DoD
"ill support. To provide for programs that do enter the post-Milestone I
Phase, a rough allocation of out-year resources for such purposes will be made
*i the DoD-wide level and, following Concept Approval by the DAB, allocated by
the DPRB to specific new programs.
nie JROC also will be chartered to play a continuing role in the validation of
Performance goals and baselines prior to DAB reviews of major programs
'including, unless otherwise directed by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary,
"pecial-access programs) at all successive Milestone intervals.
Heller System Development
''rincipal among the Packard Commission's concerns in recommending establish-
ment of the USD/A was the perceived need for more vigorous policy direction in
several related areas.
Nttearch and Development - Decisions made during the early phases of systems
'development
- including those that involve funds and schedules for prototyping
•"ind testing -- often have dramatic consequences for operational performance and
life
-cycle cost. The USD/A will be charged with developing and ensuring
"Korous application of policies that support sound decisions on major programs
ilirough Full Scale Engineering Development, In particular, these policies will
••'Uatc that the schedules and management plans for major programs:
• support the building and testing of system and critical sub-system proto-
types, the use of systems engineering, and the validation of manufacturing
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processes as early as possible and certainly well prior to the commencement
of High Rate Production;
• and provide for early test and evaluation of prototype hardware to prove
concept, performance, and suitability in realistic operational environments.
The DAB review process will be restructured and disciplined to assist the USD/A
in discharging these responsibilities. As prospective programs pass out of the
Concept Direction (post-Milestone 0) phase, the USD/A will convene a DAB
Milestone I (Concept Approval) review of requirements/costs tradeoffs, initial
affordabiliry assessments and other minimum accomplishments required by DoD
directive. DAB Milestone II (Full Scale Engineering Development) and IB
(Production) reviews will ensure that other, progressively more exacting
requirements are met. A redefined Milestone IV will replace the current Mile-
stones IV and V. The new Milestone IV review will address the need for major
upgrades or modifications to systems still in production.
In conjunction with the DoD Comptroller, the USD/A or his Principal Deputy
will exercise so-called apportionment authority with respect to funding for
programs passing through successive Milestone reviews, in order to ensure
demonstrable attainment of minimum required accomplishments established in
revised DoD directives, and the successful completion of all additional exit
criteria levied on programs as a result of previous DAB reviews. Only the
Secretary, Deputy Secretary and USD/A will have the authority to waive such
requirements and exit criteria.
In general, the USD/A will be responsible for improving the timeliness, relevance
and utility of the Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs), the Defense Acquisition
Executive Summaries (DAES), and other information on acquisition matters
available to senior DoD managers.
Constrained research and development (R&D) resources will pose special
challenges to the maintenance of a strong defense technology base. The USD/A
will be charged with coordinating R&D programs DoD-wide, to eliminate
duplication of effort and ensure that available resources are used to maximum
advantage. In this regard, the USD/A will have a broad mandate to strengthen
technology development programs of the Military Departments and the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); encourage technical competition
and technology-driven prototyping that promise increased military capabilities:
exploit the cost-reduction potential of innovative or commercially-developed
technologies; and develop procurement policies conducive to this purpose.
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Procurement Policy -- In regard to procurement policy, the Packard Commission
emphasized specific reforms in two areas:
• substantially greater reliance on commercially-available products, often
well-suited to DoD's needs and obtainable at much less cost:
• and adoption of competitive practices predicated more broadly on a mix of
cost, past performance and other considerations that determine overall
"best value" to the government.
With respect to the former, the recent Report of the Defense Science Board's
(DSB) Task Force on Commercial Components, which revisited the 1986
Summer Study conducted by the DSB in the aftermath of the Packard Commis-
sion, details a number of promising actions. These have emerged from the
DSB's sustained review of existing impediments to procurement of commer-
cially-available products, and underscore the potential for large economies
through reform of DoD's buying habits. The USD/A will be charged with
expediting the implementing administrative acrions recommended by the DSB
Task Force. The USD/A will also establish a data base to track progress
DoD-wide in expanding procurement of commercially-available products.
The DSB Task Force's work demonstrates that realizing large cost savings
through procurement of commercially-available products will also require
simplified contracting procedures. Accordingly, the Administration should make
two legislative proposals: First, the Commercial Products Acquisition Act of
1989, which would authorize procurement of such products under simplified
competitive procedures that more closely emulate those of the commercial
marketplace; and second, a Commercial Acquisition Pilot Program Act, which
would establish a pilot program to demonstrate the advantages of adopting a
full-range of commercial-style buying practices and streamlined dispute-resolution
procedures. (Sec Appendix B.)
Improving DoD's competitive practices will require two related actions. First,
existing laws governing acquisition should be clarified in order to provide DoD
broader discretion in making contract awards competitively based not only on
cost but on other considerations as well. The Administration should propose
appropriate legislation clarifying the Competition in Contracting Act for this
purpose. (See Appendix B.) Second, DoD will implement a contractor perfor-
mance review system, building DoD-wide on recent efforts of the Air Force and
DLA to expand source selection criteria to promote contracting relationships
with DoD's best-performing suppliers.
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IV. GQVERNMENT-INDUSTRV RET ATTONSHTP
Any cffon to improve the relationship between government and defense
industry must be rooted in this proposition: DoD will not tolerate illegal or
unethical behavior on the pan of anyone in the acquisition system. As a matter
of fundamental policy, DoD, with the Department of Justice (DoJ), will devote
its full energies and resources to enforcement of applicable laws.
All too obscured by the glare of recent investigations and prosecutions,
however, is a corrollary proposition emphasized by the Packard Commission:
bringing law-breakers to book for past deeds is not by itself enough; more
affirmative efforts are necessary if DoD is to acquire, and industry to supply,
equipment and materiel in a manner that meets the highest standards of account-
ability and performance. Among the specific approaches recommended by the
Commission were the following: '
• better administration of existing ethical standards for civilian and military
acquisition personnel in DoD;
• greatly improved contractor self-govemance, entailing the voluntary
assumption by industry management of demanding new responsibilities for
oversight of their contract operations;
• and more effective use of DoD auditing and other oversight resources.
The Defense Management Review took stock of progress in implementing these
and other recommendations of the Packard Commission, as well as a variety of
related initiatives to encourage improved industry performance and promote the
health of the U.S. defense industrial base. Specific actions emerging from the
Review are detailed below.
Greater Accountability in Government
The Packard Commission emphasized that:
[i]t is critical in defense management to establish and maintain
an environment where official standards of conduct are well
understood, broadly observed, and vigorously enforced.
Accordingly, it recommended that DoD mount a greater effort to administer
ethics regulations, and develop guidance and training programs tailored to the
acquisition workforce. More recently, the President, the President's Commis-
sion on Federal Ethics Law Reform, and Congress have spoken to the great need
for training and educating government employees in their ethical responsibilities.
Particularly when considered against the range of these expectations, current
DoD ethics programs appear notably deficient. For too long, such programs
have been at best a secondary concern of DoD managers and relegated instead to
lawyers and inspectors general. Consistent with the President's emphasis on
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integrity in government. DoD will commit the energy and resources required for
3 model ethics program-particularly for acquisition personnel.
The Secretary will charter a DoD Ethics Council composed of the USD/A and the
Secretaries of the Military Departments, and advised by the DoD Inspector
General and General Counsel. An Executive Director for Ethics Training and
Communications Policy will be appointed in the USD/A's office to support the
Council's efforts. The Council will be specially charged with developing ethics
programs for the acquisition workforce. It will concentrate on developing
guidance tailored for acquisition personnel, and on improving existing compliance
programs. It also will develop broader programs to enhance awareness and
understanding of ethical issues—how they arise day-to-day, how existing
standards may or may not apply, and what responsibilities DoD managers have as
moral leaders. The programs will promote an on-going dialogue on ethics issues
within DoD-from the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, who will personally
participate, to the most basic working levels. The Council will review existing
efforts in this area and recommend to the Deputy Secretary such additional
personnel and other resources as may be required, including outside expertise
necessary for designing the vigorous program intended.
In this regard, the Packard Commission noted that ethical standards are only as
easy to observe, administer, and enforce as they are certain in scope, simple in
concept, and clear in application. In the proposed Government-Wide Ethics Act
of 1989, the Administration has recommended specific changes in law to ensure,
among other things, that official standards are fair, objective, consistent with
common sense, and not unreasonably restrictive so as to discourage able persons
from entering public service. DoD strongly supports the proposed legislation,
which will establish appropriate standards for, and preserve DoD's ability to
attract and retain, personnel with the qualifications needed to manage the
acquisition system.
Greater Accountability in Industry
Within the context of vigorous law enforcement, contractor self-governance
remains the most promising additional mechanism to foster compliance with the
high standards expected of DoD's suppliers. The conduct revealed by recent
DoD-DoJ investigations, including Operation 111 Wind, is not representative.
Major elements of defense industry have made strides in answering the Packard
Commission's challenge. As with many other aspects of the Commission's
recommendations, there is no occasion here for self-congratulations. Much
remains to be done, and persistence will be required.- Nonetheless, the Defense
Industry Initiative on Business Ethics and Conduct and similar industry efforts
deserve and will receive DoD's strong support. DoD will oversee the acquisition
system in ways calculated to encourage responsible companies in such self-
governance efforts, including establishment of corporate codes of conduct. If
such codes are to be a meaningful reflection of management's priorities and
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commitment, however, it is apparent that they must be adopted by contractors
voluntarily, not mandated in procurement regulations. Like quality, ethics
cannot be inspected into an organization. Accordingly, DoD will not adopt the
rule recently proposed to mandate contractor codes of conduct.
DoD will continue its voluntary disclosure program, under which DoD contrac-
tors are encouraged to demonstrate their business integrity and honesty by
disclosing evidence of possible procurement offenses. In order to reduce the
possibility of inconsistent treatment of defense industry disclosures, the
Secretary will work with the Attorney General to adopt and publish a standard
agreement for program participation. In addition, to create clear incentives for
corporate management, voluntary disclosure of potential violations will remain a
central consideration in determination of a contractor's present responsibility to
do business with DoD and hence in application of DoD 's administrative sanctions
(i.e., suspension or debarment).
DoD also will continue to encourage industry participation in its Contractor
Risk Assessment Guide (CRAG) program. The CRAG program represents a joint
DoD-industry response to several related recommendations of the Packard
Commission, and promises more efficient use of DoD audit capabilities through
greater reliance on effective contractor systems of internal controls. In
conjunction with this program, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) has
projected broader DoD-industry communications on annual government audit
plans in order to highlight opportunities for improved contractor internal
controls. The DoD Comptroller, to whom DCAA reports, will be charged with
providing strong policy direction and oversight to DCAA for purposes of
increasing efficiency and eliminating duplication of effort through improved
strategies for the conduct, scope and frequency of its contract auditing.
Over the long term, DoD will seek to develop a procurement system that
rewards contractors for demonstrating their commitment to self-govemance and
all that that notion implies. A supplier's proven reputation for integrity is one
aspect of past performance and, as in the commercial world, the totality of such
performance merits consideration in the determination of "best value" to the
government and in selection of those suppliers with which DoD does business.
The USD/A will develop policies intended to guide source selection with these
broader purposes in view.
Better Performance by Industry
There is, of course, more to creating a healthy relationship between government
and industry than defining ethical responsibilities. There is also a need to
promote robust industrial support for the U.S. defense program, and to prompt
defense industry to greater competitiveness and to the simultaneous quality
improvements and cost reductions achieved in other industrial sectors.
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A series of major studies since the Packard Commission have documented an
alarming erosion in the U.S. defense industrial base, including:
• a decline in the overall number of defense suppliers;
• accelerating import penetration and growing dependency on foreign sources
for vital components and subassemblies;
• and decreasing returns on fixed assets, declining capital investments, and
lagging productivity in key defense sectors.
Current trends are cause for concern, and if allowed to continue will jeopardize
U.S. security. If these trends are to be reversed, the acquisition system must be
managed in ways that promote improved supplier performance and a resurgent
defense industrial base. Ultimately, only broad reform of the acquisition system,
including the legal regime and oversight practices under which it currently
operates, will attract more U.S. firms to do business with DoD. In the near
term, DoD can encourage better performance by defense contractors by:
• using contract types that reduce unnecessary financial risks;
• controlling technical configuration;
• adhering to sound policies on profitability, independent research and
development, and progress payments;
• and recognizing suppliers for consistently good performance.
DoD will take a series of actions along these lines, and seek to identify other
promising means to encourage steady improvements in industry performance.
DoD will establish contractual relations that do not create financial disincentives
to the degree of innovation and technical exploration clearly required by
contractors in the early phases of major systems development in order to
achieve proper operational performance and lower life-cycle cost. In addition to
promoting the use of multi-year procurement contracts, the USD/A will strictly
limit the use of cost-sharing contracts for systems development and the use of
fixed-price type contracts for high risk development. USD/A approval will be
required for any fixed-price type R&D contracts in excess of $25 million as well
as those for lead ships.
The USD/A will also be charged with helping to promote the long-term, efficient
producibility of systems. With the VCJCS, he will seek to expand the use of
broad performance specifications in weapons design, and ensure that specifica-
tions are "locked in" prior to High Rate Production and upgrades or modifica-
tions are made on a block, not a piecemeal basis.
As a complement to DoD's own R&D efforts, R&D by defense suppliers helps
encourage technological innovation, stimulate competition, and expand the
availability of militarily valuable products. DoD will continue to recognize costs
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incurred by suppliers for independent R&D, and bid and proposal, as necessary
costs of doing business. Through the DPRB, it will maintain appropriate levels
of funding to defray such costs and thereby promote development of promising
technologies to meet future defense needs. DoD also will review periodically the
level of progress payments on defense contracts, and maintain such payments at
levels appropriate in light of prevailing interest rates and restraints on current
DoD outlays. It also will use the tools at its disposal to motivate contractors
to improve performance (through incentive-type contracts) and productivity
(through profit guidelines that encourage capital investments). The USD/A will
be charged with monitoring these and other policies that impact the long-term
health and competitiveness of DoD's industrial base.
The USD/A also will develop a quality awards program that annually recognizes
top performers in industry that meet cost, performance, and schedule baselines
and exhibit high commitment to ethical management.
V. CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS
I
DoD, with other elements of the Executive branch, can realize significant
improvements in defense management. This Review has sought to take full
advantage of opportunities for administrative action, but also demonstrates that
these opportunities are limited. The potential for improvement can be increased
substantially if Congress adopts changes in legislation -- and can be increased
dramatically if, and only if, Congress fundamentally changes the way it addresses
defense programs and policies. The President called for DoD's views on steps of
this son to be taken by Congress to improve management practices and
procurement procedures.
Changes in Legislation. The Review has identified a variety of specific actions by
Congress that would assist in better management of the acquisition system.
These are collected in Appendix B to this Report. In addition to those treated
fully in earlier sections of the Report, one additional initiative deserves special
emphasis. The Packard Commission observed that
[ojver the years, Congress and DoD have tried to dictate man-
agement improvements in the form of ever more detailed and
extensive laws or regulations. As a result, the regime for
defense acquisition is today impossibly cumbersome . . . .Con-
gress [should) work with the Administration to recodify federal
laws governing procurement in a single, consistent, and greatly
simplified procurement statute.
Similar concerns have been reflected in the work of other major study groups
from the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel in 1970, to the Commission on Govern-
ment Procurement in 1972, to the President's Private Sector Survev on Cost
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Control in 1983. to the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1989. In
its recent report on the defense technology base. OTA concluded:
The defense acquisition system is a major contributor to the long
delays in getting new technology into the field and erects formi*
dable barriers to exploiting technology developed in the civilian
sector. While Congress did not intend the system to be slow,
cumbersome and inefficient, laws passed to foster goals other
than efficient procurement have made it so.
With the enactment of addidonal major legislation since 1986, when the Packard
Commission finished its work, there is increased urgency to addressing the body
of procurement law in its totality-in order to simplify and clarify the frame-
work under which DoD and other departments operate, and more broadly to
restore some breathing space for judgment and incentive necessary to make the
acquisition process fundamentally more effective. This will require Congress to
take the initiative, which the President should call for in urging the Congres-
sional leadership to establish select committees in both Houses to commence
work as soon as possible on a landmark recodification and streamlining of
federal law in this area. For its part, the Administration should pledge unre-
served support for such an effort, and work closely with the designated
committees in order to help them complete their work at the earliest date.
Broader Congressional Reforms. Congress plays a central role in formulating
and implementing U.S. defense policy. Much depends on the way in which it
exerts its authority, and how well or poorly it carries out its responsibilities.
The intense scrutiny recently paid to DoD organization and management has
occasioned a growing conviction that the procedures by which Congress today
does its work require careful and thorough re-examinanon, as do the various
ways in which Congress, its staff and Congressional agencies influence DoD
operations. Critics, including many in Congress and the Executive branch, have
focused on:
• the profound management problems and waste that inevitably result from
the redundant phases of budgeting, authorizing and appropriating defense
resources year by year;
• the policy gridlock implicit in the overlapping and duplicative jurisdiction
over DoD affairs enjoyed by some 30 committees, 77 subcommittees, and
4 panels;
• the tremendous disparity of interests ~ many difficult to reconcile with
prudent management — that DoD is given to serve through line items,
general provisions in authorization and appropriations bills, and report
language ; and
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• the questionable benefit to Congress, and the unquestionable cost to DoD,
of much Congressional activity. Every working day, for example, entails
on average almost 3 new General Accounting Office (GAO) audits of DoD;
an estimated 450 written inquiries and over 2,500 telephone inquiries
from Capitol Hill; and nearly 3 separate reports to Congress each averag-
ing over 1,000 man-hours in preparanon and approximately $50,000 in
cost. In addition, senior DoD officials spend upwards of 40 hours
preparing for the 6 appearances as witnesses and the 14 hours of testi-
mony that they provide on average for each day Congress is in session.
If the ambitious purposes of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Packard
Commission are ever to be fulfilled. Congress must devote serious attention to
these issues. In a bipartisan spirit, with the objective of promoting essential
collaboration between the Executive and Legislative branches, and more particu-
larly of improving Congress' performance of its vital role in providing for the
common defense, the President should urge the Congressional leadership to
charter a study of legislative processes and identify specific changes (e.g., steps
to institutionalize a biennial defense budgeting process) for consideration at the
earliest date in the 101st Congress. To support this effort, and to build on
recent work of the Packard Commission and others in this area, the Secretary
will supervise preparation of a White Paper on DoD and the Congress, for
submission to the President by October 1, 1989.
VL CONCLUSION
As wu noted at the outset, realization of the President's full objectives for
management of DoD will not be easy. It will require:
• teamwork among DoD's senior managers;
• sound longer-range planning and better means for managing available
resources;
• more discipline in what weapon systems we buy and how we buy them;
• better management of the people we rely on to produce such systems;
• an environment that promotes steady progress in cutting costs and
increasing quality and productivity;
• and adherence to the highest ethical standards.
Even actions that can be implemented on existing authority within DoD will take
time and devoted effort. Others, including those that demand Congress' and
industry's attention, will require cultivating still broader consensus and commit-
ment. Nonetheless, the American people expect that those who manage the
nation's defense effort will aim high. And they deserve nothing less than the
"quest for excellence" of which the Packard Commission spoke.
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ACQUISITIONWORKFORCE
Most narrowly defined, the acquisition workforce comprises only those who negotiate and
administer contracts for major weapon systems. Broader definitions include activities
occurring outside the contract process, such as documendng the need for a new weapon,
testing systems under development, maintaining systems in the field, and disposing of
outmoded or unneeded equipment. Service organizational structures generally group these
functions together . A still more comprehensive perspective would encompass all those who
procure the ordinary goods, such as office supplies and delivery vehicles, needed to support
any large organization within DoD.
Three general methods are available for estimating the size of this workforce:
• Surveying actual job activities;
• Counting people in specified occupations; and
• Counting entire organizations.
Experience has proven the first to be impractical; the second and third, used separately,
inevitably miss some employees with significant procurement duties. A combination of
occupational and organizational counts, while perhaps marginally overstating the total
workforce, is necessary to take into account all personnel involved in these procurement
duties.
Applying this method against a "cradle to grave" concept of acquisition is consistent with the
charter of the USD/A, which assigns authority for the "system whereby all equipment,
facilities, and services are planned, designed, developed, acquired, maintained, and disposed of
within the Department of Defense." This method encompasses 1 1 Service commands and one
Defense Agency, as well as those who work outside these organizations in 9 civilian occupa-
tions and 38 military officer specialties. It adds four commands to a list developed by the
General Accounting Office in an earlier study of defense acquisition. This method also adopts
the same job categories used by the Packard Commission in estimating the size of the





1. Army Information Systems Command
2. Army Materiel Command**
3. Office of Naval Research
4. Naval Facilities Engineering Command
5. Naval Air Systems Command**
6. Naval Supply Systems Command**
7. Naval Sea Systems Command**
8. Naval Space and Warfare Systems Command**
9. Air Force Logistics Command**
10. Air Force Systems Command**
1 1
.
Air Force Communications Command
12. Defense Logistics Agency**
OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
Acquisitions Occupations**** 18,645
Acquisitions Specialties**** -- 2,828***
TOTAL 551,764 30,367
GRAND TOTAL 582,131
* As of December 31, 1988. This does not include subsequent programmed reductions.
** Listed by General Accounting Office as "buying commands."
*** Estimated.

















1 . Stability In Funding Programs: Eliminate the current requirement that a proposed
multiyear contract achieve a specific percentage savings before the contract may be entered
into.
The FY 1989 Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. 100-456, 102 Stat. 1928 (Sept. 29,
1988)) currently limits the number of programs that can qualify for multiyear procure-
ment savings because they fail to meet the minimum savings threshold. This threshold
should be eliminated or, at a minimum, reduced. This can be done at no expense to
Congressional oversight of the procurement process because DoD would still have to
justify a multiyear procurement in terms of cost savings and other benefits before
Congress authorizes and funds the program. In addition, a multiyear procurement would
have to satisfy the statutory criteria concerning benefit to the government, stability of
requirements, stability of funding, stability of configuration, confidence in cost estimates,
and confidence in the contractor's ability to perform. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2306(h). The
proposed amendment would simply permit DoD and Congress to evaluate each multiyear
procurement candidate program on its own merits.
2. Alternative Personnel System: Authorize the Secretary of Defense to establish a personnel
and pay system for civilian acquisition employees.
The proposed legislation—modelled after the China Lake project-would authorize the
Secretary to design employment, compensation, performance, management, training, and
benefits programs to enhance the Department's competitive position in the labor market
for acquisition personnel. Designed in conjunction with the Office of Management and
Budget and the Office of Personnel Management, the personnel system (including senior
acquisition personnel, contracting officers, scientists and engineers) would be phased in
over a number of years and introduced in discrete stages at the different organizations and
for different occupations involved in the acquisition process. The approach would include
consideration of, among other things, using the concept of pay banding; paying differen-
tials to supervisors and managers; paying performance/retention bonuses; establishing a
system of direct examination and hiring; and designating a certain number of positions in
specific research and development laboratories or technology centers requiring extraordi-
nary qualifications. The cost of the alternative personnel system would be limited to the




3. Pay-for-Degree Legislations: Amend current law (5 U.S.C. 4107(c)) to permit expanded
opportunities for the education and training of civilian acquisition personnel.
Under current law, DoD is barred from paying for training the sole purpose of which is to
permit an employee to obtain an academic degree. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 4107(c). The current bar
to degree training can be a disadvantage to the DoD in competing in the marketplace for
employees with skills critical to its acquisition functions.
On March 20, 1989, the Administration submitted a legislative proposal "To amend title
5, United States Code, to allow degree training for Federal employees in critical skiUs
occupations, and for other purposes." See Letter from Constance Horner (Director,
Office of Personnel Management) to the Hon. James C. Wright, Jr. (Mar. 20, 1989). This
authority would be an important factor in improving the quality of the DoD's acquisition
workforce and should be enacted expeditiously.
4. Greater Use of Commercially-Available Products.
a. Authorize Simplified Competitive Procedures --
The Administration should submit the proposed "Commercial Products Acquisition Act of
1989." This proposed legislation would authorize the use of commercial-style, competi-
tive procedures for the acquisition of commercial products. The proposed legislation
would provide acquisition officials with the flexibility they need to emulate their
commercial counterparts and capitalize on the efficiencies possible when buying products
off existing production lines. The proposal is designed to provide acquisition officials
with an efficient means for conducting market research and identifying the products
constituting the best values. In addition to shortening acquisition leadtimes and increasing
competition, the proposal will enhance DoD's ability to acquire high-value commercial
products incorporating the most up-to-date technology. The proposal would also exempt
commercial product acquisitions from the unique requirements that ordinarily apply and
impose source preferences, special contract provisions, and performance requirements when
the Government is the purchaser.
b. Establish a Pilot Program to Evaluate DoD's Use of the Full-Range of Commercial-Style
Practices-
The Administration should also submit a "Commercial Acquisition Pilot Program Act." In
- addition to the improvements provided by the proposed "Commercial Products Acquisition
Act of 1989," this Pilot Program would require certain DoD components to use the full
range of commercial contracting terms and conditions when buying commercial products;
exempt the acquisition of commercial products from the numerous statutory requirements
93
REPORTTOTHEPRESIDENT
that otherwise govern government contracts; and dramatically streamline dispute
resolution procedures. The Pilot Program would last for two years and would be
periodically reviewed by DoD and Congress to evaluate its impact.
5. Best Buy Practices: Clarify the Competition In Contracting Act (10 U.S.C. Sec
2305(b)(4)(A) (ii)) to permit a contract to be awarded without discussions, on a basis
other than price alone, when the award would be in the best interests of the Government.
The Comptroller General has held that, under the current statute (10 U.S.C.
2305(b)(4)(A)(ii)), when a decision is made by a contracting officer to award a contract
without holding discussions with competing contractors, price must be the sole basis for
making the award. See Mariah Assoc., Inc. B-231710 (Unpub. Oct. 17, 1988); United
Telecontrol Electronics, Inc. B-230246 (Unpub. June 21, 1988); and Meridian Corp.,
B-228468 (67 Comp. Gen. 233, Feb. 3, 1988). This rcquirement-that the lowest bid be
accepted even where it does not result in the "best value" to the Government—eliminates
the benefits that accrue from making awards without discussions where a contractor's
design or technical proposal is clearly superior and the price is fair and reasonable. It also
limits the Government's ability to select commercial products on the basis of best value to
the Government, by.lengthening the acquisition time involved and increasing the overall
cost of the procurement. The proposed amendment would eliminate these problems, and
ensure that DoD has the benefit of more vigorous competition.
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APPENDIX F
DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REPORT ASSESSMENT
This article discusses the DMR and some of the affects it









Bush in a February
1989 address to Congress
charged the secretary of
defense with undertaking




tary of Defense Dick Ch-
eney responded in July





vided a plan to impler
_Ji
mentfulfy the Packard • \ •
Commission recommen-
dations; improve sub- '."'
stantially the performance of the defense
acquisition system; and manage more effec-
tively the department and its resources--
.
The report called for the deputy secretary of
defense, the secretaries of the military depart-
ments, the chairman of
') the Joint Chiefs of Staff
1
and the under secretaries
of defense for acquisition \
K
and for policy, as the sen-
1 ior managers within the -<.'
Department of Defense,
to undertake a broad





... . . . .*.;U..i
The implementation
(
process provides for con-
I tinuous improvement of
defense management.
Accomplishing the full
set of objectives will require several years of
significant effort. This progress report high-
lights the first generation of Defense Manage-
ment Report implementation actionsJhese
efforts are designed to achieve six broad goals:
Bottd on Defense Management Report Implementation Progresa Report, Jan. 10. 1990.
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Reduce overhead costs while
maintaining military strength;
3 Enhance weapon systems pro-
gram performance;
3 Reinvigorate the planning and
budgeting process;
Zi Reduce micromanagement;
3 Strengthen the defense indus-
trial base; and
3 Improve observance of ethical
standards in government and in-
dustry.
Reducing Overhead
DoD is implementing a signifi-
cantly more streamlined acquisition
management structure with clear
lines of responsibility and authority
running from the under secretary of
defense for acquisition through full-
time service acquisition executives
and full-time program executive offi-
cers to individual program manag-
ers. Each military department has
developed a plan for, and is now
streamlining, its acquisition man-
agement structure in a manner con-
sistent with the Defense Manage-
ment Report.
The services' systems and mate-
riel commands will be reorganized
with a primary focus on providing
service logistics support, managing
programs that fall outside the pro-
gram executive officer structure
and providing a variety of support
services to the program executive of-
ficers and program managers. The
revised structures will eliminate
layers of supervision and functions
that add little or no value to the
overall management of DoD and
should improve the efficiency of the
acquisition and logistics systems.
Nearly all contract administra-
tion services, currently divided
among the three military depart-
ments and the Defense Logistics
Agency, will be consolidated under
DLA. This will result in a stream-
lined organization that will promote
uniform implementation of acquisi-
tion policies and regulations and
will result in savings of both dollars
and manpower. Consolidation was
chosen to avoid the significant over-
head costs associated with establish-
ing a new management structure.
The remaining contract administra-
tion operations will also be re-
viewed for possible consolidation
and additional streamlining.
A corporate information manage-
ment initiative is under way to de-
velop more efficient and effective
data processing and information
systems, eliminate duplication of ef-
fort in information management
and ensure the systems support pol-
icy goals and timely decision-mak-
ing. This initiative will benefit from
the advice of experienced and crea-
tive information management spe-
cialists in both industry and DoD.
Through these and similar effi-
ciency efforts, DoD will realize a to-
tal reduction of approximately
18,000 civilian and 24,000 military
personnel in acquisition and man-
agement positions by the end of
1995. DoD will make a concerted ef-
fort to manage the reductions and
consolidations through attrition and
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relocation. These numbers repre-
sent a true streamlining, because
personnel requirements at all levels
will be reduced as efficiencies are
achieved.
Personnel reductions, organiza-
tional streamlining and improved
management controls will reduce
the cost of managing the Depart-
ment of Defense. The current esti-
mate is that DoD will save approxi-
mately $2.3 billion in fiscal 1991
and $39 billion over the period from
fiscal 1991 through fiscal 1995 from
the five-year defense budget, as
amended in April 1989.
The savings represent a signifi-
cant down payment toward revised
administration spending targets. In
addition to the savings above, one
adjustment alone in how the depart-
ment finances and manages repara-
ble parts will enable DoD to make
more efficient use of $2.8 billion of
budget authority in fiscal 1991.
Streamlining efforts are the re-
sult of a continuing, thorough ap-
proach to eliminate unnecessary lay-
ers of personnel and non-value-
added functions. Study groups are
investigating possibilities for con-
solidation or further streamlining of
supply depots, maintenance depots,
inventory control points, accounting
operations, research and develop-
ment laboratories and test facilities,
and automated data processing de-
sign centers and operations. These
groups will report their findings
and recommendations to the deputy
secretary of defense by May 1, 1990.
In addition, the department will
continue to extend efforts to in-
crease efficiency in other sectors of
DoD management.
Finally, force structure reduc-
tions are under consideration for fu-
ture years. If changes in the world
situation and the results of interna-
tional negotiations permit those re-
ductions to occur, DoD may be able
to realize further reductions in man-
agement support structures and as-
sociated costs.
Weapon Systems Performance
The under secretary of defense
for acquisition has the charter to
discipline programs through a re-
vised and strengthened four-phase
acquisition process. Programs must
successfully achieve defined mile-
stones and specific exit criteria set
by the under secretary, with the ad-
vice of the Defense Acquisition
Board. Clear policies guiding this
process have been issued.
In addition, the Joint Require-
ments Oversight Council, chaired
by the vice chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, has assumed a
broader role in the articulation of
military requirements and the vali-
dation of performance goals and
baselines for all acquisition board
programs. Working through the
board and council, the under secre-
tary of defense for acquisition will
ensure that complex systems reflect
proper combinations of cost, sched-
ule and performance parameters.
The military departments have
developed plans to create dedicated
corps of officers who will make ac-
quisition full-time careers. They
will be provided specialized educa-
tion and training, attractive and
equitable career paths and opportu-
nities for promotion to the highest
ranks.
Among actions to improve the ci-
vilian work force will be efforts to
enhance recruitment and retention,
provide career-related education
and professional rewards and in-
crease professionalism within acqui-
sition-related fields.
Streamlining the acquisition
management structure is designed
to improve the flow of information
between program managers and the
department's senior decisionmak-
ers. To help keep the management
lines clear and to assist program
managers, a task force was formed
to evaluate the effect of single-inter-
est program advocates within DoD.
These advocates are functional ex-
perts (transportation, packaging,
etc.) who can pose restrictions but




ity or responsibility for the program
process and tend to make the acqui-
sition system less efficient.
This task force and the Regula-
tory Relief Task Force independ-
ently examined 148 DoD-level direc-
tives and instructions that tend to
diminish the program manager's
ability to exercise authority. The
Advocacy Reduction Task Force In-
terim Report recommends that 104
of these advocacy-related issuances
be canceled outright or combined
with other issuances. When taken
together with the regulatory reduc-
tion, these internal changes will re-
duce significantly self-imposed con-
straints on sound program manage-
ment.
Although much has been accom-
plished in this area, considerably
more needs to be done. The under
secretary for acquisition will con-
tinue to develop unified and stream-
lined policy guidance. The goal is a
simplified acquisition system run by
well-trained, dedicated profession-
als who perform with a minimum of
bureaucratic distraction. Authority
and responsibility will be pushed
down the management chain to the
program managers, who will, in
turn, be held increasingly account-
able for the products of their efforts.
Planning and Budgeting
The secretary chairs a new execu-
tive committee consisting of the dep-
uty secretary, secretaries of the
military departments, chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the two
under secretaries of defense. The
committee reviews overall depart-
ment policies and permits regular
and confidential exchanges on key
issues among the department's sen-
ior leadership.
In addition, the deputy secretary
manages a revitalized planning, pro-
graming and budgeting system as
chairman of the Defense Planning
and Resources Board. Through
board discussions, the senior lead-
ers engage in dynamic planning
that will, over time, improve the de-
partment's ability to link policy,
strategy, programs and budgets
through such tools as a restruc-
tured Defense Planning Guidance.
The under secretary of defense
for policy serves as the primary ad-
viser to the deputy secretary for the
planning phase and the preparation
of the Defense Planning Guidance.
A new planning guidance has been
prepared which reflects the dy-
namic world events of recent
months. This process forms the ba-
sis of an ongoing review of defense
issues that will serve as ground-
work for the establishment of the
defense program for the next six-
year period.
In addition, the under secretary
for policy has been given an larger
role on the planning and resources
board to ensure that policy and
strategy considerations are inte-
grated throughout the programing
and budgeting phases. This process
has already proven successful in de-
veloping plans to expand DoD's role
in countering the production and
trafficking of illegal narcotics, in
supporting the reformulation of
overall defense strategy in a rapidly
changing world environment and in
the establishing a significantly re-
duced fiscal 1991 defense budget.
The board discussions will play a
vital role in providing better links
among national policies, military
strategy and defense programs. To
support this effort, the under secre-
tary for acquisition will play an in-
creased role in the resource alloca-
tion process to establish tight links
between program and resource plan-
ning.
Reduce Micromanagement
The Defense Management Report
charged the under secretary for ac-
quisition with assembling a joint
task force to evaluate the effect of
internal regulations on the acquisi-
tion process. A regulatory relief
task force of nine working groups
has achieved impressive results
from its exhaustive effort.
The task force reviewed a bewil-














































otions. For example, of the more
than 1,200 DoD directives and pol-
icy memoranda reviewed, 512 were
determined to affect the acquisition
system. The task force reviewed 383
of the documents and recommended
eliminating 61, canceling or combin-
ing 176, revising 63 and retaining
as is only 83.
In the procurement and contract-
ing area, the task force recom-
mended canceling, combining or re-
vising 64 percent of the 431 Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Sup-
plement contract clauses and 79
percent of the 66,665 lines of text,
and also 76 percent of the 80 mili-
tary department and DoD agency
contract clauses and 52 percent of
the 44,057 lines of text.
Finally, questionnaires were dis-
tributed for review on more than
50,000 specifications and standards
and related documents. The task
force has focused its initial review
on about 1,500 high-payoff stan-
dards with the most promising po-
tential for increased efficiency.
In an effort to reduce internal mi-
cromanagement, the department
will overhaul completely the system
of acquisition directives and instruc-
tions. New streamlined documents
are expected to be issued by July
1990 in a form that permits im-
plementation at the program man-
ager and field operating levels with
minimal additional policy guidance.
Procurement and contracting
guidance will be completely restruc-
tured and streamlined by February
1991 with the publication of a new
Defense Federal Acquisition Regula-
tion Supplement. The task force
will submit final recommendations
on key defense acquisition stan-
dards by April 1990, with recom-
mendations due on the remaining
body of specifications and standards
by December 1990.
To institutionalize the philosophy
of reduced micromanagement, the
under secretary for acquisition will
develop recommendations to im-
prove the process by which DoD-
level documents are developed and
issued.
A legislative task force was char-
tered under the direction of the leg-
islative counsel and former secre-
tary of the Army John O. Marsh Jr.
to review existing statutes and to
recommend changes that would im-
prove DoD efficiency. The task
force's report recommends legisla-
tion to improve the management of
production, acquisition and logis-
tics, military and civilian personnel,
environment and departmental fi-
nances.
DoD will be working with the Of-
fice of Management and Budget and
the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, among other agencies, to de-
velop the administration's legisla-
tive package.
The Defense Management Report
also calls on Congress to work with
the administration to review and
overhaul the statutory framework
for DoD acquisition. To aid in this
effort, the report suggests specific
themes that should guide such an
effort. As called for in the report, a
white paper on DoD and Congress
that emphasizes the need for coop-
eration between the executive and
legislative branches on defense is-
sues is being sent to the president.
Defense Industrial Base
The contractors that comprise
the defense industry will play a vi-
tal role in future U.S. defense ef-
forts. The industrial base must be
strong and must include manufac-
turers that are highly flexible, tech-
nologically advanced and ever-crea-
tive if DoD is to fulfill its mission of
defending the nation in the years
ahead. This will require that both
DoD and industry maintain active
research programs in vital technolo-
gies that will be particularly critical
in the future.
To strengthen this industrial
base, DoD must create incentives
(and eliminate disincentives) to in-
vest in new facilities and equipment
as well as in research and develop-
ment. One tool of particular impor-
tance in this regard will be contin-
ued DoD support of independent re-
search and development in indus-
try.
The quality of end products and
the productivity of defense manufac-
turers can be improved through the
use of contract mechanisms that re-
cduce unnecessary financial risk.
For example, the department will
restrict severely the use of fixed-
price development contracts. Such
contracts, which are restricted for
programs over $10 million, tend to
put contractors in the untenable po-
sition of developing high-risk pro-
grams at a fixed price. This tends to
inhibit exploration and innovation
early in a program when changes in
design can be made more effectively
at a much lower cost. Likewise,
cost-sharing arrangements would
be given similar scrutiny and be
subject to limitations.
In addition, DoD is fostering bet-
ter performance by defense contrac-
tors through the proper control of
technical configuration and by de-
veloping sound policies on profitabil-
ity and progress payments. Finally,
the department is developing a con-
tractor performance review system
that will permit a more thorough
consideration of past performance
in source selection and thereby pro-
mote contracting relationships with
suppliers with solid histories of per-
formance.
Observance of Ethics
The secretary chartered a DoD
council consisting of the under sec-
retary for acquisition and the secre
taries of the military departments
to develop ethics programs for the
department. The council has met
and established a joint working
group headed by the director for
ethics training and communication
policy to develop a proposed model
ethics program, including educatioi
and training; develop a plan for a
DoD-wide ethics conference; and r«
mmsi i
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view existing compliance programs
for needed enhancements.
The department is considering a
proposal to revise fundamentally
the process of industry compliance
and government oversight in pro-
curement matters. The proposal
calls for a demonstration program
in which several defense contrac-
tors enter into specific compacts
with the relevant federal govern-
ment agencies. Each compact would
be based upon complementary' com-
mitments from both the firm and
goverment in compliance and en-
forcement and in oversight auditing
of a contractor's financial and sys-
tems performance. DoD will begin
developing this proposal with other
interested government agencies in
the near future.
The goals of these efforts are to
strengthen the observance of ethical
standards within government and
with industry and to create an envi-
ronment where official standards of
conduct are well understood,
broadly observed and vigorously en-
forced.
Improving Management
The strength of the Defense Man-
agement Report process, and its
relative advantage over earlier ef-
forts to change management tech-
niques and structures within the de-
partment, is that it is a product of
the department itself, not some-
thing forced on DoD from outside.
The people, both civilian and mili-
tary, who developed the changes
will be the people called upon to
make them work.
The changes are not quick fixes
but rather fundamental shifts, "cul-
tural changes," that address the is-
sues at the core of defense manage-
ment. It may take time to realize
fully the extent of the changes asso-
ciated with the report, but the de-
partment's leadership is committed
to improving defense management
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Using the Defense Management
Report to the President as its guide, :
DoD has identified initiatives to --:-"
save about $2.3 billion in fiscal J "
1991. Over a five-year period, fiscal
1991-1995, the cumulative savings
will be close to $39 billion, with cor-
responding reductions of 18,000 ci-
vilians and 24,000 military. -
—The depaHmehTs'l^proa'clrrras
' been a cooperative effort with the _
full participation of the military de-"
partments. The approach empha-
sized the following: ..-."-- -' •"
Q Develop management efficiencies
that do not require force level or
strategy changes. " "
Q Maintain the level, and improve
the quality, of management sup-
port, while reducing the costs.
rTJse technology, including auto-
mated data processing systems
and communications, to reduce
costs.
......,^.-.
Increase the accountability of
program managers by increasing
the visibility of total program
costs and by placing the costs of
doing business under the control
of people executing the pro-
grams. -
Use budget savings realized
through management efficiencies
to meet DoD's budget target.
If, for other reasons, force reduc-
tions are necessary, consider fur-
ther reductions in the DoD man-




00 If reductions in personnel are
jr? ^necessary due to streamlining
vr£-~-and consolidations, achieve these
| reductions through attrition and
I early retirements.
-•J
- A description of the defensewide
"Sssues and the results expected







Exctrpud from the Defense Management Report Implementation Progress Report, Jan. 10, 1990
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Funding of operational costs of
'-materiel management and distribu-
tion will be moved to the stock
funds and will be reflected in the
cost of materiel through the sur-
.. charges the military departments
c:pay for materiel. Thi6 allows
- greater visibility of the actual cost
"of operation. It also allows greater
.flexibility in making decisions that
-may result in savings by taking
" down some of the barriers between
appropriations.
. ;„_;_.....,;. .
.The major cost factor is inven-
tory, and a key to improved inven-
tory management is increased visi-
bility of assets. If the item manager
can look into the retail, wholesale
and operating stocks, decisions to
redistribute can be made rather
than a decision for a new procure-
ment. This reduces lead time, costs
and inventory levels.
Transferring Army and Air Force
funding of repairable parts from di-
rect appropriations to the funds will i
Jj)
give users an incentive to repair
5
oo
rather than purchase new items.
The Navy transferred the funding
in the 1980s and realized a reduc-
tion in demand. The savings for
Army and Air Force reflect an ex-
pected decreased demand.
Multiyear contracting will move
DoD toward just-in-time materiel
management while building long-
term relationships with contractors.
Yet DoD will be free to move items
to more favorable contracts as prac-
tical. Multiple-year contracts can
drastically reduce lead times that
are very costly.
A decision to retain returns at
the closest depot will reduce han-
dling and transportation costs. Own-
ership of items will remain with
wholesale item managers, who will
notify the holding depot to release
an item when it is requisitioned. An-
other initiative is a policy to allow
storage of materiel close to the ven-
dor rather than the customer. In
these times of overnight delivery,
transportation can be efficiently
managed, and this initiative is ex-
pected to result in savings.
The department spends $2 billion
per year on transportation costs. In-
novations that will be incorporated
into DoD operations include estab-
lishment of regional freight consoli-
dation centers; a change in the pri-
ority system to ensure that only
those items that are urgently re-
quired are shipped separately; the
shipping of material directly from
vendors to users; and use of a
"guaranteed traffic" program that
includes competitive awards to car-
riers to provide scheduled move-
ments on specific routes in return
for reduced rates.
Clothing purchases for each of
the next three years will be limited
to reduce inventory growth. The pol-
icy for introducing new clothing
items will be changed to require
services to pay for purchases up
front, thereby making customers
more aware of the cost of adding
new items to the inventory. The
services will be encouraged to use
commercial specifications, to in-
crease standardization and to re-
duce the number of clothing sizes.
Administration
The Packard Commission and
the Defense Management Report to
the President called for streamlin-
ing and other efficiencies leading to
reductions in staff. Defense agen-
cies will realize reductions through
organizational changes, automation
improvements and procurement effi-
ciencies. The budget anticipates sav-
ings through personnel reductions,
but the agencies may use alterna-
tives, if appropriate.
Military personnel costs have not
previously been reflected in the cost
i i iian m 1^1 inm i i i Pi
'iff Defense agencies will realize tijf^-:;
^".reductions through organizational ^
^changes, automation improvements .
,






to run industrial facilities, ship-
yards, ammunition plants, etc. In
fiscal 1991, DoD will reflect military
personnel costs to ensure visibility
of these personnel expenses to man-
agers.
DoD will substitute civilians for
military in positions that do not spe-
cifically require military incum-
bents. These functions include in-
stallations management, research
and development, training and per-
sonnel and support activities. The
savings result from the conversion
of about 20,000 positions over the
five-year period.
DoD is committed to improving
the standardization, quality and
consistency of data from its multi-
ple management information sys-
tems and to the adoption of single
systems in each major functional
area of management.
Computer-aided logistics support
will allow the department to accept
technical information from weapon
system contractors, using DoD-ac-
cepted standards, in digitized elec-
tronic format rather than hard
copy. Computer-aided logistics sup-
port will support DoD's needs and
develop a network system architec-
ture for interoperability of existing
and emerging stand-alone technical
information data bases currently
used in DoD.
Cost efficiencies and operational
improvements can be achieved in
the financial and contract communi-
ties by consolidating like activities,
establishing and maintaining con-
trol over valuable resources and
property, and enhancing the meas-
urement and accountability for as-
sets owned or contracted for by the
department.
Action has been taken to estab-
lish better control and accountabil-
ity over government-furnished ma-
terial. This accountability will force
contractors to be more conscien-
tious, discourage requests for mate-
rial in excess of requirements and
enhance recovery of unused mate-
rial.
Contracted Advisory and Assis-
tance Services will establish better
14
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controls over documentation, compe-
tition and approval of services pro-
vided by consultants. The controls
will provide more accurate report-
ing of consulting costs, both in the
budget justifications and the federal
procurement data system.
The Defense Management Report
called for the consolidation of all
DoD contract administration serv-
ices into a single organization, the
Defense Logistics Agency. Consoli-
dation should eliminate differing
procedures now used by the four
agencies handling contract admini-
stration. It will also make it possi-
ble to present a single face to indus-
try on all contract management is-
sues.
Further Studies
A number of recommendations
for future action require further
analysis, but at this time appear
to reduce DoD costs further without
affecting military capability or re-
ducing the level of support.
Study teams will be reviewing op-
portunities to achieve greater effi-
ciencies through possible consolida-
tions, management changes and as-
sociated savings in the following ar-
eas:
Q The 33 supply depots in DoD op-
erated by the services and De-
fense Logistics Agency. Consoli-
dation in a single service or
agency may result in savings in
overhead, systems development
costs and better utilization of ex-
isting capacity.
Q The 20 inventory control points
that manage about 5 million
items valued at approximately
$100 billion. Of those items, 4
million are consumable or dispos-
able. Further savings in over-
head, system support, mission
and facilities costs could be
achieved through consolidation
and other management efficien-
cies.
3 Army, Navy and Air Force main-
tenance functions that modify,
' maintain and repair ships,
. ; \ Congress' timely and favorable ' {:
y
-^







legislative changes will enable > M s
DoD to take broad-ranging actions ' r
to produce economy and efficiency. v
sasttaaatti « ^M'tVlfira
planes, tanks and other major
equipment. Savings could be
achieved in overhead, closure
and better oversight of mainte-
nance operations.
Q The department's 1,000 informa-
tion technology facilities engaged
in software design, systems modi-
fication and maintenance, data
processing and administrative
support. Savings through more
efficient central operations, bet-
ter use of resources and reduced
staffing are anticipated.
The services' pay systems and
centers, dozens of accounting sys-
tems and hundreds of accounting
and finance stations. Savings
could be realized by streamlining
into a single accounting system.
Q The services' separate labs and
test facilities. Nine facilities
work on guided missiles, eight on
lasers, 15 on medical research,
eight on environmental issues
and six in psychology. Savings
could result through consolida-
tion, reduced overhead and cen-
tralization of professional staff.
The Defense Management Report
called for streamlining DoD's busi-
ness and management support ac-
tivities. The department plans to
implement single management in-
formation systems to support major
functional areas important to sound
management. To evaluate the depth
of the problem and to guide DoD in
developing corrective measures, an
executive-level group of outside ex-
perts and DoD officials has been es-
tablished. The department will be-
gin work in fiscal 1990 on the devel- «^fc
opment of requirements for single ^J




The department will further ana-
lyze areas where emphasis has been
placed thus far and will actively
search for other management effi-
ciencies. Those analyses will be com-
pleted in time to be incorporated in
the fiscal 1992 budget. This process
will be repeated each year.
A maze of confusing and some-
times contradictory statutes and
regulations is one of the more sub-
stantial barriers to improving DoD
management. Therefore, in addition
to budget actions and studies, a set
of legislative proposals will be
drawn to foster the goals of the
Defense Management Report.
DoD has begun to reduce self-im-
posed regulatory and policy guid-
ance. Congress' timely and favor-
able consideration of the proposed
legislative changes will enable DoD
to take broad-ranging actions to pro- C \
duce economy and efficiency in ^^
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[Including coat estimate of the CongreaaionaJ Budget Office]
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SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING




DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DoD Corporate Information Management
In order to reduce non-value-added work and costs, as hiahlighted by the
Secretary's Report to the President on Defense Management, ^nere appears to be a
need to improve the standardization, quality, and consistency of data from DoD's
multiple management information systems. More effective use of information
systems must be a high priority.
Along these lines, DoD should not expend resources to develop and maintain
multiple systems or software to meet the same functional requirements. To reduce
unnecessary redundancy, common data requirements and formats must be
developed, especially in those areas of most utility to the sound management of the
entire Department. The successes in industry in developing integrated management
information systems suggests that much can be done in DoD.
In order to evaluate the depth of this problem and to develop corrective
measures as necessary, the following actions will be taken.
- An executive level group of outside experts and DoD officials will be
established to:
(1) recommend an overall approach and action plan to enhance the
availability and standardization of information in common areas through \
a Corporate Information Management program for the DoD;
(2) review the procedures of functional cjroups described below and, as
needed, the products of the groups, including information requirements
and data formats;
3) review the processes and procedures used for overseeing the development
of new information systems and software in DoD; and, where applicable,
4) recommend corrective actions.
12 3
65931*
- The Information Resources Management staff will draft a management plan,
including a process guide for developing integrated management information
s ;
stems
- Upon completion of the guide, functional groups both in technical areas and in
common business areas (e.g., inventory, warehousing, civilian personnel,
financial management, civilian payroll, and contract payment) will be
established. The groups will be led by OSD officials and should consist of
Service and Defense Agency functional experts. The groups will support the
executive level group and will:
(1) review information requirements of the OSD, Services, and Defense
Agencies and consider levels of compatibility and redundancy within each
area; and
(2) develop uniform and consistent information requirements and data
formats within each functional area.
In the interim:
- Current life-cycle management principles and processes will remain in effect
for automated information systems.
- The Major Automated Information System Review Council (MAISRC) will be
established as a committee of the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB), with the
DoD Comptroller as the chair. The DAB committee will continue to operate
under current MAISRC procedures and will review all automated information
systems and telecommunications programs prior to DAB meetings.
It is essential that the Department improve its information management to
realize savings in both the $9 billion spent annually on information technology and
in the DoD business areas these systems support. The total cooperation and





This document is a collection of slides which was used by
the CIM director during her lecture at the Naval Postgraduate
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DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BIOGRAPHY
This document is a biography of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Mr. Donald J. Atwood.
143
Donald J. Atwood
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Donald J. Atwood was nominated by President Bush to be
Deputy Secretary ofDefense onJanuary 29, 1989, was confirmed
on April 19, 1989, and took the oath of office on April 24, 1989.
i
Before his nomination to be Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr.
Atwood was Vice Qiairman of the Board of General Motors and
President, Delco Electronics Corporation andGM Hughes Elec-
tronics.'
Mr.Atwood wasbomMay 25, 1924, in Haverhill, Massachusetts.
He attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was
awarded Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Electrical Engineering. While at MIT, he was
associated with the research work which pioneered the development of inertial guidance
systems. InMay 1988, Mr. Atwood received an Honorary Doctor of Engineering Degree from
Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology. He served in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1946.
i
Mr. Atwood joined General Motors in 1959 as an associate director of the Research and
Development Laboratory of the AC Spark Plug Division. In 1961 he became director of the
facility, jln 1962 he was named Director of Engineering of the AC Spark Plug Division in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In 1970, when the Detroit Diesel Engine and Allison Divisions were




In 1974 he became the first General Manager of GM*s new Transportation Systems Division, !
and later that yearwas named GeneralManager of theDelco Electronics Division! In 1978 Mr.
'
Atwood was named Vice President and General Manager of Detroit Diesel Allison Division.
Three years laterhewasnamed Vice Presidentand group Executive inCharge ofthe Electrical
Components Group, and in November 1981, he was given responsibility for the worldwide
TruckandBusGroup. In 1984 hewasnamed Executive Vice President ofthe Corporation, and
was elevated to the position of Vice Chairman of the Board in 1987.
Mr.Atwood has been active in many civic and industry related organizations. Tl ese include:
Corporationof the Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology; the Board ofDirectors of theCharles
Stajk Draper Laboratory, Inc; the National Academy of Engineering; the American Institute
of Aeronautics and Astronautics; the Board of Directors of the Michigan Opera Theatre; and
the National Executive Board of the Boy Scouts of America.
Mr.Atwood is married to the formerSue Harian,and has two children: Susan Atwood Lavoii I







This document is an internal CIM document which provides
direction and guidance for the various CIM functional groups
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SECTION 1. BACKGROUND
On October 4, 1989, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the
Corporate Information Management initiative. The goals are to increase
management efficiencies in the functions supporting DoD missions, improve
the effective use of information systems in the Department, and reduce
duplicative information systems supporting the same functional
requirements. Key objectives are the standardization, quality, and
consistency of data from DoD's multiple management information systems,
the reduction of non-value-added work and costs, and the development of
standard functional requirements and systems supporting the requirements.
Senior functional experts have the responsibility for reviewing the
business practices of each DoD function and for the development of
standard functional requirements to support the function. Therefore,
functional groups are being constituted to:
• Develop a vision, of the future preferred function.
• Review, evaluate, and, if necessary, revise the business
practices and policies of the functional area.
• Develop information requirements for supporting the function.
• Define standard and consistent functional requirements for
which standard, integrated information systems can be
developed.
The participation and leadership of senior functional experts are key
to arriving at a common, feasible and effective vision of the future, and
for supporting that vision with consistent policies, practices, and
related information systems. Inconsistent policies and procedures will
inevitably be manifested by inconsistencies among the supporting
information systems, a management inefficiency that cannot be tolerated
in an era of shrinking resources.
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SECTION 2. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This Process Guide describes the steps in developing a functional
business plan and information systems strategy, which include standard
functional requirements; information systems requirements; and an
implementation strategy. As presented in Exhibit 2-1, the steps are
organized into three phases: The Functional Vision; The Functional
Business Plan; and The Information Systems Strategy. The steps are
linked by a methodology tailored to particular DoD reruirements.
An overview of the process is presented in the following section.
Details of the process methodology are contained in Appendix A, and a
glossary of terms is included in Appendix B.
In addition to this Process Guide, each functional group will receive
training on the methodology that will be employed. The training will
include a walk-through of the steps. A facilitator and other support
personnel will assist functional groups. The support personnel will have





















































































































































SECTION 3. PROCESS OVERVIEW
The process can be logically thought of as three major areas of
activities: the functional vision, the functional business plan, and the
information systems strategy.
The Functional Vision
The functional vision provides the future perspective or 'target' for
the function. Specifically it is the vision of what the function will be
and what its major characteristics will be 10 years in the future. The
vision is expressed as vision elements, or brief statements which clearly
communicate the function's identity in the future. The vision is
supported through development of policy and guiding principles that will
lead the function into the 21st century, as well as the function's
mission statement, scope and definition.
The Functional Business Plan
The functional business plan contains the functional business
requirements for the future and specifies the actions that must be
accomplished to transition the function from its current state to the
desired future state. The current state of the function is identified
through a baseline analysis of the prevailing processes and business
methods and practices. The desired future state is defined in detail by
successive refinement of the vision elements through goals, objectives
and strategies into specific processes and business methods and practices
for the future. The business plan includes the function's information
requirements. They provide a basis for developing the strategy for
implementing the information system(s) that will be needed to support the
function in the future.
The Information Systems Strategy
The information system strategy is the set of actions, milestones and
procedures that will be applied to transition from the information
151
system(s) that currently support the function to the standard information
system(s) that will support the function in the future. The strategy is
derived principally from an assessment of the functionality of current
systems. and ccmr;risor. of that functionality to the functional
requirements of the future. The selected strategy might range from the
extremes of adopting a current system without modification to complete
system redesign. The actual implementation of the strategy is beyond the
scope of this process.
The following pages provide an overview of each of the seventeen
steps that are included in the process from Step 1.1, Mission and Scope,
















































































































A detailed graphical portrayal of the processes, data stores, and
data flows within a function, and the interfaces to other functions.
Strategic Implementation Plan.
The final planning product comprised of alternative models, each of
which addresses how to implement a recommendation or cluster of
recommendations. The strategic implementation plan can include a set
of updated architectures that describe the alternative models, and
configuration summaries, which include a system or configuration
diagram, a statement of the scope of the proposed implementation, and
preliminary eguipment and labor cost estimates.
Strategic Planning.
A structured process that produces an integrated plan of action for
accomplishing the organization's missions and objectives over a
5-year or longer ' period. Automated information systems (AIS)
strategic planning develops and documents the agency's direction and
specifies the AIS programs and resources requirements necessary to
support stated missions and objectives.
Vision.
The high level conceptualization of what a function must be in the
future and the major characteristics it will possess. The vision is





The means of transforming data into information in a business. It
can include both automated or manual systems.
Logical Process.
On a data flow diagram, a logical process describes the work
performed to transform incoming data flows into outgoing data flows.
A logical process is stated to eliminate any physical, or
implementation-dependent characteristics, from the model.
Objective.
A statement that explains specifically where DoD must be at various
points in time if it is to accomplish its goals. Objectives are
designed to permit quantitative measurement of progress in achieving
goals.
Object of Interest.
1. Something that must be managed or otherwise considered in order
to execute the business activities and processes of a function.
Employees, goods and services, and customers are examples.
2. [See also Data Entity]
Process.
1. The organization of people, materials, energy, equipment and
procedures into work activities designed to produce a specified
end result or work product.
2. [See also Business Activity]
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Functional Business Plan.
The collection of time-phased actions that must be accomplished in
order to achieve the objectives, goals and vision for the function.
Functional Information Model.
A high-level snap-shot of the organizations, processes and data flows
within a function.
Future Functional Concept.
A conceptual model of the function as it will be in the future,
expressed through defining the processes it will include.
Future Operational Concept.
The detailed model of the function in the future expressed in terms
of the future processes and future business methods and practices.
Goal
The desired state that must be achieved in order to attain the vision
of the future.
Guiding Principle.
A brief, declarative statement that expresses some aspect of the
management philosophy.
Information Class.




Cardinality describes the quantitative relationship between data
entities. It may be expressed in one of three wgvs : one-to-one.
one-to-many, or many-to-many.
Corporate Information Management.
A coordinated, planned approach to information management that is
driven by corporate functional policy and integrated business
methods, implemented by consistent functional data models and
information systems.
Data Entity.
1. A person, place, thing or concept about which data must be
collected and stored.
2. [See also Object of Interest]
Data Model.
A graphic depiction of the data entities and the substantive
relationships among those entities.
Functional Analysis.
An assessment of the functions, processes, and data flows of a
business. Functions are the way that a business entity translates
its goals and objectives into business products; processes are those
actions and decisions required to manage and execute the function.






A characteristic of a person, place, thing or concept. For example,
an attribute of an employee is that the employee has a Social
Security Account Number.
Business Activity.
1. A collection of decisions and actions required to operate or
manage some aspect of the business or function.
2. [See also Process]
Business Information Model.
1. The Business Information Model is a high-level snap-shot of the
organizational and functional structures within a business. It
is a graphical model that depicts the processes, systems, and
data within the functions, and the information flow between
business functions, systems, and/or organizations.
2. [See also Functional Information Model]
Business Methods.
Business methods are the formal way in which business is conducted.
Culture is an informal overlay over them. Business methods and
culture together fully describe the way business operates.
Redefinition of business methods will result in simpler, integrated
business methods that all operating groups and staff can support.
(These are aiso referred to as business practices.)
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3.3 THE INFORMATION SYSTEMS STRATEGY PHASE
Purpose :
The purpose of this phase is to develop the strategy for efficiently
and effectively providing information systems support for the function.
Description :
The analyses within this phase will proceed on two parallel paths.
The functional requirements for information systems, identified in the
previous phase, will be modeled in detail using data flow diagramming
(process modeling) and entity-relationship diagramming (data modeling).
Simultaneously, a systematic analysis of existing information systems
will be conducted to identify their functionality and the degree to which
existing systems meet the new requirements. Finally, the strategy for
implementing supporting information system(s) will be developed to
include the transition plan, actions and milestones.
This phase includes six steps. The analytical techniques used in
this phase include methods drawn from information engineering,
information systems analysis, and information systems strategic planning.
Outputs and Relationships :
• Information systems implementation strategy.
The outputs of this phase will be used as a basis for implementing
the necessary information systems.
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3.2 THE FUNCTIONAL BUSINESS PLAN PHASE
Purpose :
The purpose of this phase is to define the collection of actions that
must be taken to transition the function from its current state to its
desired future state, and to formally document the business requirements
for the function.
Description :
The first step of this phase provides for a thorough analysis of the
current state of the function in terms of its processes, organizational
structures, and business methods and practices. The analysis will
proceed through several steps to define the goals, objectives and
strategy for the function. Then the future functional concept and future
operational concept will be developed to provide definition for the
future processes and business methods. Finally, the business plan will
be formulated. It will contain specific actions that must be taker, to
transition the function from its current state to its desired future
state.
This phase includes eight steps. The analytic methods applicable to
this phase include techniques from strategic business planning, business
systems planning, information engineering, and program evaluation and
review techniques (PERT).
Outputs and Relationships :
• The functional business plan.
The plan will provide formal documentation of the various business
requirements for the function. Those requirements that apply to
information systems will be used in the next phase to develop the
strategy to implement the information system(s) needed to support the
function in the future.
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3. PHASE DESCRIPTIONS
3.1 THE FUNCTIONAL VISION PHASE
Purpose :
The purpose of this phase is to develop and articulate the visionary
perspective of the function 10 years in the future.
Description :
This phase provides for first developing the mission statement for
the function. Then a clear definition of the function will be developed
by specifying the business activities which are included within it. The
definition and mission statement prescribe the scope of the function, and
the scope for the work effort for all three phases. Governing policy,
regulations and statutes will then be identified, and prevailing business
trends will be analyzed so the future environment for the function can be
predicted and policy can be redirected as necessary. Next, the
management philosophy will be formulated and expressed as a series of
brief, declarative statements that communicate the essence of the
philosophy. Finally, the vision of the future for the function will be
developed and expressed as a set of declarative statements called vision
elements
.
This phase consists of three steps. The analytic techniques used
during this phase are customized from proven strategic business planning
methods.
Outputs and Relationships :
• The functional vision.
This phase provides the scope and direction for the entire work
effort.
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The three phases are described in the next section. The balance of
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1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE
This Appendix describes in detail the methodology for developing the
functional vision, functional business plan, and the strategy for
implementing the supporting information systems. This is the user guide
for those who will implement the methodology. The guide:
• Describes the phases, steps, tasks and subtasks,
• Explains the analytical approach that applies to each; and
• Specifies the required outputs.
Forms, other work aids, and examples of outputs are also included.
This guide is intended for use by senior DOD employees who are
experts in the business functions of the Department, and who will be:
• Working in groups with other functional experts, and
• Supported by technical methodology advisors and automated
tools.
2. ORGANIZATION
The methodology provides for three phases, each consisting of thre =
or more steps, as illustrated in Exhibit A-l. Each step includes two or
more tasks which may in turn include several subtasks. The hierarchial
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STEP 3.6 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY (PROGRAM CONCEPT)
Purpose :
The purpose of this step is to develop an implementation strategy/
program concept that will provide the necessary information systems to




The functional group will determine the adequacy of current and
planned information systems to satisfy future information systems
requirements. This determination will be accomplished by comparing the
"best" current and planned information systems, which were identified in
Step 3.5, with the future functional information systems requirements
from Step 3.3. The functional group will then develop implementation
decisions and priorities for information systems efforts. The group will
also develop an implementation transition plan that will designate how
the functional area will migrate from today's information systems to
those that are required for the future.
Outputs and Relationships :
• Implementation decisions.
• Implementation Transition Plan.
The implementation decisions and transition plan comprise the
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STEP 3.5 INFORMATION SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
Purpose
:
The purpose of this step is to evaluate the current or planned DoD
information systems in the functional area to identify approximately five
systems for which to perform a detailed comparative analysis.
Description :
The functional group will perform a systematic review of the systems
identified in the baseline to determine which ones are worthy of further
analysis. The review will apply criteria such as technical architecture,
last systems modernization, modularity, recent maintenance costs, and
portability. Other deficiencies and constraints associated with current
systems will also be considered. A detailed analysis of the systems with
the highest probability of being able to support the functional
information systems requirements will then be completed in the next
step.
Outputs and Relationships :
• List of approximately five systems that will be used for
comparative analysis in the next step.
The results of the analysis will be documented in a set of tables
comparing the systems on the criteria developed by the functional group.
The results of this step will be used in the next step to perform a
detailed analysis to help the functional group formulate recommended
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STEP 3.4 SITUATION ANALYSIS (INFORMATION SYSTEMS BASELINE)
Purpose :
The purpose of this step is to describe the current information
systems environment under which the function is executed and to determine
the number and general capabilities of the current and planned
information systems that are supporting this function.
Description :
The Situation Analysis (Information Systems Baseline) will be a
collateral step to the Situation Analysis (Functional Baseline). By
using the previously described current business environment, the work
group will develop descriptions of the current information systems
environment. The functional group will review current business processes
that were documented in Step 2.1 and identify the current and planned
information systems that are supporting the execution of these
processes. The group will then completely describe these current and
planned information systems, to include the proponent agency for the
system, functionalities, major modules, primary products, technical
architecture, sources of data, interfaces, applied standards and costs of
operations.
Outputs and Relationships :
• An Information Systems Baseline Catalog
This catalog will be used in the analysis of the current information
systems and in developing a cost effective implementation strategy to
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STEP 3.3 FUNCTIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS
Purpose :
The purpose of this step is to develop the future functional
information systems requirements that are needed to fulfill the Vision
and to support functional users.
Description :
Functional information systems requirements will be developed by
executing four tasks, using input from the process model, data model and
Functional Business Plan. These four tasks are:
• Describe Improvements Sought.
• Identify Future Applications.
• Describe Future Functional Information Systems Requirements.
• Review and Document.
The information contained in the outputs from these tasks will
constitute the functional information systems requirements and will be
the means by which the functional managers/users communicate with the
technicians who will design the information systems that will satisfy
these requirements.
Outputs and Relationships :
• Description of the nature and benefits of the improvements
sought in the information systems support of the function.
• Description of the future functional information systems"
requirements.
The future functional information systems requirements will be used
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STEP 3.2 DATA MODEL
Purpose :
The purpose of this step is to analyze and model the data
requirements of the function.
Description :
The functional group will focus on the data necessary for the
successful execution of the function. A data model will be produced that
reflects the data (in terms of data entities) and the relationships among
that data. The data model provides a standard way to communicate and to
understand the meaning of the functional data. It captures the types of
data used in the function, defines each data entity in detail, identifies
relationships, and develops standard definitions.
The work in this step may be accomplished simultaneously with the
step that does a detailed analysis of the functional processes (Process
Model). When data are created by a process external to this functional
area, assumptions will be made that the external functional area will
have arrived at the data in the same consistent manner, that we can label
the source of the data as the external process, and that standard
definitions and usage will be supplied by the external source.
Outputs and Relationships :
• Data model
The graphical representation of the data requirements. their
descriptions and a list of logical data elements will be the primary
output of this step. The data model will be used in the next step to
support the functional information systems requirements and can also be
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STEP 3.1 PROCESS MODEL
Purpose :
The purpose of this step is to define the logical processes required
to support the functional area, and then to decompose the processes to
greater levels of detail. Both the details of the processes and the flow
of data among the processes are portrayed graphically.
Description :
The logical processes will be analyzed and portrayed graphically in
charts presenting the flow and processing of information, the storage cf
information, and external agents and interfaces. It is important to
understand that although the process model and the data model are
depicted as two separate steps, they are highly interrelated, and as the
processes are defined in greater detail, the data requirements to perform
the processes will also be defined in greater detail. Data coming in
from other functional areas as input will be specifically identified, and
likewise, data that result from the particular process, flowing into
other functional areas, will be specifically labeled.
Outputs and Relationships :
• Process model
The detailed descriptions of the logical processes in the form of
diagrams are the primary outputs of this step. The logical process model
is used to document functional requirements, and can also be used as a
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STEP 2.8 FUNCTIONAL BUSINESS PLAN (FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS)
Purpose :
The purpose of this step is to develop a set of time-phased actions
required to transition to the future, assign responsibilities for




The functional group will first develop the action plan consisting of
the time-phased actions, and assign responsible agencies to accomplish
each action. The action plan will be developed using program evaluation
and review techniques (PERT) supported by automated tools. The
Functional Business Plan Report will then be prepared. It will contain
the major products of the Functional Vision Phase and the Functional
Business Plan Phase as well as the action plan.
Outputs and Relationships :
• PERT chart of actions required.
• Functional business requirements.
• Functional business plan report.
The information requirements contained in the report will be used in
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STEP 2.7 FUNCTIONAL INFORMATION MODEL
Purpose :
The purpose of this step is to focus the functional group on the
information required to execute the function in the future. The
information requirements, i.e., logical groups of data supporting the
functions, are identified. This step will employ outputs from the Future
Functional Concept step so that a complete picture, both process and
information, is analyzed.
Description :
During this step, the functional group will define the information
classes that are needed to conduct each process, both what the process
needs to receive, and what results from performing the process. The
classes of data identified in this way will form a common language across
DoD components, and when arrayed against the processes will present a
macro-view of the future information environment.
Outputs and Relationships :
• Information Model Matrix.
The primary output of this step is a matrix linking the information
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STEP 2.6 FUTURE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
Purpose :
The purpose of this step is to determine the business methods and
practices that will be applied in the future, by defining and depicting
how the processes will be executed and managed.
Description :
The functional group will analyze each process from the Future
Functional Concept and specify how each will be executed and managed.
Additionally, the group will identify and record actions that must be
accomplished to transition from the current business methods and
practices to those of the future. Information flowing in and out of each
process will be captured in a collateral step. Functional Information
Model.
Outputs and Relationships :
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STEP 2.5 FUTURE FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT
Purpose :
The purpose of this task is to identify those processes that will be
included in the function in the future and to describe each of them.
Description :
The functional group will first identify the various objects that
must be managed or addressed by the function. Objects that are currently
managed were identified in the Situation Analysis, and they will be
reviewed for applicability in the future. The vision elements and
strategy statements will then be reviewed for other objects that must be
managed in the future. The processes that will be included in the
function in the future will then be identified by performing a life cycle
management analysis of each object. Finally, a brief narrative
description of each process will be developed.
Outputs and Relationships :
• Action-oriented statements that identify and describe those
processes that will be included in the function in the future.
Completion of this step provides the work group with a high-level
insight about the function 10 years in the future. Greater specificity
will be developed in the following step where the details of the concept
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The purpose of this step is to is to develop a business strategy that
states what needs to be accomplished in order to achieve the previously
defined objectives.
Description :
The development of the strategy is dependent upon a review of the
objects of interest, environmental factors, business practices and
objectives. Based on this review, the functional group will determine
the key success factors associated with each objective. After analyzing
all of the key success factors, strategies will be developed for
achieving the objectives. The functional group will also determine the
risks associated in executing these strategies.
Outputs and Relationships :
• A business strategy expressed as a set of high-level action
statements describing what must be done to achieve each of
the objectives.
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The purpose of this step is to define objectives which measure
progress towards the agreed-upor. goals, defined to meet the vision. They
are statements about the future that express specifically where DoD must
be at various points in time and are designed to permit quantitative
measurement of progress. Tangible (quantifiable) objectives are
preferable to qualitative objectives.
Description :
In the step, each goal will be analyzed and specific measurable or
tangible products and milestones will be identified. These products will
be reviewed and restated as objectives to be reached at particular points
in time. The list of objectives will be reviewed, the key objectives
will be documented, and the objectives will be tracked back to the goals
to assure at least one objective per goal.
Outputs and Relationships :
• Objectives stated as declarative statements including
specific measurement criteria for each.




The purpose of this step is to define a set of goals for achieving
the vision elements defined in Step 1.3 for the functional area. Goals
are desired states that must be achieved to attain the vision.
Description ;
Functional officials must define the goals for their functional area,
and must collectively agree that these are the goals to be accomplished
for the Department.
The situation analysis, completed in the previous step, and the
vision provide the basis for establishing goals for the function. The
functional officials will review the vision, determine its key elements,
and identify the desired states represented by the elements.
Outputs and Relationships :
• Goals expressed as a set of declarative statements.
Goals are the key elements leading to the vision. They are refined
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• Functional business practices related to the functional area.
• Assessment of vision elements in terms of the current
situation.
This step provides parameters for the ne:-:t stieps, the de^e r~:r.£-..c:.
of goals and objectives for the function. The results are also used for
identifying information systems for review in the Situation Analysis
(Information Systems Baseline) step.
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STEP 2.1 SITUATION ANALYSIS (FUNCTIONAL BASELINE)
Purpose :
The purpose of this step is to review and analyze the current
business situation and assess the vision elements in terms of the
situation review and analysis. A situation analysis for information
systems will be done in a subsequent step. (see Step 3.4)
Description :
First, the current or baseline functional processes will be
identified. This will include a description of current business
procedures, practices, capabilities, and policies. Care will be taken to
identify what functions are actually executed, rather than how they
should be executed. Processes that are common to all Military
Departments and DoD Agencies will be distinguished from those that are
unique to some subset of DoD.
In addition to the baseline functional processes, legislative and
regulatory business practices will be identified. This analysis will
document common and unique business practices among the Military
Departments and DoD Agencies.
Finally, with a business understanding of the current situation, each
vision element will be analyzed in terms of the current situation. This
analysis will address how and how well business is conducted today
relative to each vision element.
Outputs and Relationships :
The analysis of the current situation results in:





The purpose of this step is to develop and articulate the vision for
doing business in the functional area 10 years in the future. The vision
may or may not be similar to current practices.
Description :
In developing the vision, the functional group will make fundamental
decisions about alternative ways to address the key factors, identified
in the previous steps, that will shape the function in the future. The
decisions are expressed as a set of vision elements that communicate the
decisions to other senior experts in the functional area. The group wiil
outline several future scenarios as a basis for confirming the
feasibility of each vision element. The set of vision elements
collectively identify the future target for the function to which all the
remaining work effort will focus.
Outputs and Relationships :
• Concise, declarative statements that constitute vision
elements
.
The vision will be used as guidance throughout the remaining steps,
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Completion of this step provides the foundation for articulating the
vision for the function.
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STEP 1.2 POLICY AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES
Purpose:
The purpose of this step is to define the DoD-wide overarching policy
for the functional area and the guiding principles that will lead the
function to the year 200C. The guiding principles will express the
management philosophy for the function.
Description :
The functional group will first analyze the policies, statutes and
regulations that govern the function and identify significant trends
based on them. Similarly, general business trends affecting the
functions will be identified. The group will then define and develop
policies to improve the way the Department does business in the
functional area as it guides the Department in this functional area into
the 21st Century.
Finally, based on these policies, the group will develop overall
guiding principles (the management philosophy), that will define the
operating fundamentals for performing the function the way it should be
performed.
The future direction that DoD will take in conducting its business in
the functional area will be shaped by these policies and the management
philosophy.
Outputs and Relationships :
The outputs for this step are: _
• General policy trends affecting the function.
• Overarching policies that will govern the functional area.
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STEP 1.1 MISSION AND SCOPE (FUNCTIONAL)
Purpose :
The purpose of this step is to develop a mission statement unique to
the function being analyzed and to describe the scope of the function.
The mission statement describes the purpose and reason for the function.
The scope of the function will be described in a manner that identifies
what the function will include as well as what it will not include.
Description :
The development of the mission and scope will be based on
identification and analysis of the activities that should be considered
as part of the function. The types of activities that directly support
the mission, and the identification and documentation of the boundaries
of the function will be noted.
Outputs and Relationships :
• Mission statement.
• Scope of function (defined in terms of the activities).
The mission statement will provide a guide for all subsequent
activities by stating the unique purpose and reason for the function. The
scope of the function must be clear and precise. The scope of the
function will be defined in terms of the activities that make up the
function. Both it and the mission statement must be documented formally
and have uniform applicability across the Military Departments and DoD
Agencies. This step defines the scope of the entire work effort of the
function and provides the basis for conducting the policy area analysis




DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF NAVY IRM INTERVIEW
This document contains the notes taken during an
interview with the Deputy Director of Navy IRM.
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He stressed the manpower drain the functional groups were having on navy
IRM. The services are undermanned as it is, and CIM took away some of
their best people.
He's worried about "Who's minding the store". In other words, while all
this great CIM stuff is happening, who is going to take care of the
daily business. Will the current systems fall apart due to lack of
personnel, lack of funding, lack of priority, etc.
He thinks it is too much too soon. Why not pick one area, form a
functional group, devise standard requirements, implement the system and
then learn from their mistakes. Should it work out, then advertise this
success as a precursor of what's to come. This will strengthen the
support for the new CIM devised systems. If it doesn't work out, then
lessons have been learned. Either they can fix the problems, or else
scrap the idea without wasting Billions of dollars. Maybe the
experience will lead to other avenues in which to pursue.
He mentioned that it takes 6-8 years for major systems to come online.
Is the government and DoD going to wait that long? He doesn't think so.
He's worried about lack of funding. Citing E-D . Which means
"Events in Eastern Europe = Declining Defense Dollars.
He believes support is there for CIM. The idea is sound and people
admit that something needs to be done. People are shell shocked at the
size of this effort and the time frame in which to implement it. No
figured a system would be ram rodded down their throat .
Many people in the trenches are worried about moving. Basic needs that
are of concern to anyone faced with forced change.
He feels CIM will collapse under its own weight .




DEFENSE MANAGMENT REPORT DECISION
This document is a Defense Management Report Decision
which estimates the cost of funding CIM.
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DEFENSE MANAGEMENT REPORT PECtStOti
( SUBJECT : Develop Standard ADP Systems
POD COMPONENTS : Army, Navy, Air Force, Defense Agencies
ISSUE : DoD must not expend resources to develop and maintain
multiple systems or software to meet the same functional
requirements .
(TOA, Dollars in Millions')
FY 199 FY 1991
Service Estimate 8,946.8 9,246.8
Alternative Estimate -.6
-265.1
SUMMARY OF EVALUATION : The DoD currently has multiple management
information systems in functional areas such as financial
management and inventory management. Many of these ADP systems are
in various stages of development and modernization, and some are
operational. These ADP systems are rarely designed using standard
functional and common data requirements. The Deputy Secretary, as
part of the Defense Management Review, announced a major initiative
which sets as a priority the more effective use of inforaation-
systems. Corporate Information ..Management (CIM) will enhance the].
availability and standardization of information in common areas and.
provide for the development of integrated management information!:-.
systems. Under CIM tasking, levels of compatibility and redundancy
will be addressed and uniform and consistent information
requirements will be developed. The results of these CIM
activities will provide the Department with a unique opportunity to
capture savings while at the same time dramatically improving
efficiency and effectiveness of operations. The Department should
be taking aggressive management action to hold to a minimum those
expenditures for systems that are candidates for CIM.
ALTERNATIVE BSTIMATB : The alternative estimate're'flects reductions
of $.6M for FY 1990 and $265. 1M for FY 1991, and a total of $3.5
Billion in FY 1992 through FY 1995. The alternative estimate
provides funding for the CIM initiative (FY 1990, $1.7 million;
FY 1991, $50.0 million) to include contract support, travel, office
space and other support for the Executive Level Group and the
functional working groups, and initial work on the design and
development of standard systems. CIM funding of $1.2B in the
outyears is proposed to permit the design and development of
standard systems.
OOTYBAR IMPACT ;
(TOA f Dollars in Millions)
FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 1994 ' FY 1995
DoD ADP -631.0 -931.0 -949.0 -968.0
CIM +220.0 +320.0 +323.0 +329.0
TEE DEPUTY SECRETARY APPROVED n
THE ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATE ^ NOV I IS89
(
DECISION




DETAIL OF EVALUATION :
MAJOR AUTOMATED INFORMATION SYSTEMS (AISb) :
navy : - —#3^:4;!
The Navy Integrated Disbursing and Accounting Pinancial Information
Processing System (IDAFIPS) development is an example of an AIS
•that might have 'benefited' from the CIM approach. However/ IDAFIPS
has critical functional deficiencies, including non-compliance with
DoD accounting standards, and continued investments would be
inconsistent with DoD determinations to pursue functional system -
standardization and CIM. Deletion of all funds for IDAFIPS,—
effective in FY 1990, is addressed by PBD No. 045.
The Navy Personnel/Pay (PERSPAY) Follow-on program should be able
to implement the- new standard systems being created as a part of
the CIM Management Plan.; These. new systems should allow for.
limited Navy unique extensions,' and therefore only 20 percent of
the non-investment funding 'should., be required to complete.'
.
.'









The Air Force. Automated Technical Order Management System" ('AFTOM^J...
is a significant initiative and provides DoD the opportunity". to
develop a standard system.. Consistent with the current direct'!
of the AFTOMS program and the CIM concept, the Navy and Army are2to
participate in the development of functional requirements and take
advantage of AFTOMS capabilities to meet their similar needs. No
funds will be programmed or budgeted for Army or Navy for this same
function other than those funds required to implement AFTOMS.
SUMMARY OF SPBCIPIC REDUCTIONS :
' (TOA, Dollars ' in millions)
AIS Program FY 1990 FY 1991





CORPORATE IXEOJPCATIOM MANAGEMENT :
The Department:^ is. expending over $4 billion annually on development
and modernization of automated information systems. The
Alternative-iffrrbaaed on the premise that the Department can and
should defer approximately a quarter of the amounts planned for new
development, modernization or enhancement while planning for
transition to the Corporate Information Management concept.
Furthermore, as these systems are deployed, savings would result
from reduced operation and maintenance costs. The reduction is
phased over the first few years.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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DMRD Continuation Sheet
f As part of the* CIM initiative to eliminate multiple systems or
software' that meet the same functional requirements, an effort has
been established to- develop uniform and consistent information
requirements and data formats within each functional area. These
standard functional and information requirements will be used to
develop standard integrated management information systems* Funds
will be required for developing these standard systems or for
adopting an existing system that may meet, the standard information
requirements for. Departmentwide use. About a third of the
potential savings in the outyears should be held in a centrally




• »•«»••»«•«• wwa>»~*»>.w >mj({>v. <• / »»»-._.«., waa*«»i. upuwi. BUM W W*.K * SUppOL I-
for the Executive Level Group and the functional working groups (FY
1990, $1.7 million; FY 1991, $50 . million) . -CIM funding of $1.2B
in the outyears is proposed to. permit the design and development of
standard systems. .vi^s*—
..
SUMMARY (excludes reductions to aajor systems") :
* (TOA, Dollars in millions)
Service/Agency FY 1990 FY 1991 FY 1992 FY 1993 FY 199'
Army -.5 -100.0 -200.0 -300.0 -306.Q^' :-3r2r.0
Navy -.5 -100.0 -200.0 -300.0 -306.0- -312.0
Air Force -.5 -100.0 -200.0 -300.0 -306.0 -312.0
Defense Agencies -. 2 - 15.0 - 31.0 - 31.0 - 31.0 - 32.0
Total "" -1.7 -315.0 -631.0 -931.0 -949.0 -968.0
CIM (WHS) +1.7 +50.0 +220.0 +320.0 +323.0 +329.0




This article discusses the increase of CIM funding for FY
1991 resulting in CIM establishing greater control over DoD
ADP.
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The Senate's 1991 Defense
appropriations bill gives sweep-
ing power over new ADP
systems — and $1 billion to
back it up — to the Defense
Department's Corporate Infor-
mation Management program
to consolidate Defense adminis-
trative systems.
The Senate Armed Services
Committee's report on the bill
said it strongly supports con-
solidation of Defense ADP
functions and considers CIM
— headed by DOD deputy
comptroller for information
management resources Cynthia
Kendall — "an appropriate
effort for central management."
The committee directed the
services and Defense agencies
to "submit future budget re-
quests for CIM-related sys-
tems or new-start programs
through the CIM coordinator."
The order would encompass all
new ADP systems except the
Computer-Aided Acquisition
and Logistics Support (CALS)
program.
Beefing Up Central Management
The action, which was not
actively sought by the CIM
office, was one of several steps
taken by Congress to extend
or strengthen central manage-
ment of key Defense ADP
programs.
The Senate bill called for
moving all oversight of CALS
programs from the four uni-
formed services to the Office
of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense's CALS program office.
And the House version of the
appropriations bill requires use
of the Ada programming lan-
guage in all DOD ADP systems,
extending the original mandate
SEE CIM, PAGE 49
On Hold
77k Department of State Telecommunications Network is designed to connect 275 State and 50 other
foreign-affairs offices in the United States and abroad.
SENATE TRIMS NETWORK'S FUNDS, AWAITS REPORT
Intelligence Community Bucks DOSTN
By JENNIFER RICHARDSON
A fight over who should use the
$364 million Department of
State Telecommunications Net-
work (DOSTN) has led a Senate
committee to pare back funding
until State completes a report
justifying its plans for the
network.
Due for award in February,
DOSTN will upgrade State's
communications worldwide.
The prime contractor will
design an X.25 packet-
switched network that will
connect 275 State and 50 other
foreign-affairs offices in the
United States and abroad.
Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-
N.J.), a member of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, ad-
vocated expanding use of the
network to users in the intelli-
gence community, according to
a spokesman for Lautenberg.
The senator pushed for manda-
tory use of the network by
intelligence agencies for the
sake of efficiency, the spokes-
man said.
Intelligence Says 'No Thanks'
Members of the intelligence
community, in turn, contended
that DOSTN would duplicate
existing resources, according
to a spokesman for the Appro-
priations Committee's Subcom-
mittee on Commerce, State and
Judiciary.
In a series of briefings
between the Senate Appropria-
tions and Intelligence commit-
tees, "there were enough ques-
tions raised that we agreed we
should hold up funding until
we get a report from State," the
spokesman said.
In the report, State will be
required to address "the proper
mix of government-owned and
leased communications serv-
ices at diplomatic facilities
abroad and the degree to which
such systems should be inter-
operable," according to the
report, it will be budgeted for
no more than $15 million of the
$46 million it requested for
DOSTN in fiscal 1991. State
officials said the report is
unnecessary but nonetheless
will prove the need for DOSTN.
































Of U.S. Child S
By LEIGH RIVENBARK («
chij
The Department of Health and cer
Human Service's plans to oth
launch a nationwide child sup- req
port enforcement network have /
left state officials guessing not
whether the project duplicates reg
their existing systems and tior
fearing it may bleed their ace
already-scarce system fund- adn
ing. pre
HHS' Family Support Ad- sch
ministration has solicited ven- I
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SENET,
ilwork (EPLN). a 10-statc
ulhe.isicm regional child sup-
n nciwork. said EPLN is
ui|ipcd widi electronic mail
it may be able In transmit the
sc data that CSEnct would
ndlc. for example
lending EPLN
Thomas said he questioned
ly FSA apparently did not
lsider extending EPLN to
*! 40 stales not now partici-
jng. KSA would not comment
whether it had studied such
^option.
lPLN is a locator network
signed to search records of
: last addresses of fast-
ivmg parents who fail lo pay
Id support.
The network, which is based
South Carolina, provides user
tes with online access to
;h others' records, such as
partment of Motor Vehicles
IS and state employment
:ords.
As such, it is fundamentally
ercnl from CSEnci. which
essentially an information
..hange network and does not
.rch agency records.
The federal government runs
separate, national locator
item called the Federal
' ent Locator System, which
cials said would continue to
sr once CSEnct is opera-
ml.
•SA spokesman David Siegel
erred questions about
•omas' concerns to the
Enet contracting officer, who
not reply to w-ntien ques-
ts by press time.
''We cannot respond to your
•snons because we don't




:PLN began with a federal
nt in 19S5 and now operates
loth state and federal funds,
ne user states said they
come CSEnet but worry
ut its potential impact on
ir federal funding. According
CPLN documents, states pay
icrcent of their EPLN costs.
the federal government
(s up the remaining 68
;cnt.
the presence of CSEnet
ins federal funds for EPLN
cut back, some slates may
; to leave EPLN.
recent Federal Register
in on the impact of a fiscal
1 federal budget sequester




mong other cuts, the "rale
computer-related and labo-
ry expenditures would be
iced from 90 percent to 47
cut." the notice said.
SA's Sn-gcl said he could
addrr what the notice
might mean for CSEnet or
EPLN users.
David Popovich. MIS chief
for the Florida child support
enforcement office, said he
backs CSEnet as a complement
to EPLN but added that he-
needs more information from
Washington.
"We've heard several differ-
ent versions" of how much
CSEnet funding would be
state-provided and how much
would be federal, he said. "1
think that as soon as a decision
on funding is made, it needs to
be transmuted to the states for
inclusion in state budgets."
Bruce Kaspan. assistant man-
ager of Caliiomia Parent Loca-
tor Services, said California
wants CSEnci. opting not to
participate in EPLN because of
us Southeastern regional con-
centration.
"Maybe what EPLN should
focus on is an interface with
CSEnct rather than on being a
replacement for CSEnet." Kas-
pan said.
Joanne Cunningham, who su-
pervises North Carolina's
parent locator service, said the
two networks would not be
duplicates. "I'm concerned if
people are saving our network
here in the Southeast will be
duplicated by CSEnet because
it won l." she said. "We just
don't want to lose EPLN be-
cause it is a highly valuable
locator, worth us weight in
gold."
Hetty Murphy, executive di-
rector of the National Child
Support Advocacy Coalition,
which is tracking the CSEnct
procurement, said her group is
concerned that the statistics
given potential bidders in the
CSEnet RFP may be too old to
paint a realistic picture of
expected CSEnet traffic.
NCSAC has "major problems
with the quality of data and the
estimates supplied ... in the
request for proposals," Murphy
said.
She added. "This lengthy.
10-year contract, if based on
unsound data, will probably
result in unnecessary, extended
negotiations or rebidding. fur-





end servers, midrange servers
and systems and now low-end
systems." Wamer said. "There
have been procurements in the
past that we haven t bid because
we could not bid the low end."
Solboume sells its products
to the federal government
through a hosi of resellers and
integrators. Alexandria. Va -
based Computer Systems and
Resources Inc. holds the com-
pany's General Services Ad-
ministration multiple award
schedule contract. <
for using the language in
weapons systems to using it in
administrative systems as well
Some Defense executives
criticized the language
"There's been a lot of grum-
bling about the CIM provision
because it comes out of our
budgets." a senior service ADP
official said. "This is an undisci-
plined approach. How- are thev
going to manage that much
money'"
The official said his service
interpreted the bill to mean
that the majority of new DOD
ADP programs would have lo
flow through the CIM office to
receive funding and approval.
He estimated that CIM fund-
ing — which amounts to cuts
in the ADP budgets of the
individual services — would hit
the Army hardest, with that
service losing about $500 mil-
lion. The Navy would lose about
$200 million and the Air Force
and Defense agencies about
$200 million, he said
"DOD has a 1991 ADP budget
of about $9 billion," the olfiti.il
said. "That $1 billion for CIM
has to come from somewhere,
and that's the services. It means
that the ADP budget is now $8
billion for the services and SI
billion for [CIM]."
The Senate cnminitu-c's bill
would give similar sweeping
powers over CALS procure-
ments to Michael McGrath.
director of the Office of the
Secretary of Defense's CALS
policy office. Besides removing
oversight and responsibility for
CALS from the services to
central DOD management, the
committee report "directs the
services to submit future budget
requests for CALS-rclatcd sys-
tems or new-start CALS pro-
grams through the OSD/CALS
coordinator."
The report also directs OSD
to review Army, Navy, Air
Force and Defense agency
CALS programs "to determine
which projects and systems will
be selected as CALS stan-
dards."
Bob Dornan. vice president
of the research firm Federal
Sources Inc.. said he views the
creation of CIM and CALS czars
as a positive step toward
bringing strong, central organi-
zation to the services' disorgan-
ized computing systems.
"I think this is the onlv way
they can get the consolidation
job done." he said. "I'm pleased
Congress has decided to cen-
tralize control of both the
management and the money It
gives Kendall and the CALS
office the kind of backing they
need. This is an idea whose
time has come" Dornan did
question the amount of moncv
the Senate committee gave
CIM. "It boggles the mind how
thai group can manage so much
money." he S-v
'
The service ADP source said
the large amount of funding put
into CIM by the Senate Armed
Services Committee has raised
concerns at the House Appro-
priations Committee, which is
pushing lor lower initial funding
for CIM The House committee
bill backs a program that Ken-
dall has tried to keep out of
CIM the Air Force-managed
Joint Uniformed Service Tech-
nical Information System. The
"77ms is an undisci-
plined approach.
How are they going
to manage that much
money.
bill directs CIM to fund that
program to the tune of $6 5
million, "assuming that the
system can be made to conform
to the CIM process."
The House bill also gives a
strong boost to Ada. mandating
that "after June 1. 1991. all
Department of Defense soft-
ware shall be written in the
programming language Ada. in
the absence of a special exemp-
tion by an official designated
by the secretary of Defense."
The committee report said
this language "will remove any
doubt of full DOD transition lo
Ada. particularly in other,
than weapons-systems appli-
cations. It will stimulate DOD
to move forward quickly with
Ada-based software engineer-
ing education and cataloging
reuse systems." The Language
codifies policies the services
announced over the past year
requiring the use of Ada in all
new software suns.
The House committee bill
also delivered what could be the
knockout punch to AT&T Co.'s
Standard Multiuser Small Com-
puter Requirements Contract,
denying $29.1 million in funding
to Air Force Personnel Concept
111, a system AT&T once
estimated would use up to 3,000
of the 3B2 computers sold on
that contract.
The report said the commit-
tee "does not support further
deployment" of that system
because "it is only partially
developed and tested and has
not passed significant elements
of required operational tests."
Federal Sources' Doman said
this development "does not
look very promising for
AT&T.... One wonders
whether it is lack of marketing
savvy on their part or the
technology does not turn any-
body on."
Differences between the
House and Senate bills were
being resolved in conference
at press time, but Defense
officials said the policy guidance
likely would remain intact.
"There might be some rebef
on the money, but the mark on
the policy probably will stand
in conference." said one senior
service ADP official. •*
DIGITAL,
fROM PACE it
seriously in the Unix market. I
think." said Judith Hurwilz.
editor of Uini in the Other.
Using existing technology
makes this a low-investment
proposition for Digital and may
reduce some of the problems
the company has had offering
its own brand of Unix, she said.
Though the target market is
small- lo medium-sized busi-
nesses, the new computers may
appeal to smaller government
agencies, "particularly as gov-
ernment gets more budget-
conscious." IDC's Shannon said.
"I think it's good news to
federal buyers." Hurwilz said.
Using commodity products will
make the computers relatively
inexpensive.
Multiprocessing with micro-
processors is the technology of
the future because, "it makes a
lot more sense to take two of
what you've got" rather than
develop a single microproces-
sor that is twice as powerful,
she said
"You ran use two 48fis
instead of coming out with the
K.%." she "slid.
In addition. "Multiprocessing
is the first step toward parallel
processing" with smaller, less
expensive machines, she said.
DEC's basic model, with a
single processor, 209M hard
disk. 8M of memory and SCO
Unix System V operating
system, will be available early
next year for $18,400. The
processors and memory run on
Corollary's high-speed C-
bus.
"Corollary's done a really
nice job" in developing a
software implementation of
multiprocessing Unix. Hurwitz
said. The company's first prod-
ucts used both hardware and
software to achieve the same
results, she said. But potential
customers wanted lo use their
own hardware, "so Corollary




SCO Unix while providing com-
patibility (or the many applica-
tions using that version of Unix,
Corollary officials said. Using
Corollary's extensions. SCO
sells the kernel as SCO MPX.
"With the arrival of 386-and
486-based multiprocessor
PCs. at a fraction of the cost of
a minicomputer, the PC now
rises head and shoulders above
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HIIPS is designed to o/fisoiidate HUD's ADP operations agencywide and will collapse two teleprocessing
networks into one.




By ANN M. MERCIER
The Department of Housing
and Urban Development last
week awarded Martin Marietta
Corp. a $525.9 million contract
to run the HUD Integrated
Information Processing System
(HUPS), a grand-design proj-
ect to consolidate the agency's
data processing systems.
HIIPS is designed to improve
housing and financial programs
at HUD headquarters and its
81 field offices by outsourcing
the agency's entire data proc-
essing and network manage-
ment to Martin Marietta, which
will drive the programs from its
own computer center.
V3 J.3H31N0W






"HUPS sb„6uld allow us to
keep up /with technology
changes over the long haul and
provide mtiHern computer serv-
ices to HUD users through the
'90s," said Donald Demitros,
director of HUD's information
policies and systems office.
Although planning for HUPS
predated the agency's recent
financial management scandals,
the system should improve the
agency's internal controls, De-
mitros said.
By midweek, HUD is ex-
pected to meet with the winner
and the losers: Boeing Com-
puter Services Co. and Elec-
tronic Data Systems Corp. "We
believe we conducted a fair
procurement," Demitros said,
adding that Martin Marietta
scored highest on technical
merit and lowest on cost.
Boeing and EDS would not
comment on the likelihood of a
protest until after the debrief-
ing. But analysts said they
expect a losing bidder to contest
the award. "I think a protest is
virtually assured because of
[HIIPS'] size," said Jim Kerri-
gan, vice president of market
research firm Input Inc.





The HEPS award gives a boost
to Netrix Corp., a small,
Herndon, Va., firm hired by
Martin Marietta to provide
integrated switching — combin-
ing packet switching and circuit
switching in a single device.
Netrix will provide a nation-
wide #1-ISS Integrated Switch-
ing System network under the
HIIPS contract, at a value of $2
million to $3 million in initial
installations, Netrix president
and chief executive officer Char-
les Stein said.
The switching system will
use the mandatory FTS 2000
data network, with US Sprint
providing data pipes up to what
FTS 2000 calls the service
delivery points.
Just beyond that point sits the
Netrix system, providing the
bridge between the FTS 2000
service points and HUD's com-
puters.






Defense Secretary Dick Cheney
made sweeping changes in the
management of DOD informa-
tion technology, shifting re-
sponsibility for the DOD Cor-
porate Information Manage-
ment (CIM) program to Duane
Andrews, assistant secretary
of Defense for command, con-
trol, communications and intel-
ligence (ASD C3I).
Cheney directed Andrews to
set up an organization to estab-
lish CIM throughout DOD and
to submit a detailed plan within
30 days on how that will be
accomplished. Under CIM,
DOD will choose existing De-
fense administrative systems
to be standard throughout the
military.
A memo identifying what
programs have been selected
as part of the CIM initiative has
been prepared and may be
released as early as today.
Pentagon sources said.
Deputy secretary of Defense
Donald Atwood further strength-
ened the role of the ASD CI.
Atwood removed DOD under-
secretary for acquisition John
Betti from Andrews' chain of
command on CIM, directing
Andrews to report directly to
Atwood and Cheney.
Atwood also said Andrews
would "exercise authority, di-
rection and control over the
Defense Communications
Agency (DCA), the Defense
Mapping Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency and the
General Defense Intelligence
Program Staff."
Industry and service sources
said the new policies indicate
DCA will play a key role in
centralizing management of the
Pentagon's information technol-
ogy. "Cheney's memo directs
Andrews to set up an organiza-
tion to establish CIM, while the
Atwood memo gives him direct
control of the logical organiza-
SEE CIM. PAGE 4
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IC I Protests
with two companies that protested
ie Air Force's Standard Software
The General Services Administra-
ppeals withdrew its suspension of
week after R.R. Donnelly and Sons
ic. withdrew their protests. "This




:sident of Oracle Systems Corp.'s
s surfaced as the new president of
ean, Va.-based systems integrator
ining Research Corp. and Advanced
eplaces Scott Thompson, who has
more than eight years with Oracle,
e U.S. sales effort and served as
se maker's systems integration
c Systems Corp. In fact, Kennedy
acle's executives and shareholders
its first quarterly loss this fall. <
— Carolyn Duffy Marzan
Top IRM Slot
will establish a deputy assistant
ition resources management, a post
ticism of the agency's information
t filled early next year, said assistant
;tration Harry Flickinger.
he job follows repeated General
of DOJ's information systems. DOJ
ng on Capitol Hill, where the House
nvestigating Project Eagle, the
automation contract ever.
it attorney general for IRM would
unent's data centers, systems policy




out of the Justice Department, the
; will conduct a hearing this week
is by software developer Inslaw
Irive the company out of business,
first time the committee has gone
lgs, although it has been studying
han a year. But sources said the
o publicize what they called DOJ's
tion than to reveal new informa-
—Leigh Rivenbark
90 Protest Denied
f Andersen Consulting against the
tern 90 contract award to Computer
J million, System 90 is an integrated
:m that will streamline accounting
'ernment. CSC won the award in
nged Treasury's negotiations, price
and enforcement of benchmark
—Jennifer Richardson
i->ui tl ilUUOL. VJV
Conyers characterized Navy
ADP acquisition as "a process
rife with bias and favoritism"
caused by "questionable ethical
practices by both the Navy and
IBM." But "IBM appears, for
the most part, not to be
responsible for the bizarre Navy
ADP acquisition system but
merely its willing beneficiary."
"I applaud House Govern-
ment Operations for releasing
this report," one source said.
"The Navy seems to have
cleaned up its act a good bit
since the investigation began.
Operations Committee staff
member said Conyers is not
finished probing the way the
government buys computers.
"The committee will hold more
hearings in the 102nd Congress,
which begins in January."
Carl Urie, assistant director
of the General Accounting
Office's Information Technol-
ogy Division, who was on loan
to the committee for 13 months
to work on the investigation,
also said Conyers has asked
GAO to look at the process by
which GSA delegates procure-
IJUU i^OillOli
of Federal Sources Inc., a
Vienna, Va., consulting firm,
expressed surprise at the lan-
guage the subcommittee used
to describe the Navy ADP
procurement process. "It
doesn't appear that there's an
investigation going on here but
a headline-grabbing attempt."
Dornan said he agreed with
the report's conclusion that the
fault lay primarily with the
Navy, not IBM. "It would be
like me being mad at my cat for
killing mice — good ones do
that," Dornan said. •<
CIM,
FROM PAGE 1
tion for the job, DCA," said one
industry source.
DCA officials will not com-
ment on what role — if any —
the agency will play in taking
CIM from plan to reality.
But a source close to that
agency said DCA is "in the
midst of reorganizing to handle
CIM."
One industry source specu-
lated that the Pentagon may go
as far as to rename DCA the
Defense Systems Management
Agency.
The Pentagon declined to
answer any questions about the
structure and mission of the
new DOD CIM organization.
But, when asked if DCA would
assume a central role — includ-
ing running procurements — a
DOD spokeswoman said that
because the communications
agency is now under Andrews'
control, "it is entirely feasible
that certain responsibilities
could go to that organization."
The disposition of the current
CIM office, headed by deputy
DOD comptroller Cynthia Ken-
dall, is unclear, industry and
service sources said.
Some speculated that Kendall
will continue to develop stan-
dard information systems for
Andrews, while others said that
may be a task Andrews wants
to assign to his new organiza-
tion, which would build on the
spade work done by Kendall.
One service information re-
sources management official
said, "Kendall may already be
out of the loop. Andrews already
has an information systems
director, Diane Fountain, and
she would be the brical choice
t Mil
to handle CIM.
"It's possible that Andrews'
office will now handle the
selection of interim standard
information systems," one of
the key goals of Kendall's
year-long effort on COM, the
official said.
In an interview with FCW
Nov. 22, Kendall said she
planned to decide within one
month how to allocate the $1
billion Congress took out of the
services' ADP budgets because
the services and Defense agen-
cies "have a number of pro-
grams that cannot be suspended
for more than a month."
Service sources said Kendall
already has tapped several
systems as interim standards.
They include the Air Force's
Requirements Data Bank con-
tract held by BDM International
and its Depot Maintenance
Management Information
System and the Navy's Stock
Control Point and Distribution
System.
Cheney also named Andrews
chairman of the Major Auto-
mated Information Systems
Review Committee and ap-
pointed him DOD's chief infor-
mation management official.
The CIM reorganization
makes it difficult to ascertain
how DOD will grapple with
several important and pending
issues, including the disposition
of $1 billion in funds transferred
to CIM by Congress from the
armed services, said Jim Kerri-
gan, vice president of market
research firm Input Inc.
"The situation is murky right
now. All that money dropped
into CIM made them power
brokers. Obviously someone is
rethinking where the authority
and power should lie," Kerrigan
said. <
Round 2
In a Nov. 5 article, "Fed PC
Prices Leave Buyers Bewil-
dered," General Services Ad-
ministration schedule prices
for the Compaq Deskpro 386/
25 Persona] Computer were
based on out-of-date GSA
prices. Compaq Computer
Corp. revised its schedule
prices Oct. 15; FCWs report
relied on the latest GSA price
list available to us — an Aug.
1, 1990, price list that was valid
through Oct 3L
Accordingly, the current
price of the Deskpro 386/25
Model 84, configured with an
84M hard disk, 4M of
random-access memory, a
color VGA card, a color
monitor, MS-DOS and a
L44M 3V2-inch drive, would
be $6,420, not $7,482, as we
reported.
Further, Compaq is no
longer producing the 386/25.
The replacement, Compaq's
386/25e, was introduced last
January. When configured as
described above — but with
a 120M hard disk - the
386/25e Model 120 costs gov-
ernment buyers $4,875 on the
GSA schedule.
As a result, the 25 MHz
PC Compaq offers on the
schedule is priced in line with
the AST Research Inc. 386/25,
which sells for $4,940 when
similarly configured, and the
IBM Corp. Model 70 with
60M, which costs $4,598. •<
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, RICHARD A DANCA
I ow much do«t me
oeral government pay lor a PC?
ne simoiesi answer is no one
lows Buyers face too many
voices and too many variables
jr mem lo compare pnces from
e available sources
That means federal buyers can
ay anywhere from about $1,500
/ more man S7.000 to buy
ssentially the same PC. accord-
g to pnce lists FCW examined,
nich include pnces in catalogs
' several large procurements
id General Services Administra-
on schedule contracts.
For this analysis, pnces for a
.1 or 25 MHz 80386 PC with
?yboard. 4M of memory, a 1.4M
ippy drive, an BOM hard dnve.
color VGA monitor wrm required
rapiers and cables and an
S DOS operating system were
jmpared
I hit benchmark definition
based on the Unisys Corp
V2 Advanced Workstation avail
He to military buyers through
e Air Force s Desktop III con-
act This machine also has the
west price of all me machines
cammed Pnce reviews by
ihers. including Wohl Assoo-
es inc of Bala Cynwyd, Pa..
enerally include similar ma
•unes often also adding 16 and
3 MHz 386 computers.
Wnat makes the comparison
fficult is that the pnce tor a
impuier sometimes includes
'S-DOS. Microsoft Windows,
iher utility or application soft-
are a mouse or other penpher-
is and added services such as
SEE PC PRICES, MGE 57
How Much for a PC in FY 91?
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Pentagon to AxeADP Programs
CIM office examines which Defense systems to keep or kill
By BOB BREWIN
The Defense Department will
decide a month from now which
of the services' ADP programs
it will keep or kiU in the wake
of Congress' transfer of $1
billion from the services' budg-
ets to its Corporate Information
Management (CIM) streamlin-
ing initiative.
Budget negotiators gave the
CIM program — designed to
install common administrative
systems throughout DOD —
wide latitude to choose which
among the four services' ADP
programs it will expand across
the military.
f>616 V3 A3K31N0U





Cynthia Kendall, the CIM
program chief and DOD comp-
troller for information re-
sources management, said in
an interview that the net effect
of the budget action will trans-
late to fewer ADP programs,
although Congress said "no
specific service information
system program has been ter-
minated" by the transfer of
hinds.
30 Percent funding Cut
"We planned for $1.4 billion
development and moderniza-
tion funding, and this ($1 billion)
represents a 30 percent cut,"
she said. "I expect some pro-
grams will have to be termi-
nated." Kendall said the $400
million shortfall came in opera-
tions and maintenance.
The CIM staff must act
swiftly to dispose of the $1
billion now under its control
because the four services and
Defense agencies "have a
number of programs that cannot
be suspended for more than a
month," Kendall said- "We have
to continue to perform our
missions."





The Defense Department won
the battle of the budget in the
drug war, receiving slightly
more than $1 billion to distrib-
ute to various agencies and
commands. But DOD, the lead
agency for the administration's
drug detection and interdiction
efforts, was scolded by Con-
gress for not spending money
fast enough.
Congress made major com-
mitments to increased use of
aerostats radar, improved com-
munications networks, a new
center to process and combine
drug intelligence reports and a
program to develop prototype
applications of advanced detec-
tion technology.
However, the House Appro-
priations Committee expressed
deep concern about the low
spending rate by DOD of
previously appropriated funds.
In particular, the committee is
concerned that none of the $27
million budgeted for the com-
mand, control, communications
and intelligence network had
been spent.
In its new budget. Congress
attached intermediate spending
deadlines. For example, of the
$28 million for land-based
aerostats, $14 million must be
SEE DRUG KM, MGE 57
Navy Calls for Second Round
Of Companion Final Offers
By BOB BREWIN
The Navy will try one more
time to award the Standard
Desktop Companion contract
for upgrades to the 400,000-
plus PCs in the Defense
Department. The Navy called
for a second round of final
offers, due in January, from all
bidders on the original con-
tract.
The Navy said. "Declining
price trends in the ADP
industry would indicate a
significant dollar savings to
the government" over the
original $534 million value of
the contract, which has been
deadlocked by protests ever
since it was awarded to Zenith
Data Systems last November.
Also, some items in the
original Companion bids are
no longer available, the
SEE COMPANION, MGE 5?
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'RUG WAR,
M PAGE 1
•.•nt by the end of November,
also asked for a report from
)D on the expenditures from
• counterdrug budget in six
mtns.
Much of the confusion over
e spending surrounds the use
law-enforcement support
mey. said Frank Kalder,
ector of budget and legisla-
te review at the Office of
nonal Drug Control Policy
N'DCP). Last year DOD was
en S4U million to spend on
activities that support law-
rnrcemeni agencies.
We're working with De-
:se to put together a table to
i! if they spent the money. 1
n't want to sav categorically
jt they didn't spend it."
Ider said.
Because the budget language
s so tightly written. DOD
s unable to use the funds to
ppon agencies and instead
<--ni much of it on general
erdiction activities. This year
>D got S50 million for sup-
rt. and the language allows
re leeway, Kalder said.
-oad Responsibility
Congress also is concerned
ether Stephen Duncan, as-
-tant secretary of Defense for
•erve affairs, who has been
mtd coordinator for drug
inrcement policy and sup-
rt. can handle both )obs. "The
ncern is command and control
whether Mr. Duncan's re-
onsibility is already too broad
r him to be the drug coordina-
i." said a Senate Armed
mces Committee spokes-
in. "He is the senior individ-
I in DOD responsible for
inging together military
tion in the drug war."
The creation of the National
-ug Intelligence Center, which
eived $10 million in initial
nding. was requested by the
csident as a way to set
iorilies for intelligence gain-
ing, to coordinate agencywide
stem development and to
wide links for information
• im different sources.
Surrounded by controversy
im the start. NDIC sparked
action from other agencies
jt claimed the center would
plicate facilities and efforts
eady in place, such as the
Tig Enforcement Admimstra-
in's El Paso Intelligence
enter and the Federal Bureau
Investigation's National
nme Information Center.
NDIC also aroused civil liber-
os issues. "We have concerns
out aggregating data used for
w-enforcement purposes, par-
.ularly data which is compiled
r a new entity without a
early defined mission or pur-
>se." said Marc Rotenberg.
rector of the Washington.
>.C. office of Computer Pro-
ssionals for Social Responsi-
Early attempts to fund the
center in Treasury- or Justice
appropriations bills failed. In-
stead, the House Defense Ap-
propriations Committee dis-
agreed and funded NDIC in the
DOD bill "A lot of the informa-
tion and intelligence will come
from agencies within DOD. so
it seemed likely to place it
there," a committee spokesman
said.
As envisioned by DOD. NDIC
differs from the center that
Justice proposed last year. It
will be lodged in DOD as a
"separate federal agency out-
side of the military and outside
of the intelligence community,"
much like the Defense Ad-
vanced Research Projects
Agency and the Defense Map-
ping Agency, the committee
spokesman said.
To cut the cost of running the
center, the funding bill stipu-
lates that NDIC should be
located outside of Washington.
D.C. - specifically, in the
Pennsylvania district of De-
fense Subcommittee chairman
Rep. John Murtha (D-Pa.).
Murtha has chosen Johnstown.
Pa.
"We would never propose it
in Johnstown: that's pork-
barrel politics from Murtha. It's
an intelligence-gathering
center. We're not going to
employ a bunch of out-of-
work steel workers to do that."
an ONDCP spokeswoman said.
However, the Defense Ap-
propriations Committee would
"like to see the debate move
away from the pork-barrel
issue and focus more on the
project itself. After all. the idea
[for the center) came from the
administration," the committee
spokesman said. "It's going to
be in somebody's district
Ewhubnt Technologies
Congress' faith in high-tech
solutions for drug interdiction
also is represented in the
creation of a center to evaluate
and select technologies to fund
or test in the drug war.
The Counter-Drug Tech-
nology Assessment Center
(CDTAC) will perform work
now handled by the ONDCP
Science and Technology Com-
mittee, said George Heim.
executive director of the com-
mittee.
A chief scientist will head the
center, which will consist of 10
scientists and engineers.
CDTAC will be responsible for
ranking the government's tech-
nological needs for the counter-
drug initiative and for oversee-
ing and monitoring their devel-
opment.
Congress authorized a total
of $47 million for research,
development, test and evalu-
ation of new technology to be
used in the drug war. Some $6.5
million extra went to DARPA
for unspecified counlemarco-
tics research. ^
— Ltigh Rivtnbark contrib-
CIM,
The CLM office "will not be
running ADP programs per se."
she said. "We will be funding
programs the services submit-
ted in their budget requests.
The services will be carrying
them out. I'm not running
procurements."
Nevertheless, the 1991 De-
fense appropriations bill makes
Kendall, through the CLM office.
a dominant authority over future
Defense administrative sys-
tems and planning.
The bill directes "the serv-
ices and Defense agencies to
submit future budget requests
for medical, material manage-
ment logistics and other CIM-
related systems through the
CIM program director for coor-
dination and review."
The clear-cut language, and
the authority over $1 billion in
program funding, "gives Ken-
dall a lot of power," said Jim
Kerrigan, an analyst with
market research hrm Input Inc
"She has become the driving
force behind DOD ADP policy."
Bob Doman. vice president
of market research firm Federal
Sources Inc.. said Congress'
action "puts Kendall into the
ADP driver's seat. She will
decided who thrives and who
withers."
Dornan added that Kendall's
decisions on cuts will be a test
of how she can handle pressure
from the services and pressure
to reduce ADP spending. Asked
if the $400 million cut was too
much. Doman said. "CLM says
it can save money. Congress
said. 'Stan saving it now.' "
Congress gave CIM flexibil-
ity in determining which pro-
grams to fund. "This is not an
easy exerase." Kendall said.
"It's very taxing because of the
[overall) $400 million cut
"The services will get some
portion of their budgets back
but not likely all that was taken
from them." Kendall said.
Systems that Kendall said
she wants to fund are those
that can serve as interim
standard DOD systems - pro-
grams that can solve all the
services' ADP needs in particu-
lar functional areas, such as
payroll. CLM has been identify-
ing such interim systems for
the past several months, "and
we speeded that process up in
August," Kendall said.
CLM functional groups, which
are working in such areas as
payroll and medical information
systems, should select some
interim standard systems in the
next month, she said. •*
COMPANION,
FROM PAGE 1
Navy said. Federal Computer
Corp., Government Technology
Services Inc., SMS Data Prod-
ucts Group Inc. and Zenith all
competed for the contract.
Capt Thomas McQueen, com-
mander of the Navy's Automatic
Data Processing Selection
Office, said. "If the vendors get
their technicians back in the
trenches and mail their lawyers
back home, we could have an
award as early as April." <
BUDGETS,
FROM PAGE *
The Hill has been under
pressure from vendors of CD-
ROM data bases who see
Fedlog as competing with the
private sector. Reflecting the
apparent success of that pres-
sure, the DOD conference
report singles out Fedlog. "Com-
mittee members and industry
have stated concerns that the
DLA has 'overspee'ed' the
system beyond the govern-
ment's stated needs, thus limit-
ing the opportunity for industry
to respond, " the report said. *
PC PRICES,
installation or a warranty Also, a
25 MHz machine generally costs
more than a 20 MHz one. but
both versions are not available
from all vendors under contracts
or GSA schedules.
The Desktop III machine,
known as contract line-item
number (CUN) 00O2AA. has a
base once of $905 lor a 20 MHz
machine with no monitor or hard
disk. The price includes a mouse,
one parallel and two serial ports
and a SCSI adapter as well as
setup and diagnostic software for
MS-DOS. Unix and Posoc - and
a box of 10 diskettes. MS-DOS
with Windows 2.11 adds $43.
Order a 14-inch VGA color
monitor ($197), a VGA video
board ($97) and an 80M SCSI
hard disk ($293). and the total
cost lor the Desktop III system
comes to $1,535.
By contrast, the base pnee tor
a 25 MHz 02 workstation a
$2,256.16 under the Federal Avia-
tion Administration's Office Auto-
mation Technology and Services
(OATS) contract with AT&T Co.
And that price does not include
a keyboard ($51.42 extra). Add
the 1.4M floppy drive ($92). BOM
hard drive and SCSI controller
($614). VGA monitor ($294) and
DOS ($43). and the a la carte
price rises to $3,504.
But OATS otters a better bar-
gain from what the contract calls
a master CUN Under that
Professional Workstation (CUN
010-0350) has a $3,654.12 price
Buyers get those components
plus a 1.2M floppy drive, a serial
mouse, a 2.400 tut/sec modem.
cables and power conditioner.
This master CUN also includes
a lull suite of office automation
software Microsoft's Word lor
Windows, the Microsoft Excel
spreadsheet and (he Superbase
4 data base manager, which
includes business graphics.
Adding that software to a 20
MHz Desktop III machine would
cost an additional S371 , lor a total
cost of $1,906.
In addition to cost savings, an
added advantage to OATS'
master CUNs a AT&Ts assur-
ance that all the parts work
property together, said Robert F.
Koenig. OATS program director
at AT&Ts Federal Data Systems.
Of course, the contract offers
many other options
The U.S. Postal Service has a
PC contract with Sysorex Infor-
mation Systems Inc in Falls
Church, va Under that contract,
a 20 MHz Everex Step computer
with a 70M hard disk costs
$3,626: no 80M drive is available.
Sysorex recently announced a
plan that will let some USPS
employees buy the Everex ma-
chine lor similar prices
Federal buyerswho cannot buy
from large procurements can rely
on GSA schedule pnees. Based
on last year s figures, sales
leaders included Zenith Data
Systems. Compaq Computer
Corp and Government Technoi-
exdusrve contract to sell IBM
Corp. PS/2s
Zenith sells a 25 MHz 386 lor
$4,596 under its GSA schedule.
Zenrtn also holds a similar con-
tract with the Senate, as does
Compaq, which also sells to the
House of Representatives.
The Senate price for a 25 MHz
Zenith 366 is $3,399. said Glenn
Dallaire. the Senate's contract
administrator. In addition. Senate
buyers can purchase a Compaq
366/25 tor $5,600. he said. Both
computers have color VGA moni-
tors and DOS; the Zenith ma-
chine includes Windows 3 and
a mouse. In addition, making
price comparisons even more
difficult, the Senate's computers
come with free installation and a
year's maintenance, he said.
On the other side of the Capitol
,
a similarly equipped Compaq
costs $6,513. according to a price
list lor that schedule. However, a
major portion of that cost is lor
bringing the computer's memory
up to 4M. and memory prices
have been falling preap<tously.
FCW was unable to contact
anyone in the House computer
office to provide more current
figures
Compaq's GSA price would
total as much as $7,462. again
depending on memory costs
However. Compaq's base price
of $4,959 expired Oct. 31.
With GTSl's GSA pnee. an IBM
PS/2 Model 70 with a 60M hard
disk would cost $4,596. including
the VGA monitor GTSl's catalog
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APPENDIX 8
CIM STAFF GROUP INTERVIEW NOTES
This document contains the notes taken during a group
interview at the CIM office in the Pentagon.
The members of this group included the CIM Director, and
three of her senior staff members.
This interview was important so we could capture the
history and current issues affecting the CIM initiative in a
real-time manner.
The interviewers were Professor William J. Haga and James




CIM is not about consolidation, it is about standardization.
Standardization of IS organizations, purpose, principles and
missions at the DOD level across uniformed services.
Consolidation is being handled by another directorate under DOD
Deputy Comptroller Kendall.
Atwood imported the CIM standardization process from General Motors
where he was an executive.
The origin of the CIM effort was Congressional criticism of the
management of information resources and technology in DOD.
The vertical dimension of the CIM process is to assemble -- for each
of eight functional areas such as medical, financial operations,
payroll, etc. -- representatives from the uniformed services and DOD
agencies. These representatives form a working group for their
functional area. That group is to devise the ultimate vision of IS
for their functional area. And to devise an interim program to make
the transition from the agency-specific I 5 programs and systems
that now exist to the DOD—oriented ultimate vision system of the
future.
The horizontal dimension of the CIM process will integrate
across functional areas. It will integrate organizations, systems,
hardware and data structures. This is compelled by the existing and
necessary linkages between functional areas. Personnel generates the
inputs to the payroll system. That requires an integration of data
structures and systems between personnel and payroll.
While not explicit, the implicit CIM approach
to dealing with resistance and turf defense by the agencies is to
present them with a f ait-accompli that involves the loss of IS
budget beyond the threshold of organizational pain. GM officials
acknowledge the virtue of a fait accompli approach which sweeps
aside the arguments, justifications and politicking by the agencies
being forced into IS standardization. These same officials would not
disown a characterization of their approach as "railroading" the
agencies and services into CIM.
The service most given to resisting standardization is
the Air Force.
A major organizational issue is that CAM as visible, powerful,
threatening is subject to major external influences. These create a
rather dynamic climate in the CIM office. This dynamism leads to a
stream of changes in policy, goals and understandings that are the
basis of the work if the functional area working groups. CIM
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officials attempt to buffer the working groups from the whirl of
events around CAM. Given the frequency and strength of external
influences and events, these officials cannot shield the working
groups from a working environment that is unstable.
This dynamic" environment, internal buffering merits further
development int he case.
Each functional area working group is headed by a leader who is a
representative of OSD. Each group also has a deputy leader who is
also from OSD. A third member of the group leadership is a
facilitator who is from the CIM office.
Another major organizational issue is the tension between a working
group being a congress of agency delegates, advocating and defending
their employer/s home turf and the need to draw the members of each
group into a commitment to the DOD goal of a standardized,
integrated IS system portrayed in an ultimate vision.
A part of that issue is the time factor in the work of
a group. The father away is the planning horizon, the greater is the
willingness of the group to set parochial interests aside and work
creatively to develop a DOD corporate vision of IS. The closer is
the planning horizon in time, the greater is the tendency for
working group members to withdraw into turf defense. The future is
an abstraction, the near future has a greater reality and threatens
each individual group member in terms of their career interests.
Another part of the delegate meshing issue is the difference
among functional area groups. The payroll group is observed to have
a tendency to create DOD oriented corporate visions of its work. The
group working on personnel systems have a tendency to stay in their
parochial agency interests claiming that the nature of personnel
records (training, performance evaluation, schooling, recruitment,
etc) are more culture-specific to each organization and thus less
appropriate and more difficult to standardize across services.
Payroll by contrast produces a standard green paycheck that is
instrumental and neutral
.
The facilitator job in the leadership of each working group is
tasked to deal with the issue of delegation. CIM orients each new
working group member to the corporate view of IS and Information
resources
.
CIM was not a top-down effort nor a bottom-up effort.
Rather, CIM has started in the middle of the organization, that is,
at the SES level below the political appointees. This is another
interesting organizational issue: an initiative for a major overhaul
of the structure of the organization and its workings in the realm
of IS did not emanate from the top. It was not a matter of
leadership from the top.
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Part of this middle level initiative is that the average
tenure of military bosses or political appointees is 18 months. They
are too transient to originate bold initiatives.
Three extremes show up in approaches suggested for responding to
Congressional clamor for efficiency and payoff from IS:
1. Go straight for the ultimate vision without any notion
of interim systems.
2. Develop interim systems on the way to the ultimate
vision.
3. Do nothing, leave the agencies alone in regard to
developing IS.
GO STRAIGHT TO ULTIMATE VISION
PROS:
1. It takes the long strategic view, it develops the possibility
of a strategic advantage from IS.
2. Going to an ultimate, strategic vision will enable a sound
and prudent and efficient investment of DOD IT resources
which will benefit the national economy to the extent that
DOD is the biggest spender of Federal spending.
3. A long strategic view compels a corporate view of data and
an information engineering view of the uses of information
in the work of the organization.
4. Going straight to the ultimate strategic vision compels
the consideration of a wide range of solutions and
alternatives rather than seizing upon the expedient but
narrow either/or fix. It does this because the vision
provides a basis for evaluating alternatives.
5. A strategic view communicates to industrial contractors
and to our allies that we know where we are going. This
fosters a willingness on the part of contractors to risk
an investment in providing elements of what is a stable
p 1 an
.
6. Going straight for the ultimate vision avoids bogging down
in an interim system that precludes ever realizing the
strategic view.
7. A strategic plan in place allows organization to relate
its IS budget requests to a Congressional ly endorses plan.
8. A strategic plan compels allocation of dollars in a way
that supports the plan instead of piecemeal.
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9. The implementation of a strategic vision communicates that
this organization has a measure of competence in the realm
of IS.
10. A strategic vision allows an organization to resist
transient influences.
11. Without a strategic plan we don't get money from Congress
for IS because we communicate that we don't know where we
are going in the realm of IS.
12. DOD managers can contribute good ideas rather than being
in the mode of constantly and exhaustingly reacting to
transient events and influences.
CONS:
1. Past attempts at grand visions have failed. We have no
DOD track record of. implementing visions or even of
formulating them. Example: AF Advanced Logistics system in the
late 1960 's which was awarded to CDC in the early 1970, s.
2. The implementation of an ultimate vision will take a long
time.
3. The very length of the time it will take for the working
groups to develop ultimate visions (18 months to 2 years)
means a group of experts working in isolation from their
organizations. They will be developing an ideal system
while out of touch with reality.
4. The average 18-month tenure of military officers and
political appointees means that the ultimate vision will lose
steam and support with a change in administration or the
normal turnover of leaders in the DOD system.
5. When you try to implement a total system across the
services, the implementation of that system will be a
function of the implementation by the slowest user.
6. Savings from an ultimate system are far in the future;
there are no immediate, visible quick hitter results. DOD
is an organization that prizes quick hitters.
7. DOD is functionally oriented in structure. It is
inherently vertical. That is the structure that supports





1. An interim solution is like a prototype: you can test what
you're going to do by buildiTig something later.
2. Immediate needs of system are met without violating long
run objectives.
3. Keep some contractors alive now that you will need later.
4. Interim solution is the vehicle for the cultural
transition to standardized approaches to IS.
5. Keeps services from becoming so upset that they will kill
the CIM program outright.
6. User have an opportunity to adjust to what will be their
future IS environment. Going right to the full vision
system might be too big a step for many users.
7. Users learning to work with interim system is likely to
provide valuable modifications to the formulation of the
ultimate vision, modifications that will be denied by
going directly to the strategic vision.
8. The interim solution might be good enough to become the
ultimate solution.
CONS:
1. CIM will bog down in an interim system that is oriented
to expediency rather than achieving a final system that
fully realizes what could be.
2. The existing system is so bad that no interim system can
ever be a bridge to an ultimate system. Any detour to an
interim system will prevent the realization of the
ultimate vision.
3. An interim system is bound to develop a constituency that
could not be turned to an ultimate system.
DO NOTHING;
PROS:
1. It is comfortable. Its where we are now. Ws know how to
handle that.
2. Services retain control over IS that fits their unique
requirements.
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3. System complexity defies simple analysis by the CIM working
groups. Unrealized, un appreciated, unforeseen
interdependencies in IS systems will be overlooked.
4. Centralized large systems will stifle innovate efforts by
~ decentralized small groups that are essentially in
competition for resources.
5. We have a lot of new systems about to come on line. There
is a lot of automation just around the corner. CIM will
kill all of that in the name of a distant future ideal.
6. If the Soviets turn nasty again, we have a proven IS support
system infrastructure in place. This is not the time to upset
the whole system while we are trying to figure if Gorbachev
will last and perestroika is for real.
7. Bad as we are alleged to be the fact is that DOD is no
worse than that at any other organization.
8. At decentralized facilities, technical and functional
people work closely. Under a centralized approach, they
are likely to be driven apart to the detriment of the
development of systems.
CON:
1. It doesn't work now.
Alternative to interim solution:
Have users play with off shelf systems and new technology while
they await implementation of ultimate vision. Better to do this
than make a heavy commitment to a single interim solution.
This approach keeps users open-minded until ultimate vision
arrives
.
This approach also prevents premature commitment to a massive
interim solution that becomes the default substitute for a
strategic vision down the road.
Criterion for judging which systems under development will be
allowed to be completed: some percentage of the way to
completion (sunk cost rationalization). CIM still thinking
about this.
Interservice agreed upon systems already in place:
1. JUSTIS tech manual system from Air Force.
2. CALS.
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3. ADCARS technical data system and retrieval of engineering
data
.
4. DWASP warehousing system.
As soon as budget and CIM pressure for integration and
consolidation is off, these systems will dissolve and
revert to agency-specific system. Services are getting
together on systems as an expression of their good faith
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